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Abstract 
Use of social networking sites has grown exponentially over the last decade. Facebook, 
a popular social networking site, currently boasts membership of over 500 million users 
(www.facebook.com). In the present research, four studies were conducted to examine 
factors that impact on self-disclosure and privacy settings use. The primary goal for 
Studies 1 A, B and C involved developing methods for organizing and understanding the 
information that individuals disclose through social networking sites. Specifically, in 
Study 1 A, a scoring tool was developed in order to comprehensively assess the content 
of the personal profiles. In Study 1 B, grouping categories (default/standard information, 
sensitive personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information) were 
developed to examine information pertinent to identity threat, personal and group threat. 
Finally, in Study 1 C, an alternative grouping strategy was developed to include all 
information present in Facebook, organized as a function of the content that was 
presented. Overall, these studies indicated that approximately 25% of all possible 
information that could potentially be disclosed by users was disclosed. Presenting 
personal information such as gender and age was related to disclosure of other sensitive 
and highly personal information as well as greater disclosure. As age increased, the 
amount of personal information in profiles decreased. Those seeking a relationship were 
at greater risk of threat, and disclosed the greatest amount of highly sensitive and 
potentially stigmatizing information. Study 2 examined whether giving participants 
stories to read that did or did not alert participants to potential dangers of disclosure and 
the media context (electronic or hard copy formats) impacted on disclosure and privacy 
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settings use. In addition, the predictive power of gender and the virtual other (the 
audience in mind) was also examined. Females disclosed less sensitive information than 
males after reading a personal privacy invasion story. Disclosure was less when the 
target for whom the information was being posted was the same gender as the 
participant, and more when the target was the opposite gender of the participant. 
Disclosure of specific content areas also differed by gender of the discloser. Only 20.3% 
of participants employed privacy settings. When a virtual audience consisting of 
referents other than friends or the self was in mind, use of privacy settings increased. 
Lastly, participants who filled out Facebook profiles on paper-and-pencil disclosed more 
as compared to their online Facebook counterparts. Overall, these findings shed light on 
some of the factors that may be related to over-disclosure, and help to identify those 
users who are at particular risk when online. In addition, these studies examined a 
relatively novel but highly important area, privacy settings and the factors that relate to 
use. The notion of the virtual other is one that demands further examination and may 
prove useful in understanding how and why people choose to share highly personal 
information online, and most importantly, employ privacy settings. 
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To tell or not to tell: Predictors of Disclosure and Privacy Settings Usage in an Online 
Social Networking Site (Facebook). 
"Hike Facebook because I can post 
things about myself and also see what other 
people have posted" (female, 23) 
Throughout history, technological advancements have changed the nature of 
social communication. Before the age of the telephone, people corresponded either face-
to-face, or through written letters. With the advent of the telephone, people were able to 
communicate across long distances, and could exchange verbal messages virtually 
instantly. Over the last few decades, with the advent of the Internet, social 
communication has gone through yet another transformation. Email, instant messaging 
(IM, MSN) and online profile sites have become a quick and easy mode for 
communicating with close friends and strangers alike. The Canadian Internet Survey 
conducted in 2009 asked 23,000 Canadians about their Internet use. Results reported that 
21.7 million Canadian households (80%) were connected to the Internet and reported 
using it for personal reasons. When frequency of Internet use per day was examined, 
results revealed that 3/4 of the population used the Internet every day. Eighty-one percent 
of men and 80% of women used the Internet in 2009. When asked about specific use of 
the Internet, approximately 7 out of every 10 users resorted to using the Internet for 
information seeking (e.g., reading the news, searching for health information) and online 
banking. The top reason for going online in 2009 was for social communication purposes, 
specifically for accessing email (91%). Interestingly, those who had been using the 
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Internet for more than five years were less likely to be concerned about online security. 
As the popularity of the Internet continues to grow, researchers may expect to see a 
continued increase in the frequency of online social interaction. Even more, as popularity 
with online media increase, it is possible that the ease with which users can communicate 
coupled with a growing familiarity with technology may contribute to drastic reductions 
in the use of more traditional forms of communication, including the telephone and 
written letters. How people are using this technology, and how the online social context 
differs from offline interaction warrants investigation. The concomitant arrival of 
wireless technology has made the possibility of online communication even more 
prevalent by increasing the opportunity for connection (Internet World Stats: Usage and 
Population Statistics, 2010). Wireless connection to the Internet can be attained remotely 
(from any location) that provides a wireless router. Plugging in a cord to access the 
Internet is no longer required to connect. 
It has been proposed that the Internet operates as a powerful 'Triple A Engine', 
consisting of accessibility (anytime, anywhere), affordability (most sites allow for free 
use), and anonymity (the ability to protect one's identity) (Cooper, Shapiro & Powers, 
1998). This combination of factors makes the Internet a very appealing outlet for social 
communication. Given the prevalence of computer technology in society and the 
opportunities it affords for social interaction, it is important to understand the unique 
role that computers may have in social communication. The present research is a first 
step to understanding the role computer technology, and more specifically online social 
networking plays in social interaction. More specifically, the present research examines 
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variables that might impact on disclosure online as well as use of privacy settings in 
social networking profiles. 
What are Social Networking Sites? 
Social networking sites (SNSs) (e.g., Facebook) are web-based social 
communication tools designed to allow users to contact and communicate with other 
users. The three key features that define SNSs according to Boyd and Ellison (2007) are 
that the sites "allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a 
bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, 
and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system" (pg. 2). Personal web-pages and online profile networks have emerged at an 
increasing rate on SNSs and continue to gain popularity (Yum, 2007). 
Why Do People Use Social Networking Sites? 
Researchers have started to examine how and why people are drawn to SNSs and 
social media platforms. Research examining Facebook, for example, has identified 
multiple reasons that explain why users establish and maintain personal profiles 
including: interconnection and the desire to bridge offline and online relationships (Boyd 
& Ellison, 2007), maintenance of existing offline friendships (Ellison, Steinfield, & 
Lampe, 2007; Lenhart & Madden, 2007; Madge, Meeks, Wellens, & Hooley, 2009; 
Wiley & Sisson, 2006), identity formation (Selwyn, 2009; Stutzman, 2006; Valkenburg, 
Schouten, & Peter, 2005) self-expression and self-disclosure (Wiley & Sisson, 2006), and 
"lurking" or browsing information of other users (Pempek, Yermolayeva, & Calvert, 
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2009). Additionally, SNSs allow users to express themselves openly and freely, and in 
fact, encourage just that. 
Although SNSs may represent potentially new learning tools, their introduction 
requires careful consideration in order to avoid pitfalls that could lead to vulnerabilities 
for the user. Access, information, building relationships and sharing with others are the 
hallmarks of social network sites. By simply typing in a person's name, an abundance of 
information can be accessed, ranging from relatively benign pieces of personal details 
such as favorite quotes, to highly personal pieces of information including profile 
pictures, home addresses and birth dates. 
Users may not consider the implications of their disclosures online, and may not 
realize that they can put themselves and others at risk either directly or indirectly by 
sharing information in an open forum. The very openness, connectedness and 
accessibility offered through SNSs have the potential to place users at risk, but the sites 
also have mechanisms to minimize risks. The following sections will describe a popular 
SNS (Facebook) and identify the pitfalls associated with use of SNSs. 
What is "Facebook"? 
Facebook, founded in 2004, was originally designed as a SNS for students at 
Harvard University. Its popularity has grown immensely and expanded beyond the initial 
Harvard setting with the potential to include anyone anywhere in the world who is older 
than 13 years of age. Facebook currently has over 500 million active users and as such is 
the leading social network site in the world. The infrastructure of Facebook is comprised 
of a variety of networks. Each network represents a company, school (e.g., 
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university/college) or geographical region (e.g., city, state, or province). Individuals 
create a profile within one network. Creation of an account is necessary for membership 
and requires that the user provide basic information including a valid email address, as 
well as identify a gender, and provide a birth date. Once a member, users can create a 
personal profile for themselves which may include information such as their age, gender, 
personal preferences, and location. They can also upload pictures, describe interests, 
education, relationships, and more. Facebook offers users the opportunity to search for 
friends by typing their names into the search bar (these can be actual friends, 
acquaintances or even strangers), and add them to their "friends list". Users can interact 
with one another either through a personal message, similar to an email inbox, or by 
posting more public messages on the profile wall, a feature similar to a bulletin board. 
Another attractive feature of Facebook is the capacity to create and join groups that may 
be based on similar interests, mutual causes, or are simply for fun. For a complete 
glossary of Facebook terms, refer to Appendix A. 
What are the Associated Risks with SNSs? 
When users initially sign up for a Facebook account, they are required to provide 
at least a few personal details (e.g., date of joining, birth date, email address and name). 
Once a member, many users go beyond just the bare minimum and provide a wide variety 
of personal information in their profiles (e.g., location, mobile phone number, sexual 
orientation, personal photos). The default setting for a new profile allows public access to 
any other user within the new user's specified network. As well, the new user's profile is 
accessible to the friends of all the other users within their network. Given that users are 
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providing sensitive information online, they may place themselves at considerable risk. 
For example, Facebook users may subject themselves to potential embarrassment, 
identity theft, "lurking" or stalking by other users, and blackmailing (Gross & Acquisti, 
2005). 
Just How Serious Can Over-Disclosure of Personal Details Be? 
In some cases, Facebook users have posted directions to personal residences and 
cottages along with wall updates notifying others that they are out of town for the 
weekend - providing an open invitation to thieves to come over to an empty, 
unsupervised house. During a two month-long investigation that tracked more than a 
dozen Canadians through their open social-networking profiles, a reporter for a national 
newspaper, "The Globe and Mail", built profiles for individual users (Hartley, 2008). 
Here are examples of some of the information extracted about individual users: 
"A 24-year-old Calgary woman posts her cell phone number, e-mail address, and 
the name of the Kelowna motel where she and three of her friends will spend a 
June weekend partying. In addition to nicknaming the event the "Erotic Party," 
the women joke about finding "some hot men to buy us dinner and drinks." 
"A Toronto teen posts comments about her favourite sexual positions; a 24-year-
old Saskatchewan man posts details for a huge house party he plans to hold while 
his parents are out of town." 
The reporter went on to explain that while some of these stand alone details may 
not amount to much, through use of freely available web tools including directory 
searches (e.g., Canada411) and Google (e.g., using the reverse phone search on 
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Canada411), other users could easily look up related personal information, including 
home addresses and directions to personal residences. In one instance, the reporter even 
went so far as to meet up with a 17 year old female, whose profile he found on Facebook. 
The teenager's cell phone number was posted on her open Facebook profile, and this is 
how he contacted her. After agreeing to meet, he showed her the profile he had 
constructed for her based on information she had posted, including, but not limited to, 
where she lived, where she worked, her home and cell phone numbers, and her birth date. 
Defining Self-Disclosure 
Self-disclosure generally refers to any message conveyed about the individual, 
and can be subdivided into various types. First, there are two broad categories of self-
disclosure that describe the statements made by an individual in terms of descriptive or 
affective content. Self-disclosure that consists of general facts about a person, such as 
"My favorite colour is blue", or "My family comes from Germany" is called descriptive 
self-disclosure (Derlega, Metts, Petronio & Margulis, 1993). Messages that convey 
expressions about feelings and opinions are called evaluative self-disclosures and 
include statements such as "I hate writing exams", or "I feel angry that you said that to 
me". Aside from the two broad categories of self-disclosure, it is also useful to 
distinguish the type self-disclosure based on the referent, that is, whether the disclosure 
involves divulging information about one's relationships and interactions with others 
{relational self-disclosure) or information about oneself {personal self-disclosure). 
Relational self-disclosure has been the main focus of self-disclosure research 
(e.g., Levesque, Steciuk & Ledley, 2002). This form of self-disclosure has been deemed 
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particularly salient in close relationships as it may have a very beneficial role in 
relationship maintenance. For example, when romantic couples are able to talk to one 
another about the status of a relationship it may help the couple deal with conflict 
(Waring, 1987). In comparison to research examining relational self-disclosure, no 
known studies have looked at self-disclosure online from a personal standpoint where 
disclosure occurs without the expectation of interaction. The relative lack of literature 
exploring personal self-disclosure calls for examination of this less researched form of 
communication. 
The act of self-disclosing is a key component of close relationship formation and 
maintenance (Altaian & Taylor, 1973). Many things can affect what information is 
disclosed and for whom it is disclosed. Both theory and research on self-disclosure have 
attempted to identify variables which impact on what is disclosed, how much is 
disclosed, and who is the recipient of disclosure, including: gender differences (e.g., 
Derlega & Chaikin, 1976; Dindia & Allen, 1992), and trust (Wheeless, 1978; Wheeless & 
Grotz, 1977). 
Gender Differences in Self-Disclosure 
A large body of research has examined how males and females differ in terms of 
self-disclosure. Effect sizes from a meta-analysis of gender differences in self-disclosure 
conducted by Dindia and Allen (1992) revealed that, in general, females disclosed more 
information about themselves than did males. In addition, when compared to their male 
counterparts, females disclosed more to strangers. Moreover, same-sex and opposite sex 
dyadic interactions showed that female-female disclosure was the highest and male-male 
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disclosure was the lowest, with male-female disclosure in the middle. In line with 
reciprocity theory, it was speculated that these results occurred because of more female 
and less male disclosure overall, thus canceling out the polar effects, and resulting in 
moderate disclosure. That is, while females disclose more, and males disclose less, 
partners either encouraged or discouraged disclosure, resulting in the observed moderate 
level of overall disclosure. 
Early psychologists attributed these gender differences in self-disclosure to sex 
roles, such that males were expected to be emotionally unexpressive and females were 
taught to be emotionally expressive (Derlega & Chaikin, 1976), thus encouraging 
differential levels of disclosure as a function of gender. In the case of self-disclosure, it 
would not be appropriate or acceptable for a man to disclose intimate details about the 
self, without fear of rejection or social disapproval from peers and/or strangers. 
Researchers even went so far as to imply that men who exhibited higher levels of self-
disclosure were less psychologically stable (Derlega & Chaikin, 1976) due to the conflict 
between gender role expectations and behaviours. 
Perhaps males may not be as expressive emotionally as females in everyday 
conversation, but they may still be inclined to disclose. It is possible that this disclosure 
may be content-dependent. Men may be comfortable talking about topics related to 
popular activities and less feminine activities such as sports or even on more taboo topics 
including sexuality. For example, men felt more positive about sexual material, and were 
also more likely to seek out this material (Nosko, Wood, & Desmarais, 2007). It is 
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proposed that disclosure by males may be topic dependent (Derlega, Durham, Gockel & 
Sholis, 1981), especially in settings where there are fewer social pressures (e.g., online). 
Disclosure and Trust 
Trust plays an important role in self-disclosure. Early work examined and 
conceptualized trust in several ways including situations that require trust in order to 
achieve mutual goals (e.g., Giffin, 1967); risky behaviours which indicate trust (e.g., 
Pearce, 1974); and positive perceptions of those who are trustworthy (e.g., Giffin, 1967, 
Wheeless & Grotz, 1977). Revealing personal information can be seen as a risky 
behaviour in many situations. When personal information is offered to someone, the 
threat of exposure or unwanted revelation of intimate details to a public audience is ever-
present. In order for people to feel comfortable disclosing, they need to feel as though 
they can trust the receiver of their disclosure. Self-disclosure, therefore, may be a 
behavioural indicator of trust, whereby the more trustworthy someone is perceived to be, 
the greater the likelihood of that person receiving intimate disclosures. This same 
phenomenon may occur online where, instead of a person being perceived as trustworthy, 
the system (i.e., the Internet) or a specific site is perceived as trustworthy, thus 
encouraging greater self-disclosure. 
Impact of Vivid Stories 
Aside from gender and trust, it is suggested that anecdotal stories may also play a 
role in disclosure. Various studies in the area of decision making have noted the powerful 
influence of anecdotal stories (de Wit, Das, &Vet, 2008; Fagerlin, Wang & Ubel, 2005; 
Hamill, Stanovich, 2009; Wilson, & Nisbett, 1980). Not only do vivid anecdotes engage 
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learners, but they increase meaning making (Bruner, 1996). While this can be seen as 
beneficial in certain cases, an affinity for stories can sometimes lead to the disregard of 
more reliable and accurate sources, including statistical and legal information (Stanovich, 
2009). In the case of disclosure, it is suggested that the impact of a vivid anecdote about 
the potential consequences of disclosing personal details may encourage greater vigilance 
when disclosing. Moreover, because personal accounts are such powerfully persuasive 
tools, vivid anecdotal stories may also overshadow the impact of more formal legal 
documents, and may be more likely to impact on disclosure than formal privacy policies. 
Self-Presentation (Impression Management) 
Self-presentation is defined as a form of self-impression management and positive 
display of personal details (Goffman, 1959). Goffman (1959) originally developed a 
theory of self-presentation to explicate people's self-disclosure motives. Social life, 
according to Goffman's theory, is described as a multi-staged drama that highlights the 
actor-audience relationship. Strategic manipulation of presented information in this 
"drama" occurs in two ways, through information given (e.g., verbal communication) and 
information given off (e.g., non-verbal cues such as body language). The interaction 
between actor (presenter of information) and audience (the receiver of information) 
occurs based on the agreement that each person will accept the information revealed by 
the other, and will react accordingly to the information presented. Goffman posited that 
people assume their audiences will take seriously the self that is presented to them, and 
by extension, the impressions formed as a function of the presented information. 
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Goffman went on to identify various components of self-presentation. He asserted 
that the performance by an individual that is consistent and strong enough to influence 
the observers is called the 'front'. Moreover, the setting, or the items that are most 
commonly associated with a particular individual (e.g., gender, race, physical features, 
habits) are part of the overarching concept of the 'front'. The actor can manipulate how 
these features are displayed, and by extension, alter their performance to fit their 
audiences' expectations. 
Self-presentation theory posits that social interaction is a dramatization and 
people are inclined to present themselves in an idealized way. What people choose to 
present to others may be dictated by their particular society, and often reflects or 
exemplifies the more desirable qualities of that particular culture. Goffman distinguished 
this idealized self, and called it our "social self. In comparison to our "flawed" or 
"realistic" self, in which we express genuine qualities (both positive and negative) and 
exhibit more variability in our behaviour, the "social self tends to adhere more strictly to 
a set of consistent and desirable behavioural patterns. People present different variations 
of their "social self depending on the social context and their interaction partners. In the 
case of online communication, where non-verbal cues are lacking, the opportunity to 
present an "idealized self or the "social self may be even greater (Cornwell & 
Lundgren, 2001; Walther, 1996). With fewer cues to base impressions on, there may be 
more room for misinterpretation, and for exploitation of desirable characteristics on the 
part of the user/actor. In the case of online profiles, users may take full advantage of the 
limited interactive aspect, and display highly idealized aspects of the self. 
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Self-Disclosure and Self-Presentation 
Self-disclosure often occurs in tandem with self-presentation, and both processes 
are important in relationship development offline (Taylor & Altman, 1987). People have 
the desire to present themselves in a way that is seen as positive (Godfrey, Jones & Lord, 
1986), and tend to display or convey their best qualities (e.g., best characteristics or most 
admirable accomplishments), while avoiding presenting aspects of the self that may be 
seen as less desirable, especially in the case of initial relationship development. Even 
when interacting with strangers, people engage in self-enhancement (Schlenker & 
Pontari, 2000). As choices are made about which self-relevant details to present, levels of 
self-disclosure are adjusted to match the guidelines of what is acceptable as set out by 
society or the situation. These processes are crucial during initial social encounters, 
because this information is used by interaction partners to determine whether or not to 
pursue and/or maintain the relationship (Derlega, Winstead, Wong, & Greenspan, 1987). 
While these two terms are related and important components of relationship formation, 
they are not interchangeable (Schlenker, 1986). Self-disclosure is primarily used to 
explain relationship formation, whereas self-presentation applies more generally to the 
strategic presentations of self-relevant details, in spite of a relationship context. 
Theories of Self-Disclosure: Social Exchange & Social Penetration, Reciprocity, 
and Social Information Processing Theory 
Several theories have been derived with the purpose of characterizing and 
clarifying the self-disclosure process. Specifically, four theories will be addressed in the 
following sections, including social exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), social 
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penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973), the reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 1960), and 
social information processing (Walther, 1992). 
Social Exchange Theory 
Social exchange theory is based on the exchange of social and material resources, 
and lies at the heart of social interaction. Social exchange theory can be applied to self-
disclosure by highlighting the reward/cost aspect of self-disclosing. Generally, 
relationships proceed from non-intimate to more intimate interactions (e.g., verbal and 
non-verbal communication and mutual activities) and are determined by the rewards and 
costs associated with past, present and future exchanges (Altman & Taylor, 1973). For 
example, when considering whether or not to develop a close relationship with another 
person, people may be inclined to assess what is being put into the relationship, and what 
is gained from being in the relationship. For the most part, people aim to maximize the 
benefits and minimize the costs associated with close relationships. When the benefits 
outweigh the costs associated with a particular relationship, then people may be more 
inclined to develop a close relationship and, by extension, may be more likely to disclose 
personal details. As people invest more into close relationships, disclosure increases and 
the relationship grows. 
Social Penetration Theory 
Similarly, social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973) focuses on 
reward/cost and how this affects the acquaintance process or "getting to know" process. 
This theory takes into account the joint effects of verbal as well as non-verbal 
interactions, and stipulates that there is a gradual, orderly process by which relationships 
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are formed. If this process is disrupted, relationships may suffer (e.g. too much disclosure 
initially may result in dislike). Social penetration theory consists of five stages that 
progressively increase in intimacy: the orientation stage; the exploratory affective stage; 
the affective stage; the stable stage; and the depenetration stage. In the first stage of this 
theory, the orientation stage, people are more cautious about the types of information 
they divulge. Typically, small talk occurs, whereby partners exchange trivial personal 
details, and generally adhere to socially acceptable disclosure. In the exploratory affective 
stage, people begin to express basic opinions (e.g., their political opinions) and continue 
to disclose increasingly more personal details. At this stage, interaction partners are still 
concerned with acting in socially desirable ways, and are not fully comfortable exposing 
themselves completely to their partner. This stage generally encompasses casual 
relationships. In the affective stage, more intimate details are discussed. People may 
disclose personal information to their partner, and discussions and disagreements may 
arise. In the stable stage, partners are able to fully disclose intimate personal information, 
and can often predict how their partner will react to the information received. At this 
point, the social relationship plateaus. In the last stage of the theory, or the depenetration 
stage, relationship dissolution may or may not occur. The costs begin to outweigh the 
benefits associated with the relationship, and partners are faced with the choice of 
whether or not to terminate the relationship. 
The Reciprocity Norm 
In addition to social exchange and social penetration theory, norms outlining 
expected behaviour impact on personal information exchange. Research suggests that 
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self-disclosure operates according to what Gouldner (1960) originally termed 'the norm 
of reciprocity' (Jourard, 1959; Jourard & Landsman, 1960). The norm of reciprocity 
stipulates that people feel obligated to comparably return the services given to them by 
others. These services can come in the form of various things, including favours and self-
disclosure. Reciprocity of self-disclosure, in particular, refers to the expectation that 
disclosure will be returned at a comparable level of intimacy. A study investigating this 
phenomenon conducted by Chaikin and Derlega (1974), involved showing participants 
videos of two women having a conversation. One woman was the initiator (she started 
the conversation) and the other was the respondent. The intimacy level (either high or 
low) of the initiators' disclosure was manipulated, and participants' ratings of liking for 
the respondent in the videos were then assessed according to intimacy levels. Results 
showed that liking was influenced by the norm of reciprocity, in that respondents who 
disclosed at similar levels of intimacy were better liked by participants than those who 
responded with a discrepant level of intimacy. It appears that perceptions of self-
disclosure may be heavily influenced by social norms, and that people may feel they are 
obligated to return the favour of disclosure. Not only do people feel the need to 
reciprocate disclosure, but this disclosure is expected to occur at similar intimacy levels. 
Social Information Processing (SIP) Theory 
Walther (1992) originally developed the Social Information Processing (SIP) 
theory of computer mediated exchange, which outlines the extent to which people gain 
information through social communication, and how people use this information to 
establish impressions of others. He proposed that getting to know someone is based on a 
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small initial amount of information in text based form, and that relationships develop to 
the extent that there is information first available. Walther developed this theory to clarify 
the mechanisms of social interaction online, and went on to explore how one uses the 
initial available information to develop first impressions in online settings. He argued that 
while there is a lack of non-verbal cues in computer-mediated communication, this does 
not necessarily imply that online relationships are any less meaningful or strong as 
relationships offline. 
People are still able to get to know someone based on the verbal cues available 
online. Walther (1996) suggested that people are inherently good at assessing both verbal 
and non-verbal cues, and that people can establish affinity (liking) for their online 
partner, regardless of the lack of non-verbal cues (e.g., gestures). Walther asserted that 
while computer-mediated relationships develop at a slower pace, they are equally as 
strong as offline relationships. 
The anticipation of future interaction is another important component of this 
theory, as this motivates people to be more intimate in their disclosures online. For 
example, people who expect to meet their online partner at some point in the future may 
be more likely to exchange more relational messages with their partner (Walther, 1996), 
and motivate people to further develop their relationships. 
Social exchange theory, social penetration theory and the reciprocity norm 
attempt to explain establishment of relationships, however they do not necessarily take 
into account relationships that are already formed and how these existing relationships 
function over time. In addition, because these theories for the most part are meant to 
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explicate social communication offline, they may not map as easily onto online social 
interaction, and, more specifically, personal self-disclosure online. 
The Shift in Social Communication 
With the shift in social communication from face-to-face interaction to online 
communication, theorists have sought to extend their current knowledge of standard 
theory in offline contexts to an online setting. Walther's (1996) attempt to apply offline 
theory to online relationship formation resulted in the formation of the online hyper-
personal theory. In the following sections, his theory will be reviewed and the 
implications of existing research in an online context will be explored. 
Online Hyper-personal Theory 
Following from social information processing theory, Walther (1996) established 
the hyper-personal theory of online relationship formation. Walther coined this "hyper-
personal" because he noted that, in several instances, communication online could 
surpass the level of intimacy found in parallel face-to-face interactions. This theory 
applies to relationships formed and maintained solely online, and focuses on electronic 
communication that is devoted to social or recreational interaction (e.g., chat rooms, 
social networking). Despite the argument that offline relationships are far more intimate 
and of a higher subjective quality than online relationships (Sproull & Keisler, 1986), 
Walther argued that online relationships are at least just as, and in some cases more 
intimate than relationships offline. 
Walther noted that "selective self-presentation" may occur online, whereby 
senders of information online may opt to convey more favorable aspects of the self. He 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
identified two elements common in online interaction that may enhance self-presentation: 
asynchronous communication and reduced cues. 
Asynchronous time (where there is time lag in between messages) allows for 
careful planning of communication, unlike spontaneous talk where responses are 
expected almost immediately following the delivery of a message. Walther argued that 
this form of communication is more relaxed, and thus allows for more efficient allocation 
of cognitive resources. He cites Ochs's work (1979) on discourse and goes on to assert 
that "asynchronous verbal communication is more inter-subjective and less egocentric 
than in unplanned (spontaneous) discourse (Walther, 1996, p. 26). In essence, Walther 
argued that asynchronous communication may be more socially desirable and effective. 
Walther posited that first impressions are highly controlled and manageable in 
online communication. Because information is conveyed verbally in most cases and often 
lacks physical cues that users cannot otherwise control, editing and self-censorship occurs 
more often. As a result, the receiver of the information may over-attribute the reduced 
cues provided by the sender, and form a more positive image of their partner (Spears & 
Lea, 1992). Walther explained that this "over-attribution" occurs when the receiver of 
information builds stereotypical impressions of the partner. Given minimal amounts of 
information to base impressions on, receivers over-rely on verbal cues in the absence of 
physical ones, and may idealize the interaction partner. 
While this may seem detrimental to relationship formation, Walther concluded 
that hyper-personal interaction has the potential to be highly rewarding. Quoting 
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Schlenker (1985), "People are more satisfied in particular relationships and situations to 
the extent that their desired identity images are supported, validated or elicited" (p. 93). 
Disclosure on the Internet 
While the majority of studies in this area have focused on self-disclosure in face-
to-face contexts (i.e., interviews and case studies), fewer investigations have examined 
the mechanisms and predictors of self-disclosure in different media contexts (e.g., online, 
computer-mediated communication). Over the last few years, only a small number of 
studies have emerged investigating how context plays a role in self-disclosure (e.g., 
Joinson, 2001; Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Tidwell & Walther, 2002). In order to test this 
assumption, Joinson (2001) compared levels of self-disclosure in computer-mediated and 
face-to-face contexts. In addition, visual anonymity and self-awareness were examined as 
potential predictors of self-disclosure. In Study 1, participants were paired up and were 
instructed to discuss dilemmas either in a chat room or laboratory face-to-face setting. As 
expected, participants in the computer-mediated communication setting disclosed more 
spontaneous personal details (i.e., details about themselves) than those in the face-to-face 
condition. In Study 2, the same dilemmas and procedure were employed, and a visual 
anonymity factor was included. To achieve visual identification or visual anonymity, half 
of the participants were shown a video picture of their discussion partner, and half were 
not. Results revealed that visual anonymity (i.e., no video image of interaction partner) 
encouraged higher levels of self-disclosure. 
Joinson went on to manipulate levels of private and public self-awareness (high 
and low). For private self-awareness, video images were transmitted to the participant so 
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that they were either able to see themselves (high private self-awareness) or a 
"Simpson's" episode (low private self-awareness) displayed on the screen. For high 
public self-awareness, participants walked down a well lit hallway and were seated facing 
two video cameras, encouraging a sense of reduced anonymity. For low public self-
awareness, participants walked down a dark hallway to the study room, and sat in a 
cubicle with no video cameras, encouraging a sense of anonymity. As anticipated, 
induced high private self-awareness combined with induced low public self-awareness 
resulted in the highest levels of spontaneous self-disclosure when compared to low 
private/low public and high private/high public conditions. This study stresses how 
situations that encourage salient private selves (i.e., high private self-awareness) and 
lessened public selves (i.e., low public self-awareness) result in increases in self-
disclosure. More recent examination of computer mediated communication, in particular 
instant messaging (IM), showed that even non-anonymous communication (i.e., where 
public selves are known) online encouraged self-disclosure (Schouten & Valkenburg, 
2007). 
Tidwell and Walther (2002) looked at the effects of computer-mediated 
communication on self-disclosure, impressions formed about interaction partners, and 
evaluations of interaction partners. Similarly to Joinson's study (2001), participants were 
assigned to either a face-to-face meeting, or a meeting through use of an email system 
(i.e., they sent email messages back and forth). Results showed that computer-mediated 
communication participants used more interactive questions and self-disclosed more than 
did their face-to-face counterparts. In addition, computer-mediated communication users 
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asked and offered more intimate details. In terms of impressions and evaluations, face-to-
face participants initially felt more confident in their partner attributions (i.e., how well 
they felt they knew their partner) than computer-mediated communication participants, 
but by the end of the conversation, this difference had disappeared. It could be that 
initially, face-to-face participants feel more confident in their attributions due to the 
added benefit of physical cues. As conversations progress, computer-mediated 
communication users ended up feeling equally as confident in their impressions of their 
partners, even despite the lack of visual/physical cues, lending support to Walther's 
theory of online hyper-personal communication. Even despite suggestions that online 
relationships were not as strong, and that interaction partners online were not able to 'get 
to know' their partners as well without other more visual or physical cues, these findings 
imply that the online medium is equally as effective for forming close bonds and positive 
impressions of interaction partners as offline interactions. 
The combined results of studies investigating online interactions highlight how 
interpersonal communication and self-disclosure may change as a function of whether the 
interaction takes place online or offline (e.g., Joinson, 2001; Locke & Gilbert, 1995; 
Tidwell & Walther, 2002). While offering insight into communication online (e.g., email, 
instant messaging, chat rooms), studies looked at the quantity of information presented 
and not the specific content, such that they reported how much people disclose, but not 
on which topics they disclose. For instance, Tidwell and Walther used the proportion of 
conversations, not the specific topics, to obtain a gauge of how much self-disclosure 
resulted in each group. In Joinson's (2001) study, intimate conversations were examined, 
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but were not coded for types of disclosure. Locke and Gilbert (1995) compared 
perceptions of sensitivity of material, self-disclosure, comfort, and enjoyment across 
contexts (online versus paper-and-pencil), but did not analyze specific responses. The 
next step in self-disclosure research is to compare how traditional (paper-and-pencil) and 
new media contexts (e.g., Facebook) affect people's decisions about how and, more 
importantly, what to disclose or, in other words, which topics in particular people are 
choosing to share with others. Moreover, in the case of online social networking profiles, 
a large majority of disclosure is presented by users without the expectation of interaction, 
such that details are simply displayed for others to view. Therefore, examination of 
information broadcasted about the self, rather than interactive information sharing where 
feedback and reciprocal communication is expected merits examination. The Internet 
offers an anonymous forum for personal communication and, as the Internet becomes an 
omnipresent aspect of interpersonal communication, we may expect to see an increase in 
self-disclosure patterns for online contexts (e.g., Henderson & Gilding, 2004). 
Personality and Online Communication 
Associations between various personality factors and online communication are 
mixed (Amichai-Hamburger, Wainpel & Fox, 2002; Ross, Orr, Sisic, Arseneault, 
Simmering & Orr, 2009; Swickert, Hittner, Harris & Herring, 2002). In most cases, 
studies have employed the Five Factor Model (McCrae, 1992) of personality to examine 
how various personality traits are related to patterns of technology use and disclosure 
online. Findings revealed that those with higher scores on neuroticism tended to use the 
internet more to avoid loneliness (Butt & Phillips, 2002). Researchers suggest that 
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because these individuals reported lower levels of social support, they may have resorted 
to online activities to achieve an unfulfilled need with hopes of obtaining support through 
online interactions. Conscientiousness was negatively related to online communication 
(Swickert, Hittner, Harris & Herring, 2002). This relationship was explained by a reduced 
desire to procrastinate, and thus, an active avoidance of distracting tools including online 
social networking sites. Those scoring higher on extraversion were less likely than their 
more introverted (lower on extraversion) counterparts to engage in online communication 
(Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel & Fox, 2002). Amichai-Hamburger and colleagues 
(2002) argue that this pattern is dependent on the location in which a person perceives 
their true identity. They suggest that for those scoring higher on extraversion, true 
identity resides offline. In contrast, for those scoring higher on introversion, true identity 
resides online. According to Amichai-Hamburger and colleagues, because true identity 
resides online those who are more introverted are more likely to use online social 
networking sites. Wehrli (2008) found that extraversion played an important role in social 
networking. Specifically, in their sample of 1560 students, extraverts were more likely to 
sign up for social networking sites, adopted the technology at a faster rate and had larger 
friends' lists than their less extraverted counterparts. Wilson and colleagues (2010) found 
that extraverted individuals reported higher levels of social network use. Finally, Ross 
and colleagues (2009) found that while those higher on extraversion belonged to 
significantly more social groups on Facebook, scoring higher on this trait was not 
significantly associated with time spent online or use of certain features of Facebook, 
such as frequency of status updates. Because findings are mixed, the associations 
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between personality and use of social networking sites including Facebook require 
further investigation. While it is possible that personality may impact on the likelihood to 
disclose, this factor may also be related to the use of other features of the site, including 
privacy settings. 
Familiarity with Technology 
Perceived comfort, ease and expertise with computers strongly predict actual use 
of computers (Mueller, Wood, Willoughby, Ross & Specht, 2008; Spitzberg, 2006). In 
short, individuals who are more accustomed to and are more comfortable with a 
technology, also use the technology more frequently. As Lewis and Fabos (2005) have 
proposed, as time progresses highly competent users may not consciously think about 
how they are communicating, and instead communicate without hesitation. Because 
Facebook is such a pervasive communication tool, it is proposed that as familiarity and 
comfort with the site increases so too does the propensity to disclose information. Aside 
from disclosure, it is possible that familiarity with technology may or may not predict to 
use of privacy settings. On one hand, as familiarity and expertise increases, use of all the 
various features of Facebook, including privacy settings, may increase. Alternatively, if 
highly competent users do not consciously think about how they are communicating, 
perhaps they will not be thinking about privacy settings either. This possibility will be 
explored. 
In the following sections, the relation between privacy and self-disclosure will be 
addressed, followed by an overview of privacy theory offline and online. 
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Privacy and Self-Disclosure 
There is a fine balance between maintaining privacy and emotional distance, and 
sustaining close, intimate relationships. While it is essential for most people to protect 
and have control over their personal information, self-disclosing intimate details is a 
necessary component in establishing and maintaining close, healthy relationships 
(Altman & Taylor, 1973). Privacy, defined as a boundary regulation process that controls 
the degree of contact one has with others, is strongly linked to self-disclosure. Self-
disclosure adjustment can be considered a boundary regulation process, in that increased 
control over information that is exchanged is related to greater levels of privacy in a 
social relationship (Derlega, Metts, Petronio & Margulis, 1993). Regulation of 
interpersonal boundaries dictates the kinds of relationships that are formed (Derlega & 
Chaikin, 1977), and influences levels of closeness and intimacy within social 
relationships. In a study examining privacy and disclosure, results revealed that for initial 
encounters, less private people (low privacy preference) exhibited higher levels of self-
disclosure, were more likely to open up to their interaction partner, and felt more 
comfortable interacting with their partner (Larson & Bell, 1988). 
Theories of Privacy 
Privacy Offline 
Two distinct theories of privacy developed in the 1970s have been established and 
recognized in the literature (Westin, 1970; Altman, 1975). Westin's (1970) theory of 
privacy is defined as a boundary regulation process that focuses on the types and 
functions of privacy that operate on individuals, groups and organizational levels. He was 
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interested in understanding and explaining how privacy served to protect the individual 
from exposure, by temporarily limiting access to themselves by others. Westin identified 
the ways in which privacy is attained and maintained in everyday life, and posited four 
states of privacy (how privacy is achieved): solitude; intimacy; anonymity; and reserve. 
Solitude is freedom from the observers' gaze, and can be obtained by sheltering oneself 
from the public eye. For example, taking a getaway to a remote wilderness retreat might 
offer solitude and release from the observer. Intimacy occurs when a small select group 
of individuals achieves a close, honest relationship, in which they share personal details 
with specific close others. Anonymity is freedom from identification through censorship 
of personal information. By controlling what information is presented, one can ensure 
that their unique identity is not revealed. For example, in the absence of personal 
information including name and birth date, one remains unidentified, and therefore 
maintains their anonymity. Lastly, reserve is the act of limiting the amount and type of 
information that is accessible about the self. For example, by choosing to disclose certain 
superficial details (e.g., hair colour or favorite food) one limits access to private thoughts 
and more sensitive personal details. 
In addition to the mechanisms through which we maintain privacy (how we obtain 
privacy), Westin went on to distinguish four functions of privacy (the reasons why we 
need privacy). These functions include: personal autonomy; emotional release; self-
evaluation; and limited and protected communication. Personal autonomy is the desire to 
avoid the threat of manipulation, or control by others. Emotional release is relief from 
one's social obligations such as role demands, and emotional states. Self-evaluation is the 
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sense of self-reflection/contemplation and integration of experiences into meaningful 
lessons learned. Lastly, limited and protected communication is composed of two related 
factors. Limited communication refers to setting communication boundaries and 
restricting accessible personal information, whereas protected communication refers to 
sharing personal information with certain trustworthy others. These states (or types) and 
functions have helped researchers to develop measures of privacy in various settings 
(e.g., Marshall, 1974). 
Altman (1975) suggested that the functions of privacy (why we need privacy) 
were hierarchical and that the overarching and most important function of privacy is to 
obtain a self-identity. His theory of privacy consists of four components, which focus on 
the process by which people regulate levels of social interaction. The first component is 
the temporal boundary regulation process, whereby individuals adjust their levels of 
required privacy depending on the surrounding environment and their own internal state. 
As time passes, and situations change, people continually adjust their levels of privacy. 
Second, in contrast to Westin's theory, Altman's theory distinguishes between desired 
and actual levels of privacy by discriminating between privacy that is required, and 
privacy that is experienced. Altman proposed that an optimal level of privacy exists, in 
which our desired levels of privacy match our actual levels of privacy. For example, if 
someone wishes to have complete privacy with little contact from others and they achieve 
this, they are at their optimal level of privacy. When this optimal level is not achieved, 
too much (i.e., isolation) or too little privacy (i.e., crowding) may occur. Altman also 
suggested that privacy is bidirectional in nature, involving both input (e.g., regulating if 
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we are observed or not and noise from the environment) and output (e.g., verbal 
communication/disclosure). Third, similar to Westin's theory, Altman's theory 
considered that privacy should be applied both to the individual and group level, rather 
than just from the individual's point of view. Fourth, Altman's theory takes into 
consideration input as well as output, such that he focused on both how people exercise 
control over input (e.g., protecting themselves from the observers' gaze) and output (e.g., 
what types of information they disclose). By taking into account the interaction between 
these two processes, Altman extended previous notions of privacy to include a more 
comprehensive overview. 
In addition to these four components, Altman incorporated behavioural 
mechanisms used to regulate privacy (e.g., shutting the door, verbal expression). 
Inclusion of behavioural techniques (e.g., shutting the door, personal space) used to 
maintain and regulate their optimal levels of privacy contributes a unique aspect to the 
existing privacy theory originally set forth by Westin. 
While Westin primarily focused on psychological aspects of privacy, Altman 
went on to highlight the importance of the environment or context in privacy regulation. 
More specifically, Altman proposed that understanding of the psychological components 
of privacy required systematic consideration of the social world, interactions between 
people, the physical environment, and the temporal nature of social relationships 
(Altman, 1990). Even as Altman's theory has been deemed an "environmental theory of 
privacy", environment does not always strictly imply physical environment. Environment 
has been conceptualized in two distinct ways. First, environment has been characterized 
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as an objective, physical environment in which we move (Margulis, 1977). Second, 
Wohlwill (1973) referred to the 'environment' as the perceptual, symbolic environment 
that we construct in our minds. This conceptualization of 'environment' is linked to 
psychological descriptions of privacy. According to the perspectives of both Altman 
(1990) and Wohlwill (1973), environment can be physical and/or psychological in nature, 
and must be addressed when describing definitions of privacy. 
Both Westin and Altman's privacy theories address the notion of limited access 
approaches to privacy regulation. In contrast, Altman highlighted how perceptions of 
privacy may be specific to one's culture, while Westin referenced privacy in terms of 
political values. Although both Westin and Altman's theories of privacy offer deep 
insight into how and why privacy occurs in relational settings (i.e., between interaction 
partners, in group settings or in an organization), these theories fail to address how 
privacy occurs in online settings where there is a lack of direct interaction. For example, 
in the case of personal online profiles, where users display information without the 
expectation that someone will respond directly to this information, how do the states 
(how privacy is achieved) and functions (why privacy is necessary) of privacy operate ? 
What mechanisms are at work in this context? Although Altman went on to describe how 
people exercise control over both input and output of information, these components are 
again, specific to offline self-disclosure. 
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Privacy Online 
In an attempt to apply the concept of privacy to online settings, theorists have 
formulated a newer online privacy theory. Two key theorists in this area are Moor 
(1997) and Tavani (2007). 
Originally introduced by Moor (1997) and later revised by both Moor and Tavani 
(2001), the theory of "restricted access/limited control" centers around the idea that 
information is shared with specific people at specific times. Central to the framework of 
this theory is the idea of control, and more specifically, limited control. Both Moor and 
Tavani acknowledged that in the computer age it is virtually impossible to control one's 
personal information at all times, and therefore proposed that instead, it is important to 
ensure that the right people have access to certain information at the right time. A key 
component of this theory is the notion of the "situation". A situation can include various 
contexts that are normally regarded as being private, including relationships, activities in 
a specific location, or storage, access or manipulation of information in a database. 
Activities involving the internet can, therefore, be considered situations. Tavani (2007) 
argues that it is the situation in which personal information can be used by others, not the 
information itself, that dictates whether or not the information should be declared private. 
In addition, he goes on to say that details about access to personal information should be 
"completely public" (p. 16) and known to all who are involved. This theory then has 
great implications for privacy policy construction, highlighting the need for clear and 
openly communicated roles and responsibilities. With the inclusion of clear policies, 
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debate over when normative laws should be established to protect online privacy in 
various situations (e.g., faculty salaries) can be resolved. 
While theories of privacy have clarified different mechanisms and components 
driving the boundary regulation process, less is known about individual definitions of 
privacy and how they vary. How and why do perceptions of privacy differ, and what 
influences these differences in perceptions? Do computer experience and usage relate to 
perceptions of privacy and privacy behaviours? Do personal experiences and the intended 
(or mental) audience relate to perceptions of privacy and privacy behaviours? Does 
context play a role in perceptions of privacy and privacy behaviours? Do privacy related 
behaviours differ when disclosures occur online? It could be that users view their online 
behaviours as more anonymous and therefore feel as though their information is more 
private when, in fact, this may not be the case. It is important to consider how people 
perceive privacy, because these definitions may very well impact on what they choose to 
disclose and use of privacy settings. Given the relative lack of research assessing self-
disclosure as it relates to perceptions and awareness of privacy online, the present 
research provides an exploratory examination of these issues. 
Identity Theft and Threats to Personal Security 
Identity theft and personal security are ever-present concerns associated with 
information disclosed online (e.g., Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; LaRose & Rifon, 2006; Lee, 
Im, & Taylor, 2008). In apparent opposition to the numerous warnings issued by law 
enforcement and public awareness groups regarding the need to be cautious in disclosing 
personal information (e.g., Child Online Protection (COP); McCandlish, 2002; Willard, 
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2006), one of the primary goals of social networking sites is to encourage disclosure of 
personal information with others online. This personal information can include full 
names, addresses, birthday and year, contact information, and photos. Even a select few 
pieces of personal information, however, has the potential to provide identity thieves with 
the means to acquire "identity -based" information such as social insurance numbers, 
credit cards, driver's licenses, etc. With these pieces of information, even more critical 
legal documents can be procured, such as passports (Sullivan, 2008). Apart from 
concerns regarding the protection of identity, disclosure of personal information (even if 
limited) can be sufficient, when combined with other Internet based tools such as reverse 
directory checks, to secure home phone numbers, full addresses, age and gender and 
other information that could leave a person vulnerable (Messmer, 2007). 
Given the widespread use and potential dangers associated with online 
communication, a thorough understanding of the features of networking sites, and how 
people are using these sites is critical in developing ways to educate users about how to 
protect their information and themselves. The overarching goal of the present research 
was to gain a better understanding of what can be found in online social networking 
profiles, specifically, Facebook. Apart from collecting data on the kinds of information 
users were choosing to include (and exclude) in their personal profiles, the following 
studies sought to examine the impact of individual characteristics on the type of 
information that is likely to be present in an online profile (i.e., information that is self-
disclosed as a function of characteristics including age, gender and relationship status). 
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The Current Research: Predictors of Disclosure and Privacy Settings Usage in an 
Online Social Networking Site. 
The Online Social Context 
Due to the nature of online media, the social context in which online 
communication occurs may be fundamentally different from social interactions in offline 
contexts (e.g., face-to-face). Features inherent in online interaction may encourage or 
hinder self-expression (e.g., Henderson & Gilding, 2004; Walther, 1996). Researchers 
have argued that a large proportion of the meaning derived from social communication 
comes from non-verbal feedback (Argyle, 1975). Given that certain cues are "filtered 
out" in online communication (Hian, Chuan, Trevor & Detenber, 2004), debate has 
arisen over the benefits and drawbacks of online social interaction. Though elements 
such as accessibility and anonymity may encourage users to disclose intimate details 
about the self, without worry of exposure (Carnes, 2003; Cooper, Shapiro & Powers, 
1998), many users are not fully aware that they may be sharing personal information in a 
public domain. Given that the Internet has been available for public use since the 1990s 
and the rapid advance in the number of methods for communicating on the net with 
growth in Internet usage (blog, email etc.) increasing by 146% from 2000-2010 (World 
Internet Users, 2010), it would be surprising that many users possess a relatively naive 
technical understanding of what can and does happen to the information they share on 
the net. This naivete may put users in a position of vulnerability. Even long-time Internet 
users may not understand exactly how the Internet works. Furthermore, amount of 
experience with online communication may not necessarily imply technical knowledge. 
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For example, without knowledge of the underpinnings of computer technology and 
security, users may disclose potentially damaging or very personal/intimate information, 
without realizing it. It may therefore be useful to assess factors including personality and 
familiarity with technology, and how these are related to use of technology. Moreover, 
users' perceptions about communication online, and the factors that influence what they 
are willing to disclose, such as who users are targeting when disclosing, may be of 
paramount importance for understanding the predictors of online information sharing. 
Roadmap and Overview of the Current Studies. 
This dissertation presents four studies. The fours presented are based on data 
collected from Facebook between the years 2008-2010. Studies 1 A, B and C were 
archival and looked at the same 400 publicly accessible profiles on Facebook. The main 
purpose of Study 1 A was to create a comprehensive scoring that could be used to assess 
the kinds of information disclosed in personal Facebook profiles. Study 1 B utilized the 
scoring tool developed in Study 1 A to categorize and examine information disclosed in 
terms of three types of threat: identity threat, personal security threat and the potential for 
stigmatization. Study 1 C extended Study 1 B by including an examination on all content 
available to users, rather than just the three limited categories. In both Study 1 B and C, 
factors that predicted disclosure within the three categories and overall content areas were 
investigated in an exploratory fashion to gain a better sense of how users were disclosing 
online. 
Study 2 was a three-part experimental study that extended the findings of Studies 
1 A, B and C by examining the impact of various factors on the creation of a Facebook 
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profile. Part 1 investigated experimentally the impact of story, gender of the participant 
creating the profile and gender of the target person for which the profile was created on 
disclosure and use of privacy settings. In the current study, in order to obtain a clearer 
picture of disclosure, it was necessary to control the information disclosed in the 
profiles. As such, information was fabricated for a target individual, and participant 
disclosure of information for this target person was examined. Based on privacy policy 
literature and research highlighting the saliency of anecdotal stories (Stanovich, 2009; 
Metzger, 2006, Spiekermann, Grossklags & Berendt, 2001), it was anticipated that 
participants who read a story about personal privacy invasion would disclose less 
information than those who read either Facebook's legal privacy policy or a story about 
the history of the internet (control). In addition, having read the privacy invasion story 
was expected to encourage greater use of privacy settings among users. 
In keeping with research examining gender differences in self-disclosure (e.g., 
Dindia and Allen, 1992), it was expected that female participants would disclose more 
overall, but that this difference may be dependent on the topic of disclosure (Derlega, 
Durham, Gockel & Sholis, 1981). More specifically, male participants were expected to 
disclose more in specific content areas (e.g., activities, views, education). Lastly, given 
that females are more often the victims of online abuse (WHOA, 2008) it was expected 
that participants would disclose less about female targets than about male targets. 
Part 2 consisted of an exploratory examination of predictive factors such as 
personality (private and public self-consciousness, extraversion), the virtual audience 
(i.e., who they had in mind when posted information), perceptions of online privacy, 
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online privacy attitudes and behaviours and reported self-disclosure on actual disclosure 
and privacy settings use within Facebook profiles. 
Part 3 examined experimentally the impact of the context in which the profile was 
created, gender of the participant creating the profile and gender of the target for whom 
the profile was created on disclosure and use of privacy settings. Based on online hyper-
personal theory (Walther, 1996) and previous research showing that online media 
generated higher levels of disclosure (Joinson, 2001; Schouten, Valkenburg & Peter, 
2007, Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & Irvine, 2006), it was expected that participants 
filling out a profile on paper and pencil would be less inclined to disclose information 
than their online counterparts. In terms of privacy settings usage as a function of context, 
no specific hypotheses were set forth. There is no known research examining the impact 
of context on settings use, and therefore this examination was exploratory in nature. 
An Archival Examination of Information Disclosed in Existing Facebook 
Profiles 
Given the vast array of information that can be shared and the number of users, 
concerns regarding security and privacy issues are a recurring issue (Acoca, 2008). Some 
concerns involve potential threats to personal safety from the abundance of information 
that is assumed to be available and accessible about an individual on their online profile. 
Specifically, there are concerns regarding identity theft if users provide too much 
information (e.g., birth date, address, phone, full name etc.). In addition, there are 
concerns for personal safety for vulnerable users who could be stalked, or otherwise 
threatened. A less commonly considered threat is the possibility of social risk as a 
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function of self-identification with minority or stigmatized groups. Although some of 
these concerns have surfaced in the popular media (e.g., news.cnet.com), there is little 
empirical investigation documenting how much and what kind of information is present 
in personal Facebook profiles to determine the potential for threats of any type, nor is 
there any information regarding how users differ in the information disclosed in their 
profiles to provide clues as to who is most likely to be at risk. 
Study 1 A 
Creation of a Scoring Tool for Assessing Disclosure in Facebook 
The primary purpose of Study 1 A was to develop a scoring instrument to 
summarize what information could be disclosed on Facebook profiles. To do this, a 
comprehensive coding tool was required. From this tool, we then examined the frequency 
for each piece of information to determine what is and is not likely to be found in online 
profiles. 
General Method 
Participants. A sample of 400 randomly selected, accessible, personal profiles 
from 8 Canadian Facebook networks was collected. The networks included 4 
community networks (Toronto, Vancouver, Charlottetown and Kitchener) and 4 
university networks (Mount Allison University, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
University of Toronto and Wilfrid Laurier University). Networks varied in size, ranging 
from small to large. Small networks contained up to 14000 profiles (39.2 % of the 
sample), medium networks contained 36000 to 150000 profiles (37.2 % of the sample), 
and large networks contained 720000 profiles or more (23.6 % of the sample). 
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Specifically, 12.3% of the sample came from a network exceeding a million people, 
11.3% from a network of approximately 720000 people, 15.2 % from a network of 
approximately 150000 people, 12.2% from a network of approximately 56000 people, 
9.8 % from a network of approximately 36000 people, 15.9 % from a network of 
approximately 14000 people, and 23.3 % from a network of approximately 5000 people. 
Of the 400 personal profiles, 328 indicated gender (116 females, 155 males). 
Additionally, 301 profiles disclosed age. Among the females, ages ranged from 19-47 
years (M= 22.90 years, SD = 3.91 years). Males ranged in age from 17-61 years (M= 
23.90 years, SD= 5.03 years). The mean age of males and females who reported both 
their age and gender did not differ, t (269) = 1.73,/? = .09. 
Procedure 
A scoring tool was developed in order to assess the content of the personal 
profiles. Construction of the scoring tool was a multi-step process. First, a blank template 
of a Facebook profile was examined to identify potential pieces of information that could 
be included in a profile. Two raters independently created checklists from this blank 
profile template. Following these independent content analyses, an aggregated 90 item 
checklist was constructed which was comprised of all items from both raters. Six 
independent coders then used the aggregated coding checklist to code actual online 
Facebook profiles. Each coder noted any items missing from the checklist that would be 
required to code their profiles. Coders met and discussed content that was not captured by 
the aggregated coding checklist. Following this discussion a final checklist comprised of 
3 identification items (i.e., username link, the network searched, and the size of the 
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overall network) and 97 dichotomously scored items (i.e., whether the piece of 
information was present or absent) was constructed (see Appendix B for the complete 
checklist and descriptions of items, note that the first three items are the identification 
items). 
Once the coding checklist was established, six raters coded the 400 participant 
profiles. Each coder coded 50-100 profiles. Networks searched were counterbalanced 
across coders. Random selection of profiles was achieved using a randomization feature 
of the Facebook program where 10 profiles are generated at random. These 10 profiles 
would include profiles that were and were not publicly visible. On average, 50% of 
profiles that were retrieved were publicly accessible. Coders scanned the 10 profiles and 
selected the first one from the list of 10 that was publicly visible. The search for profiles 
was continued until all raters coded their full allotment of accessible profiles. In order to 
ensure consistency between coders, reliability was conducted on 40 profiles, 
representing 10% of the data. Percentage agreement was 99%, indicating high inter-
coder reliability for the 97 dichotomous items. Differences were resolved through 
discussion. 
Results 
Descriptive summaries were calculated for each item on the checklist that was 
available among the accessible profiles (See Table 1 for a summary). Overall, the 
fifteen most consistently disclosed/provided pieces of information (available on 63% or 
more of the profiles) described personally identifying information (i.e., birth date, 
gender, profile pictures, photo albums, tagged photos and general photos of the user) as 
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well as social connections (i.e., groups joined, and friends viewable). In addition, 
education information (college/university attended) and regular update information 
(status, wall and mini-feed) were included. Finally, playful communications such as 
acceptance of pokes, messages, and gifts, and applications were frequently provided. In 
contrast, the fifteen least frequently included items (9% or less) described key personal 
information (Zip/Postal Code), phone numbers (both land line and mobile), home 
address, city or town, website and former name. In addition, there was also a limited 
amount of information provided regarding some aspects of educational experience (i.e., 
school mailbox, courses, degree, awards, and room). Finally, optional "wall features" 
(i.e., Super Wall and Advanced Wall), market place listings and events as described in 
the mini feed were also infrequently included. Of the 97 items that could be 
dichotomously scored, 26 items were disclosed by at least 50% of the sample (see Table 
1 for summary). 
Discussion 
Two important outcomes were apparent from the descriptive summary of 
Facebook profile content. First, despite the potential for significant disclosure through 
these online social networking profiles, on average, people were choosing to display 
approximately 25% of possible information for other users to view. This clearly 
indicates either a reticence to invest heavily in developing online profiles, or active 
decisions to limit disclosure. Interestingly, the pieces of information that were disclosed 
were neither consistently "safe" nor "unsafe". Specifically, for both the most prevalent 
and least prevalent pieces of information included, there were highly personal pieces of 
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information. That is, in some cases profiles contained the most salient pieces of 
information required for identity theft and personal safety threats including identifying 
pictures, birth date, and regular mini-feed updates. These pieces can be used to obtain 
social insurance numbers and physical location, posing both identity and personal safety 
threats (Messmer, 2007). However, equally critical pieces of information viewed by the 
police as particularly risky and pertinent to identity theft such as land and mobile phone 
numbers and zip/postal code were not readily apparent. Although it makes sense that 
features such as walls might be less frequently present because these features require 
active creation and generation to establish and maintain, it is surprising to see 
information that is prompted being selectively included/disclosed. Therefore, users are 
demonstrating some discretion regarding what kinds of revealing information they are 
willing to share. In keeping with Westin's theory of privacy (1970), it appears that even 
online, users still maintain certain levels of anonymity and reserve by limiting disclosure 
of certain pieces of information, albeit there are inconsistencies in the information 
provided. Specifically, users with publicly accessible profiles are, at the same time, 
choosing to display and censor personal information that can be considered risky. 
In an attempt to understand who is likely to include revealing information and 
what types of information are likely to be produced together, two additional studies were 
conducted. 
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Study 1 B 
Assessing Three Types of Information Threat on Facebook: Personal Identity, 
Personal Security and Potential for Stigmatization 
With a rapid rise in popularity and use, online social networking sites have 
introduced new and potentially harmful ways for individuals to access personal 
information. Identity theft and personal security threats are ever-present online, and thus 
calls for research examining specific kinds of information disclosed online that may pose 
a particular risk to the user (Acoca, 2008). Two kinds of threats are possible. One deals 
with identity theft, which occurs when personal information is used to commit a crime or 
theft (e.g., impersonation) without the discloser's consent and/or knowledge. Full names, 
addresses, phone numbers and birthdates are all pieces of information that can be 
potentially harmful to the discloser if used the wrong way, because other potentially 
harmful information (e.g., social insurance numbers, credit card information) can be 
accessed through indirect means using these core pieces of information (Acquisti & 
Gross, 2009). Another kind of threat is social threat or potential danger to the self and/or 
group(s) that an individual belongs to. Information such as contact information, sexual 
orientation, group membership, religious affiliation, and political affiliation are all details 
that can potentially be used to harm and stigmatize an individual. In this second study, we 
explored means for examining identity threat, personal and group threats. 
Method 
Materials and Procedure. Three disclosure categories were developed through 
qualitative analysis (Patton, 2001). All individual items were considered and based on 
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these items, categories were generated. Any discrepancies were compared, discussed and 
resolved by discussion. Development of each of the three categories is explained in 
further detail in the sections below. The first category reflected personal identity 
information, the second involved sensitive personal information, and the third involved 
potentially stigmatizing information. Refer to Table 2 for category descriptives. 
Personal Identity Information (Default/Standard Information). The first 
category involved revealing basic personal identifying information, or what was deemed 
default/standard information. This information was defined as details people might 
disclose in banks, schools, jobs etc., but that could be used in potentially threatening 
ways. 
To develop this category a three stage process was used. First, two researchers 
conducted a content analysis of the 97 items in the full checklist. The number of items 
was first reduced based on frequency. Items that were very infrequently disclosed (less 
than 5% of users disclosed the information) were omitted. In addition, items that lacked 
variability or did not cohere with the other items were omitted. Items were further 
reduced based on whether the item did or did not reveal default or standard personal 
information that is typically required to identify a person. Items that failed to meet this 
requirement were omitted. Next, separate from the sample of 400 profiles, 18 research 
assistants with experience working in psychology labs examining technology and 
technology applications in daily life, were recruited to participate in a pilot study to 
construct the final category of standard/default information. First, these research 
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assistants were asked about their familiarity with Facebook through two questions. 
Specifically they were asked to use a 7-point Likert-type scale (1= not at all familiar 
with Facebook, 1- extremely familiar with Facebook), 
"Please rate on the 7 point scale below how familiar you feel you are with 
Facebook". 
Among these research assistants the level of familiarity with Facebook was 
relatively high (M = 5.67, SD = 1.82), however, scores ranged from 1 to 7. 
The research assistants were also asked about their log in behavior. Specifically, 
they were asked, 
"On average, how often do you log into Facebook in a one-week period?" 
On average, the majority of research assistants logged into Facebook multiple 
times per week (M = 19.17, SD = 22.92), although the range from 0 to 85 times per week 
was variable, with two participants never signing in. The majority of participants (50%) 
indicated that they logged in between 12 and 15 times per week. 
The research assistants were asked to use the checklist to respond to one 
question. Research assistants were asked to indicate (with a checkmark) which items 
they felt were standard or default requirements for the construction of a personal profile 
or information typically required on personal profile websites. Specifically participants 
were asked, 
"We are trying to determine what pieces of information people consider to be "standard" 
or typical information requested on personal profile sites. We would like you to look 
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through the list below to identify the elements that you believe are customarily required 
in online profiles?" 
Items from the checklist that were positively identified by more than 50% of the 
assistants were considered for inclusion in the scale. Five items were identified as default 
or standard by more than 50% of the participants. The items and percentage endorsement 
included: gender (83.3%), birth day (61.1%), birth year (72.2%), email (61.1%), and 
profile picture (55.6%). 
Third, consultation with a local police department and police college was 
conducted to gain insight into which items were viewed by the police as particularly risky 
and pertinent to identity theft. Through consultation, 3 additional items (i.e., street 
address, city /town, postal code) were added to the default/standard information scale. 
These items identified personal information that could be used in potentially harmful 
ways. 
Finally, this yielded an 8 item default/standard information scale, comprised of 
street address, city /town, postal code, gender, birth day, birth year, profile picture and 
email (possible scores ranged from 0 - 8). Higher scores indicated higher levels of self-
disclosure for default items. 
Sensitive Personal Information (Personal Security). The second category 
reflected personally revealing/sensitive information. This information was defined as 
details that could be used to locate an individual, and could be used to threaten or harm 
another. 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
To develop this category, two researchers conducted a systematic thematic 
analysis of the checklist items to determine which variables should belong in the 
sensitive information category based on the nature of each variable and the potential 
danger in disclosing each item. After all items were considered, and through discussion, 
the following were placed in the sensitive information category: email, employer, job 
position, status, mini-feed, regular wall, profile picture, photo albums, self-selected 
photos, tagged photos, message, poke, send a gift, and friends viewable (possible scores 
ranged from 0-14). Higher scores indicated higher levels of self-disclosure. 
Potentially Stigmatizing Information. The third category reflected sensitive 
personal information that could result in stigmatization within society. 
To develop this category two researchers conducted a systematic thematic 
analysis of the items to determine which variables should belong in the stigmatizing (as 
well as sensitive) category based on the nature of each variable and the potential for 
stigmatization of the user by viewers. After all items were considered, and through 
discussion, the final scale was comprised of religious views, political views, birth year, 
sexual orientation, photos, friends viewable, interests, activities, favorite music, favorite 
movies, favorite TV shows, favorite books, favorite quotes, and about me (possible 
scores ranged from 0-14). Higher scores indicated higher levels of self-disclosure. 
Results 
Analyses based on the full sample of 400 profiles explored whether any 
differences in self-disclosure emerged for profile information. Analyses consisted of 15 
independent t-tests with 5 t-tests for each of the grouping categories (default/standard 
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information, sensitive personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information). 
Comparisons assessed potential differences as a function of network type (university vs. 
community), gender revealed (indicated/not indicated), gender (male vs. female), 
relationship status revealed (indicated/not indicated), and age revealed (indicated/not 
indicated). Using a Bonferroni correction, the probability for each comparison was 
corrected to p < .003 to accommodate the number of tests conducted. Examination of 
variables dealing with relationships and with age was carried out using multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) and regression analyses. Refer to Table 3 for a 
summary of analyses. 
Comparisons among Network, Gender Revealed, Gender Identified, 
Relationship Status Revealed, and Age Revealed. Overall, within each set of 5 t-tests, 
the same three comparisons were statistically significant. Specifically, users who 
provided information about their gender (present or absent), relationship status, and age1 
disclosed more default/standard information, more sensitive personal information, and 
more potentially stigmatizing information in their online profiles than their peers who did 
not disclose their gender, relationship status or age (smallest t (1, 398) = -2.81, p = .005). 
See Table 3 for a complete summary. 
Relationships Status (single, in a relationship, status not indicated/missing). 
For each of the three grouping categories (i.e., default/standard information, sensitive 
1
 To avoid redundancy, the default/standard information scale was revised, and birth day and year were 
omitted from the scale for the analysis examining age as a predictor. 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information), a multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to compare the amount of disclosure of 
default/standard information, sensitive personal information, and potentially 
stigmatizing information as a function of one of three relationship status possibilities 
(single, in a relationship, missing) . Relationship status served as the between subjects 
factor. 
Results for the default/standard and sensitive personal information categories 
provided similar outcomes. Specifically, there was a significant main effect of 
relationship status condition {F{2, 397) = 15.37,/? < .001 and F{2, 397) = 12.85,/? < 
.001, for default/standard information and sensitive personal information, respectively). 
Tukey-b post hoc comparisons revealed that users who indicated their relationship status 
as either single or in a relationship disclosed significantly more default/standard 
information {Msingle = 3.34 & Mrelationship = 3.11) and sensitive personal information 
{Msingle = 10.12 & Mrelationship = 10.08) than users who did not indicate their 
relationship status {Mmissing = 2.54 and Mmissing = 8.94, for default/standard 
information and sensitive personal information, respectively). 
Although the analysis for stigmatizing information also yielded a significant main 
effect of relationship status condition {F (2, 397) = 14.46,/? < .001), the Tukey-b post hoc 
2
 Only two statuses (i.e., single and in a relationship) and status missing (did not indicate their relationship 
status) were used in these analyses due to very small cell numbers (largest n < 19) for the remaining four 
statuses (i e , married, engaged, it's complicated, in an open relationship). 
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comparisons revealed that all three relationship statuses significantly differed from one 
another. Single users (M= 8.61) disclosed the highest amount of this grouping of 
information in their profiles, followed by users in a relationship {M= 7.16), and finally, 
users who did not indicate their relationship status disclosed the least amount of 
stigmatized information (M= 6.03). See Figure 1. 
Analysis of Age. Three linear regressions were conducted to explore whether 
age predicted disclosure of information for each of the three categories (default/standard 
information, sensitive personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information). 
The default/standard information was altered for this analysis through the removal of 
birth day and birth year in order to prevent redundancy in this measure. Age was entered 
as the predictor variable, and the new default information aggregate scale was entered as 
the dependent variable. The overall model was significant in all three cases, R = .06, F 
(1, 289) = 18.53/? < .001, R2= .08, F ( l , 289) = 11.31/? < .001 andi?2= .08, F ( l , 289) 
= 25.74/? < 001, for default/standard information, sensitive personal information, and 
potentially stigmatizing information, respectively. In all three cases, as age increased, 
the amount of information presented in personal profiles decreased (P = -.25,/? < .001, P 
= -.19,/? = .001, and P = -.29, p < .001, for default/standard information, sensitive 
personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information, respectively). 
Discussion 
In summary, all three disclosure categories were relevant, in that all were sources 
for disclosure and potentially sources for threat. The results revealed a similar trend for 
all three grouping categories (i.e., default/standard, sensitive personal information, and 
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potentially stigmatizing information). Facebook users who were acknowledged to have 
included information about their gender, relationship status, and age, disclosed more 
information in all three disclosure categories than people who did not indicate this 
information at all. Further, users who indicated they were single had the highest number 
of stigmatizing items, followed by users who were in a relationship, and finally, users 
who did not specify a status had the lowest number of stigmatizing items. This trend was 
not present for default/standard information or sensitive personal information. Instead, 
users who were single or in a relationship did not differ on their disclosure of 
default/standard information or sensitive personal information, but users who did not 
indicate a status had less of this information in their online Facebook profiles. 
Individuals at greatest risk for threat could therefore be those who are seeking a 
relationship. It could be that those who are searching for romantic relationships are using 
online media as a way to self-present or to advertise themselves to potential dating 
partners. In fact, research has shown that a large majority of people looking to date use 
the Internet as a means for finding a partner (Madden & Lenhart, 2006). Online daters 
not only disclose more intimate details, but disclose these details at a faster pace than do 
offline daters (Rosen, Cheever, Cummings, & Felt, 2008). While disclosing details 
online may be necessary to attract a potential mate, there is clearly greater potential for 
harm. 
Interestingly, the type of network and whether the profile was generated by a 
male or female did not have an impact on whether or not information appeared in a 
Facebook profile. That is, in the community and university samples, and males and 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 55 
females did not differ in the amount of information disclosed in their online profiles. 
While females are generally high disclosers when compared to males in more traditional 
social interactions (Dindia & Allen, 1992), perhaps males feel more comfortable 
disclosing in an online setting where there is less pressure to conform or adhere to strict 
social rules and male stereotypes for disclosure. 
Lastly, for those users who included information about their age, as age 
increased, disclosure of all three types of information (default/standard, sensitive 
personal information, and potentially stigmatizing information) decreased. Older 
individuals may be more cautious when disclosing details about themselves. It could be 
that a greater amount of life experience has taught older users to be wary of information 
sharing, and they may be more aware of some of the risks involved in disclosure of 
personal details. For the younger generation, disclosing personal information across a 
variety of domains (e.g., school, online) is part of everyday life, and may have begun to 
reduce the gap between private and public selves. Thus, younger people may be less 
cautious when disclosing highly personal details and feel more comfortable with online 
disclosure (Goodstein, 2007). Alternatively, it is also possible that as age increases, 
disclosing certain types of information may not be seen as appropriate. For example, in 
Western society it is social custom that one does not ask older people for socially 
revealing information as a mark of respect (Man, 2007). Yet another possible 
explanation is that social communication that is asynchronous yet personal, such as 
online social networks, may not provide the forum for communication that is 
comfortable for older users. While older people may be open to technology, they use it 
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less (Bucur, Renold, & Henke, 1999), and coupled with a greater awareness of the risks 
associated with use of technology, may prefer different media for social connections. 
These interpretations must be considered in light of the fact that the age of non-
disclosers is not known, and therefore conclusions about age patterns for this population 
are not possible. 
In summary, although Study 1 A indicated that there were inconsistencies such 
that some pieces of personal and revealing information were disclosed and others were 
not, the results from Study 1 B provided an initial understanding of potential individual 
differences that predict who is most likely to disclose what information. It should be 
noted that assessment of the veracity of the information presented online was not 
possible, and therefore the possibility remains that while individual differences predicted 
disclosure, it is hard to know whether or not these differences were real differences, or 
simply fabricated by the user (e.g., creating/using a fake gender and age). In keeping 
with self-presentation theory (e.g., Goffman, 1959), it would not be surprising that some 
of the users did not display accurate personal information. In some cases this 
information may have been completed fabricated and in others, as in the case of self-
presentation, it is possible that the information displayed reflected an idealized version 
of the true self. In addition, Study IB examined only publicly accessible profiles, and 
therefore patterns of disclosure may be different for profiles that do not allow public 
access. Study 1 C further explored variables that explain what is disclosed and by whom. 
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Study 1 C 
Examination of Disclosure across Various Content Areas within Facebook 
One concern in Study 1 B was that only limited information was examined. 
Study 1 C provided an examination of all of the content available through Facebook in 
order to better understand how to conceptualize the information that can be provided and 
who is likely to disclose it. 
Method and Results 
The sample included the 400 profiles specified in Study 1 A and employed the 
same checklist. 
A fourth grouping strategy was conducted to include all information present in 
Facebook but to organize it in a meaningful way. The process involved several steps. 
First, information was sorted as a function of the layout of the Facebook profile 
template. However, the template organization tended to include information that was not 
obviously related thematically. Two researchers carried out discussion about how to 
categorize information based on thematic coherence. Through discussion, the following 
10 categories were identified: Personal information, Relationship information, Age 
information, Contact information, Education information, Work information, View 
information, General Picture information, Message and Poke acceptance (whether or not 
users allowed other users to send them private messages and to poke them), and Wall 
and Update Information (i.e., regular wall, advanced wall, super wall, fun wall, mini-
feed, and status). 
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A principal components factor analysis with a Varimax rotation was conducted 
to confirm these categories and the relationships between these variables. The factor 
analysis yielded 11 factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which accounted for a 
total of 66.74% of the variance. Overall, the factors corresponded with the thematic 
analysis of the two researchers with the exception that one category identified by the 
researchers was divided into two categories through the factor analysis. Initial 
Eigenvalues ranged from 1.04 to 6.60, and indicated that the factors explained 16.93%, 
9.62%, 8.20 %, 6.13 %, 4.80%, 4.54%, 4.31%, 3.50%, 3.08%, 2.96%, and 2.68% of the 
variance, respectively. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 4. The following 
eleven aggregate scales were created based on the factor loadings and were used in the 
subsequent analyses: Personal information, Tagged and Self-selected Photos and Update 
information, Work information, Education information, Message and Poke Acceptance 
(whether users allow for receipt of private messages and nudges from other users), 
Album and Profile Picture information, Age information, Contact information, View 
information, Other Wall Presence, and Relationship information. Higher scores 
indicated higher levels of self-disclosure for these items. Reliability was conducted for 
scales that had more than 3 items using Cronbach's alpha . The alphas ranged from 
moderate to high: .91 for Personal information (8 items), .90 for Work information (4 
3
 Cronbach alphas for scales consisting of only three items were low. Alpha levels were .48 for contact 
information, and .57 for album and profile picture information. Inter-item correlations were carried out for 
scales with 2 items. Item correlations were 37 for view information, .34 for wall information, and .34 for 
relationship information. 
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items), .76 for Education information (4 items), and .84 for Tagged and Self-selected 
Photos and Update information (5 items). Refer to Table 5 for a list of items in each 
scale and means. 
Following the analyses in Study 1 B, t-tests were conducted first to explore 
possible differences as a function of network type (university vs. community), gender 
revealed (indicated/not indicated), gender (male vs. female), relationship status revealed 
(indicated/not indicated), and age revealed (indicated/not indicated) for each of the 11 
topic scales. Given the number of comparisons conducted, a Bonferroni correction was 
employed and the alpha level for each test was set to .005. These t-tests were followed 
by a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) looking within relationship status, 
and finally, with a linear regression using age. Refer to Table 6 for a summary of the t-
test statistics. 
Type of Network. One out of 11 t-tests was significant. Results revealed that 
users who belonged to a community network were more likely to include view 
information in their personal profiles than were their university network counterparts. 
Gender Revealed (indicated/not indicated). Five out of the 11 t-tests were 
significant. Results revealed that users who indicated their gender, also had higher 
levels of disclosure for: personal information, tagged and self-selected photos and 
update information, education information, album and profile picture information, and 
age information. 
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Male vs. Female. One out of the 11 t-tests was significant. Results revealed that 
males expressed more information about their political and religious views than did 
females. 
Relationship Status Revealed (indicated/not indicated). Five of the 11 t-tests 
were significant. Overall, disclosing one's relationship status was related to higher levels 
of disclosure of various topics, including: personal information, tagged and self-selected 
photos and update information, album and profile picture information, age information; 
and view information. 
Age Revealed (indicated/not indicated). One of the 10 t-tests was significant. 
Users who disclosed their age also disclosed more education information. 
Analysis of Relationship Status. A multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted with the relationship status condition (single, in a 
relationship, missing) as the between subjects factor and the 11 aggregate scales as the 
dependent variables. Results revealed a significant main effect of relationship status 
condition for 8 of the 11 scales including: personal information {F (2, 397) = 7.20,/? = 
.001); tagged and self-selected photos and update information {F (2, 397) = 8.45,/? < 
.001); album and profile picture information {F (2, 397) = 12.40,/? < .001); age 
information (F (2, 397) = 10.94,/? < .001); work information {F (2, 397) = 5.80/? = 
.003); view information {F{2, 397) = 5.88,/? = .003); relationship information {F{2, 
397) = 18.91,/? < .001) and super fun wall information {F{2, 397) = 5.88,/? = .003). 
For personal information, Tukey-b post hoc comparisons revealed that single 
users {M= 4.51) indicated significantly more personal information than did users who 
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were either in a relationship {M= 3.36), or who did not disclose their relationship status 
(M=3.04). 
According to Tukey-b post hoc comparisons, tagged and self-selected photos and 
update information, album and profile picture information, age information, and work 
information all yielded consistent patterns. In general, users who either indicated they 
were single or in a relationship, disclosed significantly more information related to these 
topics than did users who did not disclose their relationship status. Refer to Table 7 for 
means. 
For information pertaining to religious and political views, Tukey-b post hoes 
showed that single users (M=.85) had significantly more information present in their 
profiles than did users who did not indicate their relationship status (M= .52). Lastly, for 
relationship information, all three groups differed significantly from one another. Users 
who were single (M- 1.06) displayed the most relationship information, followed by 
users who were in a relationship (M= .78), and finally, users who did not disclose their 
relationship status were the least likely to display relationship information in their online 
profiles (M= .50). See Figure 2. 
Analysis of Age. Ten linear regressions were conducted to explore how age as a 
continuous factor was related to disclosure of information online. Given the number of 
regressions conducted, the alpha level for each test was set to .005. Age was entered as 
the predictor variable, and each of the aggregated topic scales were entered as the 
dependent variables. For 5 of the 10 scales, age significantly predicted disclosure of 
topic. The overall models were significant for the following scales: personal information 
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{R2= .04, F ( l , 289) = 14.11/? < .001, p = -.22,/? < .001); Tagged and Self-selected 
Photos and Update information {R2= .05, F ( l , 289) = 16.46/? < .001, p = -.23,/? < 
.001); education information {R2= .04, F{\, 289) = 10.82/? = .001, p = -.19,/? = .001); 
Album and Profile Picture information {R2 = .09, F (1, 289) = 28.24/? < 001, p = -.30,/? 
< .001); and relationship information (R2= .07, F ( l , 289) = 20.78/? < .001, p = -.26,/? 
< .001). Overall, as age increased, disclosure of these topics decreased. 
Discussion 
For the most part, the outcomes of Study 1 C support the outcomes reported in 
Study 1 B. Specifically, gender (male versus female) and network membership 
(community versus university) were not important variables for distinguishing who 
would or would not be likely to disclose information. Differences existed only for one 
topic. Unlike traditional face-to-face interactions (Dindia & Allen, 1992), online social 
networking profiles may provide a means of communicating that facilitates disclosure 
among males to the same level as evidenced in females. Also, whether an individual 
belongs to a university-based or community-based network did not strongly predict to 
the amount of disclosure of information, with the exception of one topic. Apparently, 
both university and community samples share similar knowledge or attitudes toward 
revealing information online. 
Like Study 1 B, results from Study 1 C revealed that voluntarily providing 
personal information related to gender, and relationship status was related to greater 
disclosure of certain topics (i.e., for 5 of the 11 scales). One notable difference between 
Study 1 B and Study 1 C concerns revealing personal information related to age. In 
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Study 1 B, revealing any information about age (i.e., whether they indicated their age or 
not) had an impact on the likelihood to disclose information. In contrast, for Study 1 C, 
whether an individual supplied information regarding their age or not did not predict 
information disclosed. Out of the possible 10 topic categories, revealing age was only 
significant for one (i.e., education information). 
On the other hand, in both Studies 1 B and C, when individuals provided their 
age, it proved to be an important factor in distinguishing levels of disclosure online. As 
age increased, self-disclosure decreased on 5 out of 10 scales in Study 1 C (i.e., photo 
album information, relationship information, personal information, Tagged and self-
selected photos and update information, and education information) and for all 
categories examined in Study 1 B. Items in these particular 5 areas tended to overlap 
with the items in the three grouping categories used in Study 1 B relative to the 5 areas 
that were not significant in this analysis. 
Consistent with earlier discussions, older adults may be less likely to reveal 
information due to less familiarity and trust with technology or due to more experience, 
wariness or social prohibitions regarding disclosure of private information (Bucur, 
Renold, & Henke, 1999; Mann, 2007). In keeping with the norm of reciprocity 
(Gouldner, 1960), it may be that there is a disclosure "culture" whereby peers within the 
same age group or social sphere grow to expect certain levels of reciprocal disclosure, 
therefore encouraging or discouraging information sharing. Perhaps for younger users 
who have publicly accessible profiles to start off with, disclosure norms are higher, 
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whereas for older users, disclosure norms set out by their "culture" are lower in 
comparison. Again, these conclusions apply only to publicly accessible profiles. 
Relationship status was very important in distinguishing levels of disclosure for 
the different topic categories. Overall, those seeking a relationship were far more 
inclined to disclose on a variety of topics including views, relationship information, and 
personal information than were their counterparts who were in a relationship or who did 
not disclose a status. The current outcomes highlight the importance of relationship 
status for identifying those users who are more likely to reveal highly personal 
information. Those seeking a relationship may be using Facebook as a less overt dating 
site, and, thus, may be differentially motivated to disclose highly personal information 
across a variety of topics regardless of the dangers or threats associated with disclosing 
this information. Motivation therefore may prove to be an important factor, and merits 
further investigation in future studies. 
Interestingly, contact, other wall information (i.e., Fun Wall, Advanced Wall and 
Super Wall), and acceptance of messages and pokes yielded non-significant results. In 
the case of acceptance of pokes and messages, a very high percentage (99.3% and 99% 
for pokes and messages, respectively) of users had these features present in their 
profiles. It may be that because these features are a prompted or automatic feature 
present in a Facebook profile, less variability may result for these particular items. 
Alternatively, these may also be perceived as more "playful" and social opportunities to 
interact and may not carry any perceived threat in having them as part of the profile. For 
other wall information, those that occurred in less than 10% of the profiles, there might 
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be less use as a function of the amount of effort and time required to generate the 
materials required to develop these features. 
Interestingly, items involving contact information did not result in any 
significant outcomes as a function of age, gender, network, or relationship status. 
Perhaps this is a function of the acknowledgement of the high sensitivity of this 
information with this information being reported very infrequently. Given the many 
other alternatives for communicating with someone in the social network, including 
sending a wall post, these other alternatives may be accepted more readily than highly 
sensitive personal information because these former alternatives leave the door open for 
connection without exposing oneself to information theft or invasion. Thus, it appears 
that regardless of group membership, people did not voluntarily disclose this 
information. 
Understanding What is Disclosed 
In order to make meaningful conclusions about the data found in the publicly 
accessible profiles, grouping procedures were used to aggregate various items within 
descriptive or associated categories (i.e., default/standard, sensitive personal and 
potentially stigmatizing, as well as according to specific topics). While the same effects 
were being interpreted in both Study 1 B and C, the different grouping strategies 
permitted a novel, exploratory examination of the impact that individual difference 
factors have on disclosure. For the most part, age and relationship status were salient in 
describing who would or would not be likely to disclose information, while traditional 
variables such as gender were not significant. In fact, across the grouping strategies 
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there was considerable overlap in outcomes suggesting that some types of information 
were particularly salient for some groups. 
Overall, this research was important because it provided evidence that highly 
personal, sensitive, and potentially stigmatizing information is being disclosed in 
publicly accessible profiles on social networking sites such as Facebook. However, 
findings also depict users who are expressing discretion regarding at least some 
personally revealing information. In light of the prevalence of online identity theft, and 
social threat issues, the results of this study can be used to partially support the need for 
developing programs and interventions that further caution users of online social 
networks against placing themselves at risk, especially in the case of those who are not 
employing basic settings. In addition, Study 1 C provided insight indicating that, in the 
case of publicly accessible profiles, some pieces of personal information may be more 
likely to be grouped together, as supported by factor analysis of topic. Examination of 
profiles that are not publicly accessible would therefore enhance our understanding of 
disclosure in online social networking profiles. 
Study 2 
An Experimental Examination of Stories as a Mechanism for Increasing the Use of 
Privacy Settings in Facebook and Potential Contributing Predictors. 
Some level of disclosure is a requirement to participate on social networking 
sites. As a result, users who otherwise would not disclose personal information may feel 
compelled to disclose information as a function of the way social networking sites are 
constructed (Joinson, 2008). For example, in the case of Facebook, users are required to 
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disclose at least a few key pieces of personal information (e.g., name, birth date and 
valid email address), as part of constructing an account. The concern with even this 
small amount of disclosure is that this particular constellation of information, if provided 
in a public forum, opens the discloser to the potential risk of privacy invasion. Even 
despite the possibility that users may choose aliases and submit false personal 
information upon sign-up, the possibility remains that a substantial proportion of users 
are signed up on Facebook based on their actual information. Therefore, examining 
mechanisms which might minimize risks associated with disclosure was a key 
motivation for the present study. 
Design and Rationale for Study Two 
The focus of this study was threefold. First, the study examined the impact of 
having individuals read stories about safety and privacy issues as a potential means for 
reducing the amount of disclosure and increasing the use of privacy settings. The 
specific design involved two story conditions and a control condition. One story group 
read privacy information prepared by online social networking site developers and the 
other group read about a personal case of stalking which resulted from too much 
disclosure online. The control condition read general information about the history of 
the Internet that did not raise issues related to privacy or disclosure. It was expected that 
a simple story manipulation alone might not change disclosure behaviours or use of 
privacy settings, therefore the second focus was to identify other potentially important 
variables that might impact on what was or was not disclosed and that might also impact 
on the story conditions. Specifically, gender and the target person were included. 
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Participants in the study generated a Facebook account for another person, and the 
gender of that Facebook target person was manipulated. It was made very clear to 
participants that this target person was in fact a real person who had provided their 
personal information for the study. In addition, to further emphasize the presence of the 
target person, participants were told that the person for whom they were creating the 
profile may have the chance to view the profile once it was completed. In addition to 
the target person, the study also addressed the target audience for the Facebook profile. 
Specifically, the notion of who the account was being constructed for was tested through 
some preliminary questions targeting the "virtual other". In addition, personality and 
computer use variables were examined as potential predictors. These variables were 
added as an exploratory investigation. Finally, the third focus followed from previous 
research which suggests that the media (electronic versus hard copy) may generate 
different behaviours. To extend this to a social networking context, half of the 
participants constructed the new Facebook accounts online and half created them using 
paper-and-pencil replicas of the sites. Rationales for these specific manipulations are 
outlined below. 
Background: How Can Users Protect Themselves and Others? 
Although the system design of Facebook requests users to disclose potentially 
risky information, the system design also includes features which would allow users to 
protect themselves and others with whom they connect from privacy threats. 
Specifically, Facebook gives users the opportunity to change privacy settings for their 
personal profile information, photo, and video information. Users can also control who 
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can contact them, who can see their profile and can limit third party access to their 
personal information. Alternatively, users may also keep an "open" profile, allowing 
anyone to freely browse through their information. If a user is particularly open with 
their information and does not change available settings, the default option is to have 
their profiles entered into search engines such as Google and Yahoo. While this option is 
selected, a simple Google search of a users' name will pull up their profile and list it in 
the search results. Online sites have taken steps to educate users and help them to protect 
their personal privacy. Privacy policies are in place to educate users about their privacy 
rights and the rights of the site and how information is shared and used by the company. 
Privacy Policies and Settings: What Impacts When They Are Being Used? 
Although privacy features protect the user and any information that the user may 
have posted about other people (e.g., pictures, posts, and personal details), many users 
do not employ available privacy settings, nor do they read the privacy policies (Berendt, 
Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Gross and Acquisti (2006) 
found that the majority of Facebook users did not employ the available privacy settings, 
allowing for complete access to their profiles, even when they knew about the settings. 
If any settings were used they were minimal, and allowed, for example, friends of 
friends or a user's entire network to view their profile. Most people, however, express 
concern about their privacy, both offline and online (Cranor, Reagle, & Ackerman, 
1999; Nosko, Wood, & Kenney, manuscript in preparation; Statistics Canada, 2009). 
While the general consensus is that privacy is important (Acquisti & Gross, 2006), there 
appears to be a discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; 
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Metzger, 2006; Spiekermann, Grossklags & Berendt, 2001). The following section 
explores this discrepancy further by examining variables that could influence users' 
decisions to employ privacy settings. 
Presentation of Privacy Policies 
Given that online privacy is a concern for most users, it is surprising that most do 
not read the privacy policies. One concern is that the privacy policies may not be 
presented in a user friendly way. Specifically, the language used may be too "legalistic" 
or formal to be accessible to most users. Indeed, research has found that, even when 
users do read the privacy policies many do not fully understand what they have read 
(Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Legal privacy 
policies frequently contain wordy, incomprehensible statements (Jensen & Potts, 2004), 
with readability levels of the majority of privacy policies falling above the capacity of 
most adults (Anton, Earp, Bolcini, Jensen & Stufflebeam, 2003). Language constraints 
may, therefore, be an important consideration in understanding why users do not 
understand and hence, do not utilize the privacy policy information. In addition, 
especially challenging text that does not inherently appear to be personally relevant, may 
serve as a deterrent but also may simply be less interesting especially in a media 
environment where many more attractive visual stimuli are available. In summary, 
complex text, along with text only presentation may lead users to by-pass reading 
policies entirely or to terminate their reading shortly after starting. This presents a 
challenge to policy makers, and perhaps calls for a more engaging and easily understood 
alternative. In the present study, reading a short yet representative subsection of a formal 
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privacy policy statement was required prior to completing a Facebook profile. Reading 
this type of information may encourage less disclosure and greater use of privacy 
settings. 
Saliency of Anecdotal Stories: The Decision to Employ Settings 
The power of anecdotal storytelling is robust in decision making research (e.g., 
de Wit, Das, &Vet, 2008; Fagerlin, Wang & Ubel, 2005; Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett, 
1980; Stanovich, 2009). Humans are natural story tellers (McAdams, 1993, 2001), and 
prefer personal stories to other forms of data (Kida, 2006) due to ease of processing, 
retrieval and mental vividness of stories (Hamill et al., 1980; Stanovich, 2009). The 
power of anecdotal stories for learning has been demonstrated in educational contexts. 
Anecdotes have proved useful for engaging students during lectures by enhancing 
interest and encouraging meaning making and greater recall (Bruner, 1996; Cosmides, 
1989). This positive impact of personal stories also has a negative counterpart in which 
personal stories can overshadow more reliable and accurate sources of information 
(Stanovich, 2009). For example, people may accept the account of one personal story 
even when it contradicts a body of consistent research findings. This highlights the 
importance of personal anecdotal stories and their potential impact on employing 
privacy settings. In the present study some participants were provided with a brief 
anecdotal story relaying a stalking situation following too much disclosure online. It was 
expected that the presentation of a salient, vivid anecdotal privacy story may address 
both the issue of getting people to read privacy related documents, while at the same 
time persuading them to use the available privacy features. In addition, it may be that a 
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well told anecdotal story may prove more persuasive than even the most convincing 
statistical or legal information. 
Gender Differences in Online Privacy Attitudes and Behaviours 
Various studies have noted gender differences in terms of online privacy 
attitudes and behaviours (Bartel-Sheehan, 1999; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Kehoe et al., 
1997; O'Neil, 2001; Westin, 1997; Youn & Hall, 2008). When compared to males, 
females perceived greater privacy risks when online, reported higher levels of privacy 
concern, were more concerned about instituting laws aimed at protecting privacy online, 
were more likely to review and control available privacy settings online and were more 
likely to provide aliases on web-pages (Kehoe et al., 1997; O'Neil, 2001; Youn & Hall, 
2008). Recent research by Grubbs-Hoy and Milne (2010) found that females engaged in 
various privacy protection behaviours more often than males, including greater 
discretion when posting and un-tagging photos, accepting friends and joining groups. 
Gender differences also seem to be important in understanding who is and who is not 
likely to read privacy policies. Milne and Culnan (2004) found that men were less likely 
than women to read privacy policies. Based on previous research, it was anticipated that 
females would report higher levels of online privacy concern, as well as report 
exhibiting a greater number of behaviours geared toward protecting online personal 
privacy. Moreover, it was expected that females would be more likely to employ privacy 
settings than their male counterparts. 
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The "Virtual Other" 
"People's willingness to share depends on who they are sharing the information 
with" (Olson, Grudin & Horvitz, 2005, p. 1987). Presumably, in the case of online 
profiles and personal web-pages, users have a receiver in mind when constructing or 
deciding to share personal details. While this 'other' is not an interactive partner per se, 
that is, they do not respond directly to the profile creator, they are nonetheless an end 
goal or target. It is suggested that the virtual other may best be characterized as a 
psychological other, or a mental representation of an audience. For example, a young 
woman posts her best pictures on her online profile, and highlights all of her best 
qualities in hopes that an old flame might come across her profile and see how she has 
progressed since their break-up. Alternatively, a young woman might choose not to post 
certain personal details (e.g., pictures of her drunk at a party or in compromising poses 
at a nightclub) due to the fear that a relative, co-worker or even stranger might see her 
profile and form negative judgments about her person based on the information 
presented. Decisions about how much and what types of information to share may very 
well be dependent on who the user is thinking about at the time. At present there is no 
literature addressing the "virtual other" in an online setting. The current research 
provides a first exploratory investigation of the target "other". 
Impact of Media (Context) 
The context in which information is shared has an impact on levels of disclosure 
(Joinson, 2001; Schouten, Valkenburg & Peter, 2007; Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & 
Irvine, 2006). The general consensus is that online media, when compared to more 
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traditional media such as paper-and-pencil, over the telephone, and face-to-face, tend to 
encourage higher levels of disclosure (Joinson, 2001; Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Tidwell & 
Walther, 2002; Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & Irvine, 2006). Research has proposed 
the presence of the online disinhibition effect (Suler, 2004), whereby various features of 
the online context (e.g., anonymity, invisibility, and asynchronicity of communication) 
may help to explain why patterns of disclosure differ online and offline. Specifically, as 
a result of the perceived psychological distance fostered by anonymity offered online, 
users are more relaxed, are more likely to "open up" and may even feel less restrained 
(Suler, 2004), thus resulting in greater disclosure. In the present study, the impact of 
media on users' decisions to share information in personal profiles was examined. It was 
anticipated that the online condition, as compared to disclosure on paper-and-pencil, 
would generate higher levels of disclosure. No known studies exist comparing the 
impact of media on privacy setting use in personal profiles, therefore this aspect of the 
investigation was exploratory in nature. 
Summary of the Present Study 
The purpose of Study 2 was to further explore the factors that may influence the 
choice to self-disclose various types of information online in Facebook profiles and the 
choice to employ privacy settings. The three main lines of inquiry outlined above were 
addressed as follows. First, this study addressed the impact of type of story read prior to 
constructing a profile. Specifically, two groups were exposed to privacy relevant 
information prior to constructing a Facebook account. One group read an anecdotal story 
depicting the case of a young woman who was stalked and found as a result of the 
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information she had posted about herself on her Facebook account. A second group was 
required to read a more formal review of privacy policies that is found on the Facebook 
website. These two groups were compared to one another and to a third group who read 
a story that simply reviewed the history of the Internet. It was expected that participants 
who read a salient personal privacy invasion story (Personal Privacy Story) would be the 
least inclined to disclose information online, and the most inclined to set privacy 
settings, as compared to those reading either the Facebook privacy policy (Legal Privacy 
Agreement Story), or a story about the history of the Internet (History of the Internet 
Control Story). 
The second issue sought to address additional variables that might also have an 
impact on the decision to disclose information or use privacy settings. Given previous 
research identifying gender as a key concern, target person gender (i.e., whether the 
profile participants created was for a male or female), and the gender of the participant 
(male, female) were also considered. In order to ensure a degree of control and 
consistency over the information that was included in the profiles, participants were 
asked to create profiles based on information for a target person. Information provided 
to participants in the study was consistent across participants with the exception of the 
target person's gender (some received information about a female target and others 
received information about a male target) and photos of the target individual4. 
4
 Independent raters (4 females, 3 males) evaluated the photos based on three criteria, attractiveness, 
sociability and friendliness. Results indicated that ratings were similar for both sets of photos. 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
It was expected that female participants would reveal less and employ more 
privacy settings overall. It was also expected that the story type might impact on the 
amount of information disclosed and the number of settings employed such that female 
participants exposed to the anecdotal story would disclose the least amount of 
information and employ the most privacy settings as this story in particular depicts the 
particular risks for women on social networking profiles. 
Further, this study sought to examine from an exploratory perspective which 
factors such as demographic variables (age and relationship status), personality (e.g., 
extraversion, self-consciousness), computer usage (e.g., familiarity with computers, 
Facebook usage), reported privacy attitudes and behaviours, the virtual "other" (who it is 
the user is thinking about when posting information) and self-report levels of disclosure 
predicted actual disclosure and privacy settings use in Facebook profiles. 
Finally, the third issue examined the impact of media with a contrast between 
online and hard copy (paper-and-pencil) formats for filling out a personal profile. The 
role of media was examined within the context of the other variables identified above. 
Specifically, the study sought to examine the impact of target gender (i.e., whether the 
profile participants created was for a male or female), gender of the participant (male, 
female) and type of media used (paper-and-pencil, online in Facebook) for generating 
profiles on information that was disclosed and the likelihood to employ privacy settings. 
Based on online hyper-personal theory (Walther, 1996) and previous research showing 
that online media generated higher levels of disclosure (Joinson, 2001; Schouten, 
Valkenburg & Peter, 2007, Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & Irvine, 2006), it was 
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expected that participants filling out a profile on paper-and-pencil would be less inclined 
than their online counterparts to disclose information. No specific hypotheses were set 
forth for privacy settings usage as a function of media context. There is no known 
research examining the impact of context on settings use, and therefore this examination 
was exploratory in nature. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
1. The Personal Privacy Story would result in the least disclosure of 
information and the most use of privacy settings among the three story types. 
2. The Legal Privacy Agreement Story would result in less disclosure of 
information and use of more privacy settings than the Internet History Story. 
3. If consistent with face-to-face interactions, female participants would 
disclose more overall information online, but employ more privacy settings than male 
participants. 
4. There would be less disclosure and greater use of privacy settings for female 
targets than male targets. 
5. There would be an interaction such that females would employ more privacy 
settings and disclose the least amount of information for female targets in the Personal 
Privacy Story. 
6. Explorations of variables including the virtual other, personality and 
experience issues were exploratory and no specific hypotheses were derived. 
7. There would be more disclosure of information in the online media condition 
than in the paper and pencil media condition. The impact of this manipulation on 
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privacy setting use was exploratory. The impact of gender was also exploratory in this 
analysis. 
General Method 
Participants. In total, 236 first-year undergraduate psychology students enrolled 
in an Introductory Psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University participated. 
Participants were recruited through a voluntary sign-up system and were given 2% in 
compensation towards their introductory psychology course grade. Participants included 
100 male participants and 136 female participants, with ages ranging from 17 to 27 
years (Xage= 18.55, SD = 1.16). Independent t-tests revealed that gender differed 
significantly by age {t (234) = 2.21,/? = .03), with males being slightly older than 
females {Magemaie = 18.74 years, Magefemaie= 18.40 years). Although significant 
statistically, this was not considered a meaningful difference given that the mean age of 
both groups was 18 years of age. Approximately 65% of the sample reported currently 
being in a romantic relationship, 34% reported being single, and the remaining 1% were 
either married or engaged. Two-hundred and twenty seven participants indicated that 
they currently had a Facebook account. All participants were treated in accordance with 
APA ethical guidelines. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 groups: one of three story 
conditions, either the female or male target for the profile construction and either the 
online or paper-and-pencil media context. Specifically, among the story conditions 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three story conditions: History of the 
Internet Control Story (N = 78), Legal Privacy Agreement Story (N = 77) and Personal 
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Privacy Story (N = 81), and one of two target conditions: Michael (N = 102) and Sarah 
(N = 134). (See Tables 8 and 9 for breakdowns of story condition by gender of the target 
male and female participants, respectively). For the media context evaluation, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two methodology conditions: paper-and-
pencil (N = 129) or online (N = 107), and one of two target conditions: Michael (N = 
102) and Sarah (N = 134). (See Tables 10 and 11 for a breakdown of context condition 
by participant gender for male and female participants, respectively). 
Materials 
Several sets of materials were constructed for this study, including stories, target 
person portfolios, Facebook accounts, paper-and-pencil hard copy materials matching 
the online condition, privacy settings booklets and some measures for the survey. Other 
materials were drawn from existing research including survey scales and scoring 
schemes. These materials are outlined below. 
Stories. There were three stories: History of the Internet Control Story, the Legal 
Privacy Agreement Story and the Personal Privacy Story (See Appendix C). All three 
stories were constructed to be approximately equal in length (506, 496, and 496 words, 
for the control, legal and personal story, respectively). Participants read one of three 
stories. In two conditions the stories provided information regarding privacy. In the 
History of the Internet Control Story condition, participants read a short passage that 
described the history of the Internet and its popularity. This vignette did not discuss 
privacy issues. The Legal Privacy Agreement Story was an excerpt taken directly from 
the privacy statement on the Facebook online website. This excerpt discussed the legal 
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privacy terms associated with the online network. The Personal Privacy Story was an 
adaptation of a story that appeared in the Globe and Mail (September 2008) which 
outlined potential consequences of putting personal information online. This vignette 
described the story of a young woman who was stalked and later approached by a 
reporter in a local coffee shop. The reporter went on to explain that he had located her 
by using only the information she had posted in her Facebook profile. She was shocked 
to find out that a complete stranger was able locate her actual whereabouts and identify 
her personally, without her awareness. 
Facebook Target Person Portfolio. Participants used information from a pre-
made portfolio that included the personal information of two fictional individuals: Sarah 
Barnes and Michael Barnes (see Appendix D). Information included a personal resume, 
an employment application, a list of the individual's "25 things about me", a short 
"About me" summary and a series of photos. Various pieces of information were 
included in the booklets that represented default, sensitive and stigmatizing information, 
as well as information relevant to various topics, such as relationship information and 
work information. For example, sexual orientation, religious and political views were 
included in the portfolio, and were considered stigmatizing information. All information 
was identical in the two pre-made portfolios (e.g., both Sarah and Michael were 25 years 
old, both had the same degree from the same university, the same work history etc.), 
with the exception of photos and names. Participants used the information in the 
portfolios to create a Facebook profile. 
Materials for the Online Condition 
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For the online condition, participants were provided with a folder on the desktop 
that contained all of the photos that were in the portfolio, so that they could upload the 
photos directly into Facebook. While photos for Michael and Sarah depicted a different 
person, there photos that were chosen were equivalent in content. For both, photos were 
goofy, serious, and contained shots of scenery, friends, family and relationship partners. 
Participants were tested individually, using the same make and model of PC based 
computers with Internet access. All participants used the standard Facebook website to 
construct their profile. 
Facebook Accounts. Online Facebook accounts were generated for each 
participant in the online condition. Prior to the study session, researchers created a series 
of new email accounts in Hotmail which were then used to open up associated Facebook 
accounts. Each Facebook account was opened using the newly created email address, a 
fictitious name, and fictitious birth date information. The existing blank Facebook 
accounts were then used during the study session. Participants were able to upload any 
photos and include any information in their profile that they desired, based on the 
information provided to them in the pre-made target portfolio. 
Materials for the Paper-and-Pencil Condition 
Participants in the paper-and-pencil condition were provided with a paper-and-
pencil version of a Facebook profile (see Appendix E for an example page). This 27 
page booklet consisted of one screenshot of each page available to users online when 
actually in Facebook, including the pages that outlined privacy setting options. All of the 
available drop down tab options and checkbox options were displayed in the screenshots 
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so that participants could simply circle their preferred choice. Participants were also 
provided with a series of 13 numbered photos printed on paper that they could choose to 
include in their profile. These photos were identical to the photos included in the online 
condition. They simply indicated by photo number which one they wished to include in 
albums or as a profile picture. Participants could include any information in their profile 
that they desired, based on the information provided to them in the pre-made target 
portfolio. 
Privacy Settings Booklet. Participants were provided with a privacy settings 
booklet that outlined all of the privacy and account settings available to users in 
Facebook (see Appendix F for an example page from the privacy settings booklet). The 
eight page booklet contained subheadings with specific types of settings that participants 
could easily flip to for reference. All settings were described, and then screenshots of the 
actual settings page as seen online were provided. In addition, instructions on how to 
employ each setting were provided. For example, participants were provided with 
statements such as "If you want to limit or control who can search for you on Facebook, 
you can click on "search visibility", and choose from a variety of settings (e.g., only 
friends can search for you, all my networks and friends of friends, so virtually anyone). 
You can also limit what people can see about you, and how they can contact you after 
locating your profile online". 
Scoring tool. This study used an existing scoring tool that was established for 
coding Facebook profiles (see Study 1 A, B and C). This scoring tool allowed for 
assessment of overall disclosure in Facebook (based on coding scheme from Study 1 A), 
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disclosure across three categories of information (personal identity information, 
sensitive personal information, and stigmatizing information) (based on coding scheme 
from Study 1 B), disclosure within various topic areas (e.g., personal information, work 
information) (based on coding scheme from Study 1 C), and employment of privacy 
settings within Facebook. The pre-established checklist was comprised of 97 
dichotomously scored items (i.e., whether the piece of information was present or 
absent) and three identification items (i.e., username link, the network searched, and the 
size of the overall network). To examine disclosure of content within Facebook, eight of 
the topic categories from Study 1 C were adopted for the current study, including: 
Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education 
information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship 
information. These eight were chosen based on the information that participants could 
include in the profiles. For example, some of the scales used in Study 1 C contained 
items that were not provided to users, and were thus not included in the profiles. 
To assess use of privacy settings, an additional 25 dichotomously scored items 
were added to the scoring tool. Each of the 25 new items represented a possible change 
in privacy settings. A three step process was used to establish the privacy settings coding 
scheme. First, a blank Facebook profile was created. Second, a researcher signed into 
the blank profile and recorded all of the pre-set or default privacy settings. Third, for all 
of the participant profiles, settings were recorded, and for each privacy setting that was 
changed from the default setting, a score of 1 was given, if no change was made, a score 
of 0 was given. For example, users are able to change the "public search" option, or 
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whether or not other users in Facebook can search for them through Facebook by means 
of typing their name into a search bar. By default, this option is selected, allowing for 
public search. In this case, this setting, if selected, would receive a score of 0 indicating 
that no change was made from the default. Alternatively, if unchecked or unselected, a 
score of 1 would be assigned indicating that a change had been made to the setting. 
Online Survey. Participants completed an online survey at the beginning of the 
study session (see Appendix G). This survey contained a broad range of measures, 
including standardized and newly created measures. The first section included a 
demographic sheet. The second section contained measures assessing perceptions of 
technology, uses of technology and Facebook and familiarity with technology. The third 
section assessed views about the self (i.e. self-disclosure and public self-consciousness), 
personality (extraversion), and privacy attitudes and behaviours (e.g., privacy 
behaviours when online, concern for privacy in general and online). Lastly, participants 
responded to a scale assessing perceptions of the virtual other (the audience for whom 
they are disclosing), and a measure of social desirability. 
Demographics. Participants responded to three questions pertaining to age, 
gender and relationship status. 
Unstandardized/Newly Created Measures. 
For descriptive information for unstandardized/newly created measures and items, refer 
to Tables 12 and 13. The following scales were chosen based on previous research that 
has examined factors related to use of technology (e.g., Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel 
& Fox, 2002; Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007; Butt & Phillips, 2008; Mueller, 
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Wood, Willoughby, Ross & Specht, 2008) and the need to explore potentially novel 
predictors of use such as the virtual audience. 
Computer Use. Participants were asked to indicate how many hours per week 
they used the computer for three purposes, including: the internet, recreation (e.g., 
games, communication), and work/school. Participants were asked to fill in the number 
of hours per week they used the internet for each purpose. 
Attitudes towards Computers (Mueller, Wood, Willoughby, Ross, & Specht, 
2008). This measure assessed general computer use and expertise (familiarity with 
computers) as well as comfort and ease with computers and the Internet. In total, there 
were three items in this scale. For example, participants were asked how knowledgeable 
they were about using computer software. Response options ranged from 1 (very 
knowledgeable) to 7 (not at all knowledgeable). Participants were also asked about how 
comfortable they felt when using computers. Response options ranged from 1 (very 
comfortable) to 7 (very uncomfortable). Cronbach's alpha was .80, indicating good 
reliability. 
Internet Security Concerns and Behaviours. This measure contained 26 items 
assessing concern with internet security, as well as behaviours related to protecting 
security online. This measure employs 7-point Likert type scales, with response options 
ranging from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (absolutely true of me). Participants were asked 
to respond to statements such as "Please indicate the degree to which you have used this 
strategy to protect your privacy online: Installed Antivirus software". Cronbach's alphas 
for the concern subscale were .87 and .91 for Virus Concern and Entity Concern, 
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respectively, indicating high reliability. For the Strategy Use Subscale, Cronbach's alphas 
were .75 for Software Strategy Use, .60 for and Privacy Strategy Use, and .44 for 
Password Strategy Use, indicating low to moderate high reliability. 
Facebook Usage Scale. Various items from Viegas' (2005) Blog Survey were 
adopted and modified, and new items were created and added to this scale. The 
Facebook Usage Scale assessed types of information posted on Facebook, amount of 
time spent using Facebook, awareness of other users' Facebook behavior, and 
familiarity and use of privacy settings in Facebook. In total, this measure contained 13 
items and employed 5-point Likert type scales. For the two subscales Degree of 
Disclosure and Consideration of Disclosure, Cronbach's alphas were .65 and .47, 
respectively, indicating moderate to low reliability. 
Facebook Privacy Settings Behaviours. Participants were asked about their 
privacy settings behaviours when using Facebook. For example, participants were asked 
to respond to items such as "How familiar are you with Facebook privacy settings?", 
and "How often have you advised others to employ their privacy settings?" In total, 
this measure contained 3 items, and employed 7-point Likert type scales. Cronbach's 
alpha for this measure was .79. 
The Virtual "Other". Participants were asked to indicate who they were 
thinking of (the audience) when posting personally revealing information. Participants 
were asked the following statement, "When you post personally revealing information in 
your profile, who are you thinking about?" Response options included: No one in 
particular, friends, family, business associates, employer, romantic partners, instructors, 
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acquaintances, ex-romantic partners, strangers, and anyone, and were rated using a 1 
{not at all true of me) to 7 (absolutely true of me) Likert type scale. Participants were 
also asked to indicate with a "yes" or "no" whether or not there was someone or 
something limiting them from posting information. The two items in the Myself/Friends 
subscale were significantly correlated at the .001 level (r = .57). Cronbach's alpha for 
the Other Referents subscale was .83, indicating good reliability. 
Short Privacy Survey. Participants responded to items assessing their use of the 
privacy booklet provided to them in the study. In addition, participants indicated on a 
scale from 1 (not at all enjoyable) to 7 (extremely enjoyable) how enjoyable they found 
the profile creation task. In total, this measure contained 6 items, and employed a variety 
of question types including 7-point Likert type scales, dichotomous yes or no response 
options, and fill-in-the-blanks. 
Standardized Measures 
For descriptive information for each standardized measure and corresponding 
subscale refer to Table 14. 
Self-Disclosure: The Temperament and Target Inventory (Cloninger, 
Przybeck, Svrakic & Wetzel, 1994). This measure consisted of 13 items assessing self-
disclosive behaviours, and employed a 7-point Likert scale. Participants were asked to 
respond to statements such as "I am open about my feelings", with response options 
ranging from 1 {not at all true of me) to 7 {very true of me). Higher scores indicated 
higher levels of self-disclosure. Previously established reliability for this scale was .86. 
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A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample with an 
outcome of .91, indicating very good reliability. 
Personal Attributes Survey (PAS): Public and Private Self-Consciousness 
(Buss, 1980). This measure consisted of 22 items assessing both public and private self-
consciousness, and employed a 7-point Likert scale with response options ranging from 
1 {not at all true of me) to 7 {very true of me). This scale consisted of two subscales, 
public and private self-consciousness. A total score of 12 was possible for the public 
self-consciousness subscale, and a total score of 10 was possible for the private self-
consciousness scale. A higher score on each subscale indicated higher levels of these 
factors. Participants were asked to respond to statements such as "I worry about what 
people think of me", and "I spend time reflecting on things". Previously established 
reliabilities for the subscales were .77 (Public SC) and .81 (Private SC). A Cronbach 
alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample with an outcome of 
.89, indicating good reliability. Reliability was also calculated for each of the individual 
subscales, revealing alphas of .85 for the public self-consciousness subscale and .87 for 
the private self-consciousness subscale, indicating higher reliability than reported in 
previous assessments. 
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) version 6 - Form 
40A (Paulhus, 1984). This measure consisted of 40 items assessing social desirability 
tendencies and employed a 7-point Likert scale. The BIDR consisted of two subscales, 
impression management (IM) and self-deceptive enhancement (SDE). A total score of 
20 was possible for each subscale, with a possible overall score of 40 for the entire 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
measure. Higher scores indicated more socially desirable responses. Participants were 
asked to respond to statements such as "I always know why I like things", with response 
options ranging from 1 {not true) to 7 {very true). Reliabilities for the subscales were 
.77-. 85 (IM) and .61-.11 (SDE) based on a sample of undergraduates from the 
University of British Columbia. A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was 
calculated for the present sample with an outcome of .77, indicating similar reliability as 
reported in previous assessments. Reliability was also calculated for each of the 
individual subscales, revealing alphas of .71 for the IM subscale and .69 for the SDE 
subscale. 
BIG FIVE: short version (TIPI) (Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003). This 
measure consisted of 10 items assessing personality and employed a 7-point Likert scale 
with response options ranging from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly). The 
TIPI consisted of 5 subscales with 2 items in each including: Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experiences. 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
statements such as, "I see myself as: Extraverted, enthusiastic". A higher score 
on each subscale indicated a tendency towards that particular personality trait. 
Correlations between each of the five pairs of items were significant, suggesting good 
reliability (.47, .15, .30, .51, and .27, for Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experiences, respectively). 
The TIPI is recommended for use in studies that contain multiple surveys and in cases 
where time is a constraint, such as in the case of the current study where a large number 
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of measures were used. In addition, according to Gosling and colleagues, when 
compared to the larger Big Five measure of personality the TIPI yielded adequate levels 
of convergence with widely used Big Five measures, test-re-test reliability, and 
convergence between self and others ratings. For these reasons, the decision was made 
to use the shorter version. 
Online Privacy Attitudes Scale (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007). 
This measure consisted of 16 items assessing concerns about establishing and 
maintaining privacy online. This scale employed a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
{not at all concerned) to 7 {very concerned). Participants are asked to respond to 
statements such as "In general, how concerned are you about your privacy while you are 
using the internet?" Higher scores indicated a greater concern for maintaining privacy 
online. A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample 
with an outcome of .93 indicating very high reliability. 
Online Privacy Behaviours Scale (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007). 
This measure consisted of 12 items assessing behaviours related to establishing and 
maintaining privacy online. This scale employed a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
{not at all concerned) to 7 {very concerned). Participants are asked to respond to 
statements such as "How often do you watch for ways to control what people send you 
online (such as check boxes that allow you to opt-in or opt-out of certain offers)?" This 
measure consisted of two subscales: General Caution (N= 6) and Technical Protection 
(N= 6). Higher scores indicated higher levels of privacy behaviours related to these 
factors. A Cronbach alpha for the overall measure was calculated for the present sample 
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with an outcome of .80 indicating high reliability. Reliability was also calculated for 
each of the individual subscales, revealing alphas of .78 for the General Caution 
subscale and .72 for the Technical Protection subscale. 
Procedure 
Prior to participating, all participants completed a consent form (see Appendix 
H). 
Upon consent, participants were instructed to complete the online survey at the 
beginning of the study session. All participants filled out the online survey on individual 
computer terminals. In order to ensure privacy of response, participants were seated at 
every other computer terminal, allowing ample space in between participants. Sessions 
ranged from one to 15 participants with five participants being tested at once on average, 
which enhanced compliance and ensured that participants read the stories provided to 
them. Following the completion of the online survey task, participants were given one of 
the three privacy stories to read. After reading the story, participants in the online 
condition were given Facebook log-in information, including an individual user name 
and password. Once participants were logged into a blank Facebook profile, they were 
told to construct an online personal profile for the person whose information they had 
been given (Michael or Sarah). In the paper-and-pencil condition, participants were 
provided with a booklet of screenshots that directly corresponded to each screen 
viewable in Facebook and they were told to construct an online personal profile for the 
person whose information they had been given (Michael or Sarah). For the cover story, 
participants were told that there were two conditions, one in which they created a profile 
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for themselves and another where they created a profile for another person. They were 
told that they were assigned to the condition where they would create a profile for 
someone else based on that person's actual information. In order to encourage 
participants to complete the profiles in as natural a way as possible, all participants were 
told in the cover story that the target person for whom they were creating the profile was 
a real person, that they had volunteered their personal information, and that this person 
may have the opportunity to view the profile once it was completed. All participants 
were instructed to use as much or as little information as they felt necessary. A verbal 
explanation of the constraints of the study was expressed to each participant, including 
the inability to add friends, join a network, or upload applications. In order to obtain as 
much information as possible about which pieces of information users would have liked 
to include in the profile, participants were instructed to indicate on the profile wall any 
additional information or features that they would have wanted included in the profile, 
but were not able to include (e.g., join a network, add friends etc.). In addition, all 
participants were provided with a booklet containing information about all of the 
available privacy settings in Facebook. Each participant was told that if they wished they 
could find detailed instructions describing the privacy settings on Facebook within the 
privacy settings booklet. Once they finished developing the online profile, participants 
were given the short 7-item survey. The sessions took approximately an hour and 15 
minutes to complete. Finally, after completing the study each participant received a 
debriefing form describing important privacy information, along with a summary of the 
current study (see Appendix I). Upon completion of the study session, a trained 
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researcher came in and coded each Facebook profile for overall content and privacy 
settings. 
Results 
Given the number of analyses and the different focal points in the present study 
the results are divided into sections to more clearly depict the analyses specific for each 
focal point of the study. Three sections are provided; Effect of Story and Gender, 
Additional Exploratory Predictors, and Effect of Media and Gender5. 
Question 1 
Effect of Story and Gender. The first area of inquiry involved examination of 
the impact of the stories on the construction of Facebook accounts. 
Design 
To address the first line of inquiry, a 3 (Story condition: Personal Privacy Story, 
Legal Privacy Agreement Story, History of the Internet Control Story) x 2 (Participant 
gender: Male, Female) x 2 (Target gender: Male, Female) experimental design was 
employed. 
Analyses 
Analyses explored whether any differences in disclosure and use of privacy 
settings in Facebook emerged as a function of story condition, gender of target and 
Cell sizes were insufficient to analyze story, context and gender together. Therefore, the 
decision was made to analyze the effects of story and gender and context and gender separately. 
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gender of participant6. Examination of these variables was carried out using univariate 
and multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA). Three analyses were conducted to 
examine disclosure: one for overall disclosure, one for disclosure divided into three 
grouping categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive personal information, and 
Stigmatizing information), and one for disclosure within eight content areas with 
Facebook (Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, 
Education information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and 
Relationship information) . Privacy settings were examined using regression analyses. It 
is important to note that only 49 participants out of 236 changed at least one privacy 
setting. 
Overall Disclosure. A univariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine 
overall disclosure within the Facebook profiles. Story condition, gender of target and 
gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors, and overall disclosure was 
entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed that there were no significant main 
effects of any of the fixed factors (largest F= 1.38) (See Table 16). 
Disclosure of Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information, 
and Stigmatizing Information. To address the question of how much information 
6
 In order to examine disclosure as a function of privacy settings usage, all analyses examining story and 
gender were repeated using only those participants who did not employ settings. Patterns were consistent 
with results found for the entire sample. 
7
 Coding categories were adopted from Study 1 B and 1 C (see Scoring Tool in Materials section). 
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participants disclosed in three risk categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive 
personal information, and Stigmatizing information), a multivariate analysis of variance 
was conducted. For disclosure in the three grouping categories, story condition, gender 
of target and gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors, and personal 
identity information, sensitive personal information, and stigmatizing information were 
entered as the dependent variables. Results revealed that although there were no 
significant main effects, there were two significant interactions. 
First, there was a significant interaction of gender of participant and story 
condition for sensitive information (See Table 17). Two follow-up one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted, one for males and one for females, to identify where the differences 
were occurring. For each, story condition was entered as the between subjects variable, 
and sensitive information was entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed that 
the difference was significant for females (F (2, 130) = 3.36,p = .04), such that they 
disclosed significantly more sensitive information in the History of the Internet Control 
Story condition, and significantly less sensitive information in the Legal Privacy 
Agreement Story condition (See Table 17). 
Second, there was a significant interaction of gender of participant and gender of 
target for stigmatizing information (See Table 17). Two follow-up one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted, one for male targets and one for female targets, to identify where the 
differences were occurring. For each, gender of the participant was entered as the 
between subjects variable, and stigmatizing information was entered as the dependent 
variable. Results revealed that the difference was significant for female targets {t (129) = 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
2.36, p = .02), such that male participants disclosed more stigmatizing information for a 
female target than did female participants (See Table 17). 
Disclosure within Facebook Content Areas. To address the question of how 
much information participants disclosed in eight content areas within Facebook 
(Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education 
information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship 
information), a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Story 
condition, gender of target and gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors, 
and all eight topics were entered as the dependent variables. 
Results revealed that there was a significant main effect of gender of participant 
for one out of the eight topics. Specifically, when disclosing contact information in 
particular, males included significantly more than did females (See Table 18). While 
there were no significant main effects for either story condition or gender of the target, 
the main effect was qualified by significant interactions. 
Specifically, results revealed four significant interaction effects, two for contact 
information and two for view information. First, there was a significant interaction of 
gender of participant and story condition for contact information (See Table 18). Two 
follow-up one-way ANOVAs were conducted, one for males and one for females, to 
identify where the differences were occurring. For each, story condition was entered as 
the between subjects variables, and contact information was entered as the dependent 
variable. Results revealed that the difference was significant for males, (F (2, 97) = 3.24, 
p = .04), such that they disclosed significantly less contact information in the History of 
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the Internet Control Story condition than either of the Legal Privacy Agreement Story or 
Personal Privacy Story conditions (See Table 18). Interestingly, while story condition 
did not have a significant impact on disclosure for female participants, it is of note that 
females disclosed less overall than males in both the Legal Privacy Agreement Story and 
Personal Privacy Story conditions. 
Second, there was a significant interaction of story condition and gender of the 
target for contact information. Three follow-up independent t-tests were conducted, one 
for each story condition, to identify where the differences were occurring. For each, 
gender of the target was entered as the grouping variable, and contact information was 
entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed that after having read the personal 
privacy story, there was less disclosure of contact information for female targets than for 
male targets (See Table 18). 
Finally, there were significant interactions of gender of participant and gender of 
target for both contact and view information. For contact information, two follow-up 
independent t- tests were conducted, one for males and one for females, to identify 
where the differences were occurring. For each, gender of target was entered as the 
grouping variable, and contact information was entered as the dependent variable. 
Results revealed that the difference was significant for males, (t (98) = 2.55,p = .01), 
such that they disclosed significantly more contact information for male targets than 
they did for female targets (See Table 18). For view information, a follow-up 
independent t- test was conducted, one for male targets and one for female targets, to 
identify where the differences were occurring. For each, gender of participant was 
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entered as the grouping variable, and view information was entered as the dependent 
variable. Results revealed that the difference was significant for female targets, (t (130) 
= 2.10, p = .008), such that male participants disclosed far more view information about 
a female target than did female participants (See Table 18). 
Privacy Settings Use. While only 48 participants out of 236 (20.3%) changed at 
least one privacy setting, this was not unexpected. Previous research has found that very 
few users choose to employ privacy settings (e.g., Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 
2005; Gross & Acquisti, 2006; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Preliminary analyses indicated 
that each condition had at least one participant who employed privacy settings. Due to 
small sample sizes, only descriptive analyses were available8. A count was conducted to 
compare privacy settings by story condition, and revealed that more privacy settings 
were employed in the Personal Privacy Story condition as compared to the two other 
story conditions. In terms of gender of the participant, females tended to employ more 
settings than did males. For target gender, males and females employed more settings 
for a target of the same gender. Finally, females in the Personal Privacy Story condition 
employed more settings for female targets in particular (See Table 19). 
Question 2 
Additional Exploratory Predictors. The second area of inquiry involved an 
exploratory examination of additional variables that may predict disclosure and privacy 
settings use. 
8
 Non-parametric analyses were not possible given that 71.4% of expected cell sizes that were less than 5. 
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Factor analysis: Scale aggregation 
In order to firmly establish which items should be aggregated, to confirm the 
relationships between these variables, and to identify the factors underlying the data, a 
principal components factor analysis with a Varimax rotation was conducted for four out 
of the eight created measures used in the current study. Only those items within each 
measure that were assessed using the same scale (e.g., 7-point Likert type scale) were 
included in the factor analyses. 
Items were selected based on two criteria. First, factors were selected that were 
measured by more than one item. Second, items that loaded highly on one factor were 
retained. Items that loaded moderately on more than one factor were judged not only 
based on factor loadings, but on item content and theory. The decision was then made to 
group these particular items together with items of a similar nature. Reliability was 
conducted for scales that had more than 3 items using Cronbach's alpha. 
Attitudes towards Computers. For the attitudes towards computer scale, three 
items were subjected to factor analysis, and results revealed that there was one factor 
with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00 (Eigenvalue = 2.48), which accounted for a total of 
82.60% of the variance. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 19. The 
following aggregate scale was created based on the factor loadings: Positive Attitudes 
towards Computers. Cronbach's alpha was .80, indicating good reliability. 
Internet Security Concerns and Behaviours. 
Concern Subscale. There were two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, 
which collectively accounted for a total of 76.95% of the variance. Eigenvalues ranged 
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were 1.04 and 5.12, and indicated that the two factors explained 12.98% and 63.98% of 
the variance, respectively. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 20. Two 
aggregate scales were created based on the factor loadings: Virus Concern and Entity 
Concern. Virus concern referred to a concern over breaches in security from virus, spam 
and spyware. Entity concern referred to a concern over breaches in online security from 
hackers, online stalkers and other unauthorized access by a party or individual. 
Cronbach's alpha was .87 for Virus Concern and .91 for and Entity Concern, indicating 
high reliability. 
Strategy Use Subscale. There were three factors with Eigenvalues greater than 
1.00, which collectively accounted for a total of 60.03% of the variance. Eigenvalues 
ranged from 1.17 to 2.82, and indicated that the three factors explained 12.97%, 15.78 
and 31.28% of the variance, respectively. The factor loading matrix is presented in Table 
21. Three aggregate scales were created based on the factor loadings: Software Strategy 
Use, Privacy Strategy Use and Password Strategy Use. Cronbach's alphas were .75 for 
Software Strategy Use, .60 for and Privacy Strategy Use, and .44 for Password Strategy 
Use, indicating low to moderate high reliability. 
Facebook Usage Scale. For the Facebook usage scale, there were five factors 
with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which collectively accounted for a total of 58.07% 
of the variance. Eigenvalues ranged from 1.02 to 2.50, and indicated that the five factors 
explained 19.25%, 13.00%, 9.74%, 8.27% and 7.81 % of the variance, respectively. The 
factor loading matrix is presented in Table 22. Results indicated that no items loaded 
highly on the fourth factor (highest loading = .40), therefore this factor was omitted. 
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Two items, "How well do you feel you know your profile's audience?" and "How liable 
do you think you are for the things you post in your profile?" were the only items to load 
on factors three and five, respectively, and were therefore omitted from scale 
aggregation. The following two aggregate scales were created based on the factor 
loadings: Degree of Disclosure and Consideration of Degree of Disclosure. Cronbach's 
alpha was .65 for Degree of Disclosure and .47 for and Consideration of Degree of 
Disclosure, indicating low to moderate reliability. 
Facebook Privacy Settings Behaviours Scale. For the Facebook Privacy 
Settings Behaviours Scale there was one factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00, 
which accounted for a total of 70.58% of the variance. The Eigenvalue was 2.12, and 
indicated that the factor explained 70.58% of the variance. The factor loading matrix is 
presented in Table 23. The following aggregate scale was created based on the factor 
loadings: Privacy Settings Behaviour. Cronbach's alpha was .79. 
The Virtual Other. For the Virtual Other, there were four factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which collectively accounted for a total of 68.49% of the 
variance. Eigenvalues ranged from 1.00 to 4.24, and indicated that the four factors 
explained 35.31%, 15.37%, 9.44% and 8.37 % of the variance, respectively. The factor 
loading matrix is presented in Table 24. No items loaded highly on factor three (highest 
loading = .33), so this factor was omitted. One item, "When you post personally 
revealing information in your profile, who are you thinking about? No one", was the 
only item to load highly on factor four and was therefore omitted from scale 
aggregation. The following two aggregate scales were created based on the factor 
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loadings: Myself/Friends and Other Referents. The two items in the Myself/Friends 
subscale were significantly correlated at the .001 level (r = .57). Cronbach's alpha for 
Other Referents was .83, indicating good reliability. 
Design 
The design of the current study included a number of variables that could 
identify what factors predict disclosure of information in terms of personal attitudes, 
experiences and behaviours and also variables that could potentially explain disclosure 
apart from the experimental manipulations. Analyses of these variables were exploratory 
as their impact was not directly associated with previous literature. Specifically, a series 
of regressions were conducted to examine the predictive power of various variables 
including attitudes towards computers, online privacy attitudes, online privacy 
behaviours, personality, social desirability, reported disclosure and the virtual other. 
Scales that measured similar constructs were examined together in the analyses. For 
example, all the personality measures were examined as potential predictors in one 
regression. This was done to increase parsimony in the analyses, and to examine the 
predictive power of specific categories of variables (e.g., personality, online privacy 
attitudes) that may have been associated with disclosure and use of privacy settings. In 
total, there were seven groups of predictor variables. For an overview of the measures 
within each of the seven groups, refer to Table 25. 
Descriptives 
For the short privacy survey, 25.3% of participants reported using the privacy 
setting booklet that was provided (65% did not use it, and 9.7% did not answer this 
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question). When asked why they did not use the booklet, of those who gave a response, 
40.1% participants indicated that they already knew the settings, .8% indicated they had 
no time to read it, 3.5% were not interested in reading it, 3.1% didn't want to use the 
booklet, and 2.7% were not interested in using privacy settings. The remaining 15.6% 
indicated a combination of reasons for not using the booklet including lack of interest, 
already knowing about the settings and lack of time to read through the booklet. Of the 
25.3% of participants who did use the booklet, 44.6% reported that they learned 
something new about the privacy settings (49.2% indicated they did not learn anything 
new, and 6.2% did not answer this question). When asked about how enjoyable the task 
was of creating a Facebook profile for another person, the majority of participants 
indicated that they found the task to be more than somewhat enjoyable (i.e., indicated 5 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all enjoyable), to 7 (extremely enjoyable). 
Participants were also given the opportunity to fill in a comment box about the study. A 
common theme emerged, whereby participants commented on how it really made them 
think twice about what they were including in the profiles, especially because the 
information was for another person. 
Analyses 
For each regression analysis, one of the seven groups of measures was entered as 
the independent variable. One dependent variable was entered per regression. Using a 
Bonferroni correction the probability for each comparison was corrected to p < .007 to 
accommodate the number of tests conducted. For disclosure, seven regressions were 
conducted for each of the dependent measures: overall disclosure, disclosure of Personal 
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identity information, Sensitive personal information, and Stigmatizing information, and 
disclosure within eight content areas of Facebook (Personal information, Picture and 
Album information, Work information, Education information, Age information, 
Contact information, View information, and Relationship information). For privacy 
settings seven binary logistic regressions were conducted to examine whether the 
measures predicted the likelihood of employing settings or not (dichotomous scoring). 
Following, seven linear regressions were conducted to examine whether the measures 
predicted the number of privacy settings that were changed. 
Overall Disclosure. To address the question of which variables predicted 
disclosure overall, seven linear regressions were conducted. Results revealed that none 
of the seven regressions were significant. 
Disclosure of Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information, 
and Stigmatizing Information. To address the question of which variables predicted 
disclosure in three categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive personal 
information, and Stigmatizing information), linear regressions were conducted. Results 
revealed that one linear regression was significant. Specifically, positive attitudes 
towards computers was a significant predictor of disclosure of personal identity 
information (t (224) = 3.03,p = .003, R2 = .04). As positive attitudes towards computers 
increased, so did disclosure of personal identity information. No other regressions 
significantly predicted disclosure of either sensitive information or stigmatizing 
information. 
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Disclosure within Facebook Content Areas. To address the question of which 
variables predicted disclosure in eight content areas within Facebook (Personal 
information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education information, 
Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship 
information), linear regressions were conducted. 
Results revealed that none of the regressions were significant at the .007 level. 
While not significant, there was a trend (at the .07 level) such that increased positive 
attitudes towards computers were related to a greater likelihood of disclosing both 
education and address information. 
Privacy Settings Use. Even given that there was a relatively small percentage of 
participants who made at least one setting change (approx. 20%), it was important to 
examine factors related to privacy settings behaviours. It was not surprising that so few 
participants made any privacy settings changes, as previous research has indicated that 
this tends to be the case (e.g., Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Gross & 
Acquisti, 2006; Milne & Culnan, 2004). The current analysis sought to examine, within 
the constraints of the small study sample, which variables predicted privacy settings 
usage. To do this, seven binary and seven linear regressions were conducted. Binary 
regressions results revealed that none of the seven groups of measures predicted whether 
or not privacy settings were employed. When specific number of settings employed was 
examined, four out of seven linear regressions were significant. Specifically, results 
showed that private self-consciousness, reported self-disclosure, social desirability: 
impression management and the virtual other: other referents significantly predicted use 
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of privacy settings (t (205) = 2.44, p = .02, R2 = .09, t (220) = 2.30, p = .02, R2 = .03, t 
(193) = 1.96, p = .05, R2 = .03 and t (2, 206) = 2.70,/? = .01, R2 = .04, for private self-
consciousness, reported self-disclosure, social desirability: impression management and 
the virtual other: other referents, respectively). In all cases, as these variables increased, 
so did use of privacy settings. 
Question 3 
Effect of Media (Context) and Gender 
Design 
A third set of analyses was conducted to examine the impact of media condition. 
Specifically, a 2 (Context condition: Paper-and-pencil, Online) x 2 (Participant gender: 
Male, Female) x 2 (Target gender: Male, Female) experimental design was employed. 
Analyses 
Analyses explored whether any differences in disclosure and use of settings in 
Facebook emerged as a function of context condition, gender of target and gender of 
participant . Examination of these variables was carried out using univariate and 
multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA). Three analyses were conducted for 
disclosure: one for overall disclosure, one for disclosure divided into three grouping 
categories (Personal identity information, Sensitive personal information, and 
9
 In order to examine disclosure as a function of pnvacy settings usage, all analyses examining context and 
gender were repeated using only those participants who did not employ settings. Patterns were consistent 
with results found for the entire sample. 
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Stigmatizing information), and one for disclosure within eight content areas with 
Facebook (Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, 
Education information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and 
Relationship information). Privacy settings were examined using regression analyses. 
Overall Disclosure. A univariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine 
overall disclosure within the Facebook profiles. Context condition, gender of target and 
gender of participant were entered as the between subjects factors, and overall disclosure 
in Facebook was entered as the dependent variable. Results revealed a significant main 
effect of context, such that participants who filled out their profiles on paper-and-pencil 
included significantly more information overall than did participants who filled out their 
profiles online (See Table 26). 
Disclosure of Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information, 
and Stigmatizing Information. To address the question of how much information 
participants disclosed in three disclosure categories (personal identity information, 
sensitive personal information, and stigmatizing information), a multivariate analysis of 
variance was conducted. Context, gender of target and gender of participant were 
entered as the fixed factors, and disclosure in each of the three categories were entered 
as the dependent variables. Results revealed a significant main effect of context for 
sensitive information only (See Table 27). Participants who filled out paper-and-pencil 
profiles disclosed more sensitive information than those who filled out profiles online. 
While results indicated that there were no significant main effects of gender, there was a 
significant interaction of gender of participant by gender of target for stigmatizing 
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information in particular. Follow-up independent t-tests revealed that the difference was 
significant for female targets, (t (129) = 2.34, p = .02), such that male participants 
disclosed more stigmatizing information about a female target than did female 
participants (see Table 27). 
Disclosure within Facebook Content Areas. To address the question of how 
much information participants disclosed in eight content areas within Facebook 
(Personal information, Picture and Album information, Work information, Education 
information, Age information, Contact information, View information, and Relationship 
information), a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Context 
condition, gender of target and gender of participant were entered as the fixed factors, 
and all eight topics were entered as the dependent variables. 
Results revealed that there were significant main effects of context condition for 
three of the eight topics. Specifically, for relationship information (F (1, 216) = 6.86, p = 
.009), work information (F (1,216) = 17.71, p < .001) and contact information {F (1, 
216) = 26.95,/? < .001). In all three topic areas, disclosure was significantly greater in the 
paper-and-pencil condition as compared to the online condition (see Table 29). There 
were no significant main effects for either gender of the participant or gender of the target 
(largest F= 2.95). 
In total, there were four significant interactions. First, there were significant 
interaction effects of context condition and gender of the participant for education 
information (F{\, 216) = 7.81,/? = .01) and personal information {F{\, 216) = 3.99,/? = 
.05). Follow-up independent t-tests were conducted, one for paper-and-pencil and one for 
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online, to identify where the differences were occurring. For each, gender was entered as 
the grouping variable, and education and personal information were entered as the 
dependent variables. On paper-and-pencil, males disclosed more education information 
than females (t (127) = 2.36,/? = .02, Mmale = .63 and Mfemale= .49). In comparison, 
when online, males disclosed more personal information than females {t (101) = 2.19,/? = 
.03, Mmale = .60 and Mfemale= .48). 
Second, there were significant interaction effects of gender of the participant and 
gender of the target for relationship information {F (1, 216) = 135, p = .01) and view 
information (F( l , 216) = 6.38,/? = .01). For relationship information, follow-up 
independent t-tests were conducted, one for males and one for females, to identify where 
the differences were occurring. For each, gender of the target was entered as the 
grouping variable, and relationship information was entered as the dependent variable. 
Disclosure of relationship information differed by target gender for females only (t (134) 
= 2.07, p = .04), such that they disclosed more for male targets {Mmalechar = .67) than 
for female targets (Mfemalechar = .52). 
For view information, follow-up independent t-tests were conducted, one for 
female targets and one for male targets, to identify where the differences were occurring. 
For each, gender of the participant was entered as the grouping variable, and view 
information was entered as the dependent variable. Disclosure of view information 
differed by gender of participant for female targets only (t (130) = 2.10, p = .008), such 
that males disclosed more {Mmale = .60) than did females {Mfemale = .38). 
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Privacy Settings Use. Preliminary analyses indicated that each condition had at 
least two participants who employed privacy settings (see Table 30). Due to small cell 
sizes, this analysis was descriptive in nature. A count was conducted to compare privacy 
settings by context condition, and revealed that more privacy settings were employed in 
the paper-and-pencil condition as compared to the online condition. In terms of gender 
of the participant, females tended to employ more settings than did males. For target 
gender, females employed far more settings for a target of the same gender. Finally, 
females in the paper-and-pencil condition employed more settings for female targets in 
particular (See Table 30). 
Discussion 
What is Disclosed: Effect of Story and Gender 
Overall Disclosure 
Overall, in keeping with findings from Study 1 B examination of overall 
disclosure did not yield significant findings in Study 2, therefore further reinforcing the 
need to assess disclosure in terms of specific disclosure categories, as well as by topic. 
However, important outcomes related to the type of story, gender, and subsequent 
disclosure were apparent in Study 2. First, while hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported 
statistically, the Personal Privacy Story resulted in the lowest amount of overall 
disclosure, followed by the Legal Privacy Agreement Story and finally the History of the 
Internet Control Story, which contained the highest amount of disclosure. This pattern is 
in the hypothesized direction, albeit not significant. It could be that the stories, especially 
the Personal Privacy Story, were salient but not as salient as they might have been with 
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more detail and perhaps gender specific information. Perhaps the impact of stories about 
both genders or stories that depict a variety of scenarios and incidences of privacy 
invasion resulting from over-disclosure rather than a single instance is worthy of 
investigation. In addition, if the stories had contained more vivid and negative outcomes 
as a result of the over-disclosure, the patterns of results may have been strengthened. 
Alternatively, it may be more important to examine the type of information, as will be 
conducted below, that can be inhibited as a function of the story rather than sheer 
quantity, as some types of information may be more risky to disclose than others. 
Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and 
Stigmatizing Information 
In terms of the three disclosure categories, there were significant differences in 
disclosure of both sensitive and stigmatizing information in particular. First, female 
participants disclosed significantly more sensitive information in the History of the 
Internet Control Story, and significantly less sensitive information in the Legal Privacy 
Agreement Story. While it was originally hypothesized (see hypothesis 5) that the 
Personal Privacy Story would have the greatest impact on disclosure for females in 
particular, it appears that for females there was something especially salient about a legal 
document. Gender norms are not supportive of female criminality (Steffensmeier & 
Allan, 1996), and favour instead a motherly, caring and responsible image of females. In 
addition, females are raised to be moral, nurturing individuals with a strong "ethic of 
care", or in other words, a strong sensitivity to the needs of others (Gilligan, 1982). It is 
speculated that, due to moral development and socialization processes, females may be 
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more inclined to abide by rules and regulations that are framed in a legal way. Therefore, 
the strength of a legal privacy policy may be augmented for females, thus resulting in less 
disclosure in this condition in particular. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that the legal document was seen as more formal, 
and as a result, female participants in particular took this story more seriously, resulting 
in less disclosure. Second, in regards to stigmatizing information, male participants in 
particular disclosed significantly more for a female target. While not significant, there 
was also a similar trend for female participants, such that they tended to disclose more for 
a male target. Even though the information provided did not convey minority status (e.g., 
homosexual orientation, or extremist political or religious views), examination of less 
extreme information that could be used to potentially stigmatize another person (even 
including fairly common religious and political views) was of interest and may still be 
viewed as threatening. As a result, this information may activate collective group 
identification (Tajfel, 1982) and even an inclination to protect one's own gender. In this 
case, both genders may elicit behaviours that reflect a greater value for their own gender, 
thus limiting disclosure of potentially damaging information. Alternatively, perhaps the 
participants identify more with the target of the same gender and act in accordance with 
their own disclosure needs. More specifically, it could be that participants are acting as 
though the information they are disclosing about the target is in fact information about 
them, and, therefore, limit sharing information that could be used to humiliate or discredit 
when the gender of the target matches their own gender. 
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Different Topic Categories 
When disclosure of specific topics was examined, interesting results emerged for 
two out of the eight topic scales: contact information and view information. Male 
participants tended to disclose more contact information overall than did female 
participants. This finding is consistent with research that has found that male disclosure 
may be topic dependent (Derlega, Durham, Gockel & Sholis, 1981). It is also suggested 
that males may also be more comfortable disclosing topics that are more prohibited, 
including contact information. Moreover, it may be that females are more cautious and 
feel a greater sense of social responsibility (Gilligan, 1982); especially in the case where 
information is being disclosed for another person they have never met. 
While males were more likely than females to disclose contact information for 
another person, disclosure was also dependent on story. Surprisingly, males who read a 
control story about the history of the Internet disclosed less contact information than 
males who read either the Personal Privacy or Legal Agreement stories. This finding was 
unexpected and surprising as the two other conditions were specifically designed to 
reduce not increase disclosure. This may be a spurious finding. Alternatively, after 
reading the History of the Internet Control story, which was really not about Facebook 
and generally not personally interesting, it could be that this may have made the task less 
interesting or engaging. This may have resulted in less overall involvement in the task, 
and may have been especially so for the males in the sample. 
There were important interactions between story and target gender. In partial 
support for hypothesis 5, results demonstrated that the Personal Privacy Story resulted in 
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less disclosure of contact information for female targets. Moreover, male participants 
seemed to be particularly sensitive to the gender of the target, and disclosed less contact 
details for female targets than for male targets, offering partial support for hypothesis 4. 
While this is not entirely surprising given that the story depicted an incidence in which a 
female was located and confronted by a reporter based on disclosure of personal contact 
details, this does reinforce the idea that perhaps females are viewed as more vulnerable 
and even less competent (Diekman & Eagly, 2000), especially by males, and as such 
disclosures that could result in bodily harm or potential physical harassment are more 
carefully considered. 
Differences also emerged for political and religious views. Specifically, male 
participants disclosed more view information about a female target than did female 
participants. This finding is not surprising given that both political and religious views 
were included in the stigmatizing information scale and these findings are consistent with 
results obtained for the disclosure categories, such that males disclosed more stigmatizing 
information for a female target. In addition, this is also somewhat consistent with 
findings from Study 1 C where results confirmed that males expressed more information 
about political and religious views overall than did females, albeit in Study 2 this is 
intensified for female targets in particular. 
Privacy Settings 
Not surprisingly, only 20.3% of participants chose to employ at least one privacy 
setting. This is consistent with previous studies that found that very few users chose to 
employ privacy settings (e.g., Berendt, Gunther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Gross & 
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Acquisti, 2006; Milne & Culnan, 2004). In support for hypothesis 5, as expected, by 
means of a descriptive count, more settings were employed in the privacy invasion story 
condition that in either of the other two story conditions. Moreover, as anticipated, 
females tended to employ more settings than males. Interestingly, both genders employed 
more settings for a target of the same gender. Consistent with the findings from Study 2 
examining disclosure, it appears as though males and females alike are more protective of 
targets of the same gender. Lastly, as predicted, females who read the privacy invasion 
story employed more settings for female targets. This finding is not surprising given that 
the story retold an incidence of privacy invasion occurring to a female, thus, perhaps 
encouraging female participants to engage in more protective behaviours for a female 
target in particular. The next step might be to provide participants with explicit privacy 
settings training and instruction, which would encourage use of settings and foster a 
greater understanding of the options available to users. 
Additional Exploratory Factors Related to Disclosure and Privacy Settings Use 
A secondary exploratory examination of additional predictors was conducted to 
assess the predictive power of various factors including: personality, familiarity with 
technology, attitudes and behaviours related to online privacy protection and the virtual 
audience. Although previous research has examined factors related to use of technology 
(e.g., Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007; Mueller, Wood, Willoughby, Ross & 
Specht, 2008; Ross, Orr, Sisic, Arseneault, Simmering & Orr, 2009), no known studies 
have explored novel predictors such as the virtual audience. 
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Disclosure 
While none of the exploratory factors were related to overall disclosure, results 
indicated that one factor, possessing positive attitudes towards computers in general, was 
a significant predictor of disclosure of personal identity information. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies that have looked at how attitudes towards technology 
relate to use of technology (Levine & Donitsa-Schmidt, 1998; Mueller, Wood, 
Willoughby, Ross & Specht, 2008). Perhaps possessing positive attitudes about 
technology encourages greater disclosure by buffering fears of information invasion 
because users feel more comfortable about their ability to protect themselves, and 
possibly have a better understanding of technology in the first place. Moreover, it is 
possible that because those individuals with more positive attitudes are more likely to use 
technology, the compounding effect of positive experiences with technology and fewer 
incidences of problems over time may encourage greater disclosure when using the 
technology. 
Interestingly, none of the other factors were related to disclosure. This begs the 
question; what else drives disclosure? In the current sample, a large majority of 
participants were university aged students. Following from Erikson's theory of 
psychosocial development (1968), it is possible that users in this age group possesses a 
certain degree of naivete about the self and may not have yet achieved a firm sense of 
identity (Jensen Arnett, 2000). As a result, these younger users may possess a greater 
desire for gratification and require more feedback from peers. As such, disclosure of 
personal details overshadows the requirement for information protection or censorship of 
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personal details. Even if self-presentation occurs online, and only positive attributes or 
the ideal self is conveyed, this may be putting users at risk of identity and security 
breaches. In comparison, older users may have a firmer sense of who they are, and may 
not possess the desire to disclose to the same degree as their younger counterparts. It is 
also possible that motivation to use the site differs between groups. For example, perhaps 
older users are using the site for the purpose of social connectivity, and for keeping in 
touch with close others within their tight social sphere. In comparison, it could be that 
younger users are using the site for a means to explore their possible selves and to self-
express. While this question was not answered in the current research, it is an area that 
merits further examination. Lastly, the notion of "culture" is one that may prove 
important in understanding disclosive communication online. Altman (1975) posited that 
individuals adjust privacy regulation according to both the environment and the internal 
state. He went on to acknowledge the importance of the social world, and the context in 
which privacy is negotiated. For some, Facebook may be considered a "culture", such 
that certain groups achieve a collective identity whereby standards of disclosure and 
access to information are set by the group (or the social world), not the individual. 
Consequently, users within these subcultures on Facebook may be inclined to act in a 
way that is consistent with what other users are doing. Not only do they act in accordance 
with the groups norms, this may even instill a sense of normalcy, indicating that if 
everyone else is doing it, it must be okay. While self-presentation may be viewed as a 
buffer against presenting more harmful information, given that when self-presenting, 
information tends to be idealized and more positive (Goffman, 1959), group standards 
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may dictate what is considered "ideal". If ideal information as set out by the subculture is 
information that puts the user at particular risk (e.g., posting drunk pictures or pictures of 
the user in compromising positions), problems may arise. At the same time, perhaps a 
desire for social acceptance within one's culture overrides rational thought about 
protecting personal information, and results in over-disclosure of personal information. 
There is obvious need for further exploration of additional factors. Even so, while 
the majority of the factors measured in the current study did not relate to disclosure, they 
may be associated with privacy settings use. This possibility was explored next. 
Privacy Settings 
In terms of settings, results revealed that the overall amount of variance in use of 
privacy settings predicted by the additional exploratory factors was quite small (R = 
.19). Even so, personality factors including private self-consciousness and social 
desirability: impression management did significantly relate to increased settings use. 
Perhaps in the case of private self-consciousness, participants who score higher on this 
measure may have been more self-reflective, and consequently more concerned with how 
their information might be used. As a result, they were also more likely to employ 
settings. Public self-consciousness, on the other hand, was not a significant predictor of 
settings use. Given that the premise of Facebook is based on creation of personal profiles 
and displaying personal information, perhaps Facebook itself is not viewed as public by 
some. It could be that for some users, creating a Facebook account is considered a more 
private activity. In addition, even despite the fact that Facebook is designed as a site for 
information sharing, this sharing may be considered to occur only within tight social 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
networks or within one's personal sphere. Therefore, whether or not one has a public 
focus does not relate to use of various features of the site. For social desirability, it is 
possible that participants detected the importance of privacy settings as a feature of the 
study, and, as such, utilized more of the available privacy settings. Alternatively, Paulhus 
(1984) views impression management as reflective of a more communal concern in 
individuals. As such, those who score higher on this scale may be more cautious about 
their actions, especially when their actions involve others. 
Worthy of note, although accounting for a small percentage of variance in privacy 
settings, the virtual audience and, in particular, having referents in mind other than the 
self or close friends was significantly related to greater use of privacy settings. Although 
weak, this finding may be considered encouraging since it seems as though users are 
more conscious about employing settings when less close others are in mind, but it is still 
a concern that friends are not considered to be a potential risk. In the case of Facebook, 
the inability to control accessibility of information displayed by friends may indirectly 
expose users to the risk of identity theft, and social and personal security issues. For 
example, if a friend tagged the user in their profile or in an album, and this friend did not 
have strict privacy settings employed, thus allowing for access to photos, the photos of 
the user are available to whoever the friend has in their friends list. If friends were 
considered more of a threat, users may be more likely to employ stricter settings so as to 
limit what friends can do with their information. For example, users can employ privacy 
settings that limit what content friends can view. By creating a group that contains only 
specific users (i.e., friends), users have the option to specify exactly which pieces of 
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information each group can see, thus selectively limiting access to certain content and 
indirectly limiting unwanted exposure of information via friends profiles. This previously 
overlooked area may prove to be especially important in understanding further how users 
perceive relationships and information sharing online, and how they may be putting 
themselves at risk unknowingly, but studying this factor may require revised approaches. 
In the current study, participants were asked about who they were thinking about when 
simply posting personally revealing information. While they were asked about the 
referent, participants were not asked about how each referent related to disclosure of 
specific kinds of information (e.g., photos, status updates etc.). Results may produce 
significant associations between virtual other and disclosure if topic of disclosure is 
broken down more finely. In addition, the virtual other may be a concern more so when 
the information is being posted about the self and not for another person, as in the case of 
the current study. For both disclosure and use of privacy settings a more in-depth and rich 
investigation of the dynamics and perceptions of various relationships both while online 
and offline and how they impact on disclosure and privacy settings use may prove 
insightful. The next step may be to conduct interviews, and ask users about their choices 
when posting specific kinds of personal information about themselves, at the time that the 
information is being posted, and who and/or what they are thinking about when 
employing specific settings. 
Descriptive examination of overall use and effectiveness of the provided privacy 
settings booklet yielded interesting results. When asked why they did not use the booklet, 
of those who gave a response, 40.1% participants indicated that they already knew the 
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settings. Even despite reporting knowing about the settings, and thus having no need to 
use the booklet, more than a quarter of these participants (25.7%) indicated that they 
learned something new about the settings that they previously did not know. This 
highlights the discrepancy between what users are saying they know and what they 
actually know. Is it possible that this effect reflects age or cohort differences in terms of 
understanding how much one knows in a certain domain (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger & 
Kruger, 2003). Presumably, as age increases so does experience and knowledge. 
Conceivably, those in their late teens or early adult years could have insufficient 
knowledge or expertise necessary to deduce what they know, and more importantly what 
they don't know. In the case of privacy settings, these individuals may reflect an 
overconfidence or overestimation of their true knowledge. 
Alternatively, it may be that users tend to go with the default, and fail to actively 
change the settings within Facebook. Users may be more inclined to go with the default 
option, either because they do not wish to actively change the option, or because it 
requires a certain level of engagement. Because settings are not presented in such a way 
that they are readily accessible, perhaps users perceive the task of employing settings as 
arduous. Without proper knowledge and the desire to explore available privacy options 
due to inaccessibility and incomprehensible explanations, as in the case of privacy 
policies, users are left to fend for themselves. In such cases, it appears that this results in 
a lack of use of settings entirely. This may indicate a need for more effective and 
comprehensive privacy settings training. 
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Effect of Media Context and Gender 
In order to gain a better understanding of how disclosure of information in 
traditional formats compares with disclosure online, the impact of media context on 
disclosure of information was examined. In addition, no known studies have compared 
privacy settings use across context, and, therefore, this novel area was also examined. 
Disclosure 
Contrary to expectations (hypothesis 7) and previous studies (e.g., Joinson, 2001; 
Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Wood, Nosko, Desmarais, Ross & 
Irvine, 2006), overall disclosure was greater on paper-and-pencil than online. This 
finding was quite surprising. It is possible that because the information was being 
disclosed for another individual and not for the participants themselves, there may have 
been a greater concern about the security of the information. This may be supported by 
the qualitative comments given by participants that reflected a strong sense of 
responsibility as well as hesitation over their disclosures, because the information was not 
their own. In the case of online information sharing, perhaps participants felt that this 
context in particular was more risky than simply writing personal details down on paper. 
Generally, studies have looked at disclosure specific to the self, such as in the case of 
survey material about personal opinions, attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Christofides, 
Muise & Desmarais, 2009). Patterns of disclosure across context, especially when online, 
may therefore be different when the information is being shared about someone else, 
especially a complete stranger. On the other hand, perhaps the knowledge or worry of 
information leakage is greater in an online setting, where not only the researchers have 
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access to the information, but potentially hundreds if not thousands of other users. This 
awareness or realization that exposure is greater online may give rise to greater vigilance 
when disclosing in this context. Alternatively, the nature of the paper-and-pencil booklet 
may have encouraged greater disclosure. Specifically, participants were given numerous 
screenshots in a booklet that was visible in its entirety. In contrast to online, where users 
must scroll through pull down tabs to access similar pages, perhaps the fact that the 
information was presented directly in front of the participants encouraged them to fill in 
more. It is also possible that the paper-and-pencil condition was not an authentic task, and 
was not as comparable to online as previously expected. A potential next step may be to 
have participants simply fill out profile information on a blank sheet, without the aid of a 
premade booklet. By allowing them to add in without as many obvious prompts, a better 
gauge of disclosure in this context may be obtained. 
Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and 
Stigmatizing Information 
A similar pattern emerged for one out of the three disclosure categories: sensitive 
information. More sensitive information was disclosed on paper-and-pencil than online. 
Again, there may be something specific to the information disclosed in the sensitive 
information disclosure category that is viewed as particularly risky, especially when 
disclosed online. Further explanation is provided in the next section. In addition, there 
was also a significant interaction of gender of participant by gender of target for 
stigmatizing information. Specifically, male participants disclosed significantly more and 
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female participants significantly less for a female target. These patterns are identical to 
those found in part 1 examining effect of story and gender. 
Different Topic Categories 
There were significant main effects of context for three of the eight topics, 
including work, relationship and contact information. Consistent with findings for 
disclosure overall and by disclosure category, disclosure of these topics was greater on 
paper-and-pencil than online. Perhaps sensitive information and these topic areas in 
particular are considered quite delicate in nature, given that they open up the user to 
breaches in personal and financial security. For example, sensitive information consisted 
of various items including information pertaining to one's employer and job position. Not 
surprising then, disclosure of work information was less online. It is suggested that 
disclosing contact information and work information may place users at risk of 
harassment and potentially loss of employment should employers access the information 
and feel the employee is reflecting inappropriate behavior online. In the case of 
relationship information, close others including romantic partners and family may also be 
placed at risk indirectly should they be located or otherwise identified via information 
found online. There could be something specific to certain content that is considered 
more unsafe to share, especially when online. 
Significant interactions also emerged between context and gender of participant 
for two of the eight topic scales: education information and personal information. On 
paper-and-pencil, males disclosed more education information than females. In 
comparison, when online, males disclosed more personal information than females. This 
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finding was quite puzzling, given the argument that certain types of information may be 
seen as more 'unsafe' than others. In the case of education information versus personal 
information, one might assume that personal information is more risky to share online 
than education information. It is proposed that, for some, online social networking 
profiles may be viewed as a less explicit way of meeting romantic partners and may even 
be seen as a less overt dating site. Even despite the fact that the target person was in a 
romantic relationship, perhaps for male participants in particular, this was an opportunity 
to share potentially desirable and insightful information about the target person that could 
potentially be used in future for dating purposes. Previous research examining gender 
differences in attitudes towards infidelity has found that males possessed more 
permissive attitudes (Lieberman, 1988) and also had a stronger desire to engage in 
unfaithful behavior (Prins, Buunk & VanYperen, 1993). By advertising information such 
as interests, activities and all "about me", items that were included in the personal 
information topic scale, it is speculated that perhaps male participants may have been 
"putting it out there" for the target and displaying information that another user may be 
interested in knowing should they be looking for a relationship. 
Finally, significant interactions emerged between gender of the participant and 
gender of the target for two of the topic scales: relationship information and view 
information. Findings revealed that disclosure of relationship information differed by 
target gender for females only, such that they disclosed more for male targets than for 
female targets. While this explanation is speculative, this may be a way for females to 
assert romantic status and faithfulness in the relationship, especially for the male target. 
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This argument stems from a similar argument made for increased disclosure of personal 
information online on the part of male participants. Males and females may view 
relationships differently, such that females may have less permissive attitudes about 
infidelity and may have an increased need to display this qualifying information, whereas 
males may view certain interactions as an opportunity to potentially meet new partners. 
Madden and Lenhart (2006) have found that relationship seekers often use the Internet as 
a means for locating potential dating partners. In terms of gender, Golub and colleagues 
(2007) found that males were more likely to report that they would consider dating 
someone online. 
Privacy Settings 
When privacy settings were examined descriptively, results revealed that more 
settings were employed on paper-and-pencil. Again, the nature of the paper-and-pencil 
booklet may have encouraged greater use of privacy settings. It is possible that users find 
it overwhelming to find the appropriate setting online, even when a booklet outlining the 
settings was provided. Moreover, given that online the settings are oftentimes not 
obviously laid out or in intuitive places, users may have grown tired of looking or 
decided that it was not worth the effort to locate and employ to appropriate setting. 
Offering partial support for hypothesis 2, based on a descriptive count, females 
employed more privacy settings than did males. This may reflect a general caution on the 
part of females, and along a similar vein, a greater sense of social responsibility, 
especially in the case of a stranger's personal information. For gender of the target 
person, females employed more settings for a target person of the same gender. This 
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result is consistent with results regarding disclosure in Study 2, albeit this finding only 
applies to females. Finally, females in the paper-and-pencil condition employed more 
settings for female targets in particular. Given the relatively larger amount of disclosure 
on paper-and-pencil, it appears as though females are more consistent in their protective 
behaviours. While results were descriptive in nature, it is possible that females in 
particular are more inclined to complement their disclosure with use of privacy settings. 
This possibility warrants further examination. 
Summary 
Although the effect of story was not as strong as hoped, overall, this study 
provides partial evidence that having participants read certain stories may encourage 
them to alter the way in which they display or share personal information, even in the 
case of information about another person. Given the relative lack of impact of privacy 
policies on over-disclosure, results from this study may help give insight into more 
effective ways of reaching a potentially at risk population. In addition, this study offers 
insight into differences in information sharing across context, and provides evidence that 
previously found patterns of self-disclosure may not be consistent when the information 
is being disclosed for another person. 
Study 1 B and C did not yield significant gender differences in disclosure, while 
in Study 2 gender played a significant role. Not only did males and females differ in 
disclosure, but consideration of the gender of the target seems to be important in 
understanding what types of information in particular people are willing to share about 
another person. 
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In contrast to Study 1 C, in Study 2 contact information and personal information 
emerged as key topics of disclosure, suggesting that there is utility in examining factors 
including story, context and gender in reference to specific content. 
Lastly, while a small percentage of the sample chose to employ privacy settings, 
this was not a surprise. However, for those who did choose to employ privacy settings, 
there were descriptive associations with the type of story read. While effect of story was 
not as strong as hoped, the results from Study 2 highlight how a salient anecdotal story 
could predict increased use of privacy enhancing features. There was also a gender trend 
consistent with previous research (Kehoe et al., 1997; O'Neil, 2001; Youn & Hall, 2008) 
whereby females demonstrated greater use of privacy settings, especially when 
displaying information for another female. In sum, in comparison to disclosure, similar 
factors were related to use of privacy settings. Given the relative lack of research 
examining story, gender and privacy settings use, the current study offers a first glance at 
factors that may be associated with an increase in privacy settings use in personal 
profiles. 
General Discussion 
Studies 1 A, B, and C provided an initial, systematic exploration of Facebook 
profiles. The study identified what kinds of information can be disclosed through these 
profiles, as well as when information is likely to be disclosed, and by whom. 
Specifically, the first contribution of these studies was the construction of a 
comprehensive checklist to identify the types of information available on the Facebook 
profiles. This first step was important for establishing a general checklist that can be 
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used in future Facebook research. No known checklist that accounted for all of the 
possible items contained within online Facebook profiles existed prior to this research. 
Developing this tool was a first step in permitting systematic study of what is and is not 
disclosed on social networking profiles. Analysis of the information assessed by this 
checklist indicated that there is a great diversity of kinds of information that can be 
shared and that, for some online social networking users, a great deal of information is 
shared through this media and that some information is more likely to be revealed than 
others. Information provided in Study 1 A established that there was information that 
could be considered both threatening and non-threatening to users. Once this was 
established, the purpose of Study 1 B was then to further examine factors that predicted 
disclosure within the more threatening information categories. Developing this 
instrument and then refining the instrument through the categories identified in Studies 1 
A, B, and C represents a substantial contribution to existing research as the categories 
provide a systematic mechanism though which subsequent research can assess the 
quantity, types and potential risk that disclosed information represents. 
Study 2 was an initial systematic investigation using the tools developed from 
Studies 1 A, B, and C and examined experimentally the impact of story, gender and 
media context on overall disclosure and use of privacy settings. Understanding 
mechanisms by which individuals will disclose more 'safely' online is a key concern 
today. Study 2 broadened awareness of potential factors that may help to inhibit over-
disclosure and the subsequent risk of information invasion in personal profiles, and 
indicated a need for further examination of additional factors that may be related to use 
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of settings. Gender in particular emerged as a very strong predictor of disclosure across 
a variety of topic areas. While Study 2 produced some surprising findings, this may 
indicate a need for further examination of the association between various factors. 
Keeping in mind that disclosure was for a target person, it appears that patterns of 
disclosure in social networking sites such as Facebook may be different from disclosure 
patterns found in more traditional studies. Typically, disclosure occurs in the case where 
two or more individual already know each other, and where a conversational "back and 
forth" occurs, such as in the case of reciprocal information sharing. Online, and more 
specifically in the case of Facebook, this back and forth is not as evident. In fact, in most 
cases disclosure occurs whereby information is broadcasted to other users, but there is not 
always feedback or follow-up from an interaction partner. 
In the current study, gender emerged as a strong predictor of disclosure for 
another person. Traditional self-disclosure theory boasts strong gender differences in 
terms of communication patterns, with females disclosing more than males (Dindia & 
Allen, 1992). Results from the current study did not support this and instead revealed that 
females consistently censored their disclosures for a target individual more than did 
males across a variety of different topics. In the case of disclosure for another person, 
gendered communication appears to be different in social networking profiles as 
compared to face-to-face. These findings may inform current theory, and may call for 
revision to traditional explanations of disclosure by gender. 
Careful revision may be required to tailor existing theories of disclosure offline to 
fit disclosure online. For example, while speculative, the order of the stages in the theory 
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of social penetration (Altman & Taylor, 1973) may require revision. In terms of personal 
disclosure in social networking sites such as Facebook, it may be that the orientation 
stage whereby people are more cautious about the types of information they divulge, 
occurs later on and may be prompted by incidences involving invasion of privacy or 
greater experience with the site. At first rather, it appears that there is a moderate level of 
disclosure containing both more risky and less risky information, consistent with both the 
exploratory affective stage where people begin to express basic opinions (e.g., their 
political opinions), and the affective stage where even more intimate details are revealed. 
Given that this theory typically addresses the "getting to know" process in a relationship, 
in the case of personal disclosure on Facebook where presumably most users already 
know their audience, similar stages of communication may occur, but in a slightly 
different order. 
Current theories of online communication such as the hyper-personal theory of 
online communication have attempted to explain online relationships that are formed and 
maintained solely online. This theory in particular may require revision to include 
relationships that are formed offline and maintained solely online, as in the case of 
relationships on Facebook. The "getting to know" process may not apply in these 
relationships. Furthermore, examination and consideration of how personal self-
disclosure online (i.e., when users post information without the expectation of direct 
reciprocal communication) occurs and differs from relational self-disclosure is necessary. 
Features that are important in explaining disclosure relationally may not apply or may 
require revision when applied to personal disclosure online in social networking profiles. 
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While pitfalls exist in existing online theory, there are a variety of components that can 
be applied to personal disclosure in social networking profiles, including asynchronous 
time, reduced cues and the norm of reciprocity. First, Facebook users have opportunities 
to communicate through various means, including an email inbox or by posting on 
another users' wall. In both cases, response from other users is not immediate and 
therefore, consistent with the notion of asynchronous time, a lag time in between 
messages exists. In this case, users may filter and censor their disclosure messages. 
Second, communication via Facebook profiles often occurs in text-based form, but is not 
limited to text. Users have the opportunity to convey meaning through use of emoticons, 
graphics, and pictures. Therefore, while there are reduced cues when communicating 
online (e.g., lack of physical cues including gestures, tone and intonation), the cues 
presented by communication partners are not as "reduced" or strict as originally set forth 
by Walther (1996). This may be worthwhile considering. Third, the norm of reciprocity, 
which refers to the expectation that disclosure will be returned at a comparable level 
applies to personal disclosure via social networking profiles. This may be related to the 
idea of a "Facebook" culture, whereby users within a specific online social sphere may 
set out standards for what is expected in terms of personal disclosure. If other users in an 
individual's friends group post highly personal pictures, intimate status updates and 
regular wall posts, then that individual may be expected to disclose to the same degree. It 
may be that the "culture" dictates what is expected as opposed to the interaction partner, 
as in the case of traditional theories of reciprocal communication (Gouldner, 1960). 
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While speculative, a variety of other factors that were not examined in the current 
research may prove useful in understanding the nature of disclosure and privacy settings 
use in social networking profiles, and may inform current theory. Perceived trust in the 
system (i.e., how trustworthy the site is perceived to be) may influence decisions about 
displaying personal information. The consensus is that Facebook is perceived as more 
trustworthy than other social networking sites, such as MySpace (Fogel & Nehmad, 
2009). Given that the site is endorsed as being reliable and safe, users may feel more 
comfortable disclosing riskier pieces of information. Perceptions of trust in the system 
therefore warrant further examination in relation to disclosure and privacy settings use. 
Cues from the social environment on Facebook may also be related to information 
disclosure. If users are obtaining positive feedback from other users based on the 
information displayed, the costs and risks of disclosing highly personal details may be 
overshadowed by the benefits associated with over-disclosure, such as popularity or 
attention. Moreover, motivation to use the site may play a significant role in disclosure 
and privacy settings use when online. Individual goals for using the site may vary from 
one user to the next, including social connectivity, identity exploration, self-esteem, 
popularity, curiosity, and even revenge. These goals may also drive perceptions of the 
benefits and costs associated with disclosing information. For example, social exchange 
theory posits that if benefits outweigh the costs of a particular relationship, disclosure 
within that relationship increases. Depending on individual motivations, the perceived 
cost/benefits may vary, and as a result subsequent patterns of disclosure may differ. 
Furthermore, who the user is thinking about (the virtual other) and the perceived risks 
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associated with that particular person seeing their information may be related to the 
amount and type of information displayed as well as the privacy settings employed. 
Disclosure may be higher for virtual others that are perceived as less threatening (e..g, 
friends). It could be that users are thinking about various virtual others at the same time. 
Management of opposing virtual others (e.g., mother and ex-boyfriend) and how users 
make decisions about what to post ultimately is therefore worthy of exploration, and may 
also be related to motivation or individual reasons for using the site. Lastly, existence of a 
common Facebook subculture and the notion of "birds of a feather flock together" may 
prove particularly useful in understanding disclosure and settings use in social 
networking profiles. Investigation of the norms and standards that are set out by a 
particular online culture and how these expectations are transferred to disclosure and 
settings usage within personal profiles is necessary. While even less if known about 
privacy settings behavior, the possibility remains that the same factors that explain 
disclosure may also explain use of protective mechanisms. Ultimately, further research 
examining factors that relate to self-disclosure and information control processes (i.e., 
privacy settings use) in more detail is required before revisions to existing theory and 
creation of new theory can be achieved, but may eventually guide the development of 
theories of personal disclosure in social networking profiles. 
Limitations 
Studies 1 A, B, and C examined only those profiles that were publicly accessible, 
meaning that profiles with privacy settings limiting access were not included in the 
analysis. It is possible that those users who choose to employ settings are very different 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 
from those who do not (i.e., have publicly accessible profiles). Users with publicly 
accessible profiles may be more likely to disclose more overall, while those who do not 
allow for public accessibility may be more inclined to censor certain pieces of 
information over others. This possibility warrants examination. While this is a 
limitation, the findings from these studies offer insight into the kinds of information that 
are being shared, and the factors that help to predict who is more or less likely to over-
disclose. 
Study 1 A allowed for the development of a comprehensive scoring tool that will 
guide future research in this area. While this coding scheme was not cross-validated due 
to time constraints, additional studies employing this coding scheme may prove useful in 
establishing validity. 
Study 2 examined disclosure and privacy settings use when the information was 
for another person, not the user themselves. While results were not strong, findings 
suggest that factors previously examined as predictors of technology use may not relate 
to use of privacy settings. This indicates further examination is needed to identify which 
factors may have a stronger effect of privacy settings usage. It is suggested that 
knowledge about the risks and life experiences may have played a role in predicting use 
of privacy settings. For example, if an individual has gone through life experiences 
related to identity theft, or has encountered other individuals who have had their identity 
compromised, they may be more apprehensive about information security when online. 
In addition, by sampling from a more diverse age group, age may have been related to 
increased privacy settings usage, with older users exhibiting increased use of privacy 
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settings. Unfortunately, in the current sample, age was limited and therefore this factor 
could not be examined as a predictor. It is also possible that motivation and education 
plays a role in the likelihood to use privacy settings. More specifically, greater exposure 
to media though news and media stories online and offline and taking an active role in 
pursuing information about the risks may better predict who is more likely to use the 
available security features. While information is available about the settings, it is 
ultimately up to the user to pursue the information, whether it be clicking on a link or 
actively searching for the privacy policy information. The more educated an individual 
is about the risks, the more likely they may be to protect themselves. This may also be 
dependent on the motivation of the user to pursue the information, and could possibly be 
related again to age and life experiences. 
Given that social networking sites are based on information sharing and more 
importantly, sharing information about others within one's social sphere, understanding 
what impacts of the likelihood of over-disclosing about someone else is critical. In Study 
2, the impact of the anecdotal story was not as strong as hoped. This may be due to the 
fact that the story did not contain any real negative outcomes as a result of over-
disclosure. In the case where some negative consequence was reflected, the saliency of 
the story may have increased and may have therefore yielded greater differences 
between stories. 
Until replication can be conducted, it is also possible that the effects found in 
Study 2 were being driven by specific elements of the information provided in the target 
person's portfolio. For example, it was clear that the target was in the midst of moving to 
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a different city. In this case, the gender differences found in regards to posting 
relationship information, such that males posted less and females posted more, could be a 
by-product of a change in location. By this, it could be that males and females view the 
commitment aspect of a romantic relationship as dependent on proximity. Perhaps for 
males, relationships are viewed as less stable when partners are further away from one 
another (i.e., in different cities). While this is quite speculative, this may be a point to 
consider for future studies. 
Directions for Future Research 
Based on findings from the current studies, the next step may be to examine how 
explicit privacy training impacts on disclosure and privacy settings use. It is apparent 
that there is a need for additional, more effective ways of educating users about the 
options available to them when online. This may illustrate why certain users are not 
employing settings and help inform policy and web developers about better ways of 
conveying features available to users. 
Further, inclusion of different participant groups such as older and younger users 
and novice and expert users will allow for a more comprehensive look at how various 
groups use social networking sites. In addition to these possibilities, a follow-up study 
employing a variety of stories that contain content about both genders, identifying 
information (e.g., actual names of the victims) and numerous scenarios including both 
negative and positive outcomes may prove useful in narrowing in on the specific 
features of anecdotal stories that encourage users to disclose less and better protect 
themselves and others through use of privacy settings. 
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Moreover, qualitative examination of content including status updates and text 
entries (e.g., wall posts) may prove useful in understanding the links between self-
disclosure theory and disclosure in an online social networking setting, and may aid in 
the development of new disclosure theories that apply directly to information sharing in 
personal profiles. Qualitatively examining text based entries may offer a richer 
assessment of content of messages conveyed in social networking profiles. By taking 
into account the differences between disclosure that involves reciprocal communication 
and direct feedback, and disclosure of information that is simply broadcasted by a user 
for an audience without expectation of interaction, a clearer understanding of how 
people are communicating online may be obtained. 
In order to gain a more complete picture of disclosure and settings use online, 
examination of private profiles (i.e., profiles that are not publicly accessible) needs to be 
conducted. Perhaps disclosure and use of privacy settings is very different in this case. 
In addition, various other distinguishing factors including familiarity with technology 
and how long they have been a Facebook member may be associated with use, and 
therefore merits investigation. 
Finally, the virtual other warrants further investigation. It may be of particular 
utility to conduct interviews with users in order to gain a richer understanding of who 
and what they are thinking about when posting information and when choosing, or not 
choosing, to use the available privacy features. By specifically asking users who they are 
thinking about when posting certain information, at the time that it is posted, will help 
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researchers to better understand the relationship between the mental audience and 
activities online in personal profiles. 
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Table 1. 
Frequencies for All Dichotomously Scored Items in the Facebook Checklist 
Item 
Can you poke them? 
Can you message them? 
Mini-Feed 
Profile Picture 
Birthday 
Friends Viewable 
College/University 
Wall 
Gender 
Applications 
Groups (joined at least one group) 
Photos of... 
Tagged Photos 
Can you send them a gift? 
Photo Album(s) 
Relationship Status 
Sub categories within 
Dichotomous variables 
(Profile Picture) self 
(Profile Picture) friends 
(Profile Picture) 
relationship partner 
(Profile Picture) activity 
(Profile Picture) random 
picture 
(Profile Picture) family 
(Profile Picture) animal(s) 
(Profile Picture) school 
(Profile Picture) work 
Birth day 
Birth year 
(Gender) male 
(Gender) female 
(Relationship status) in a 
relationship 
(Relationship status) single 
(Relationship status) 
married 
(Relationship status) 
Frequency 
99.30% 
99% 
97.50% 
91.80% 
73.80% 
22% 
11.30% 
7.30% 
7% 
4.50% 
3.80% 
0.50% 
0.30% 
88% 
83.80% 
73.30% 
87.80% 
83.30% 
83% 
82% 
38.80% 
29% 
81.50% 
79.30% 
77.50% 
75.80% 
71.30% 
70% 
63% 
30.30% 
23.80% 
4.80% 
3% 
N 
397 
396 
390 
367 
295 
88 
45 
29 
28 
18 
15 
2 
1 
352 
335 
293 
351 
333 
332 
328 
155 
116 
326 
317 
310 
303 
285 
280 
252 
121 
95 
19 
12 
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High school 
Concentration 
Graduation Year 
Self Selected Photos 
Interested in (Sexual Orientation) 
Favorite Music 
Favorite Movies 
Gifts 
Favorite Quotes 
Interests 
Favorite TV Shows 
Hometown 
Email address 
Favorite Books 
Activities 
Employer 
Political views 
Job Listed (have listed at least one 
job) 
Religious views 
About Me 
Position 
Status 
Posted Items 
Time Period 
Notes 
Personal Pages 
Looking for (Relationship 
Preference) 
(Relationship status)it's 
complicated 
(Relationship status) in an 
open relationship 
(Interested in) women 
(Interested in) men 
(Looking for) friendship 
(Looking for)relationship 
(Looking for)networking 
(Looking for) dating 
(Looking for)whatever I 
can get 
(Looking for) random play 
1.30% 
0% 
62.80% 
62.30% 
56% 
55.30% 
54.50% 
33% 
22.50% 
51.30% 
50.30% 
47.80% 
47.30% 
46.80% 
46.80% 
45.40% 
43.30% 
40.80% 
37% 
35.3%% 
35% 
32.50% 
32% 
30.80% 
30.50% 
25.80% 
25.30% 
24.30% 
23.50% 
23.50% 
19.50% 
19.80% 
5% 
4.80% 
4% 
2.50% 
2.30% 
5 
0 
251 
249 
224 
221 
218 
132 
90 
205 
201 
191 
189 
187 
187 
182 
173 
163 
148 
141 
140 
130 
128 
123 
122 
103 
101 
97 
94 
94 
78 
78 
20 
19 
16 
10 
9 
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Job Description 
Tagged Videos 
Fun Wall 
Residence 
Degree 
Website 
City/Town 
Former Name 
Mobile Phone 
Events (as indicated in their mini-
feed) 
Home Address 
Room 
Advanced Wall 
Super Wall 
Market Place listings 
Land Phone 
Courses 
School Mailbox 
Zip 
Awards 
(Degree) Masters 
(Degree) Bachelors 
(Degree) Doctorate 
(Degree) Diploma 
(Degree) Post-doctorate 
(Degree) Alumni 
17.80% 
13% 
9.80% 
9.30% 
9% 
4.50% 
3.30% 
2.30% 
1.30% 
0% 
0% 
8% 
7.80% 
5% 
5% 
4.80% 
3.50% 
3.30% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
2.30% 
2.30% 
1.30% 
0.80% 
0% 
71 
52 
39 
37 
36 
18 
13 
9 
5 
0 
0 
32 
31 
20 
20 
19 
14 
13 
12 
12 
12 
9 
9 
5 
3 
0 
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Table 3. 
Means, Standard Deviations and T-test Statistics for Default/standard Information, 
Sensitive Personal Information and Potentially Stigmatizing Information 
Grouping Strategy/ Factor Mean (SD) T- test 
Default/Standard Information 
Network type 
University 
Community 
Gender Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Relationship Status Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Age Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Sensitive Personal Information 
Network type 
University 
Community 
Gender Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
3.12(1.23) 
2.77 (1 23) 
3 14(1 11) 
1 41 (1.13) 
3 23(1.08) 
3 03 (1 14) 
3 17(1.10) 
2 55(1.36) 
1 12 (.88) 
1.47 (.79) 
9.63 (2.27) 
9.68 (2.28) 
9.92 (2.09) 
7 57 (2.59) 
r( l ,398) = -281J ;p= 005 
t(1, 398) = -9.92,p<.OOP 
f ( l , 352 ) = l 74,p = .08 
t (1,398) = -4.94,p< 001* 
t(1,398) = -3.81,p< OOP 
r(l ,398) = .24,p=.81 
t (1,398) = -7 01,/? < 001' 
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Gender 
Male 
Female 
Relationship Status Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Age Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
9 74(2.18) 
10.15(1.93) 
10.05(1.95) 
8.97(2.61) 
9.86(2 15) 
9.09 (2.49) 
f (1,352) = -1.85,/? = 07 
/ ( l , 398) =-4.70,p<.OOP 
f(l,398) = -3 05,p> = .002< 
Potentially Stigmatizing Information 
Network type 
University 
Community 
Gender Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Relationship Status Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Age Revealed 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
6.80 (3.89) 
7.35(3.71) 
7.50 (3.65) 
3.74 (3.42) 
7.84(3.67) 
7.28 (3.58) 
7.74(3.51) 
5 93 (4.04) 
7.57 (3.68) 
5.74 (3.84) 
f( l ,398)=143,jP = .15 
t(1, 398) = -6.63,p<.001* 
t (1,352) =1.84,/? = 06 
t (1,398) = -4.73,p< OOP 
t (1,398) = -4 36,/? < OOP 
*Significant at the .003 level 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 146 
Table 4. 
Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation for 39 Items 
Variable I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sexual Orientation 017 015 oTl OH 61)0 OTO 67Tl 61)5 oTl ^007 0/73 
Looking for 0.16 0.02 0.16 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.23 0.70 
Birth Day -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.89 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.13 
Birth Year 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.89 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.03 
Political views 0.16 -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.69 -0.09 0.23 
Religious views 0.27 0.05 0.13 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.16 
Address -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.80 
City/Town 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.12 -0.32 0.00 0.06 0.53 
Zip or postal code 0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.83 
Activities 0.69 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.04 
Interests 0.81 0.08 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.01 
Favorite Music 0.84 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.11 
0.66 
0.03 
0.26 
0.03 
0.05 
0.08 
0.01 
0.02 
-0.03 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.01 
-0.02 
-0.22 
0.13 
0.11 
0.04 
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Favorite TV Shows 0.83 0.08 0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.02 0.17 
Favorite Movies 0.86 0.12 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.04 
Favorite Books 0.79 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 
Favorite Quotes 0.66 -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.16 -0.09 -0.05 
About Me 0.66 0.00 0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.09 -0.12 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.02 
College/University 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.76 0.04 -0.17 0.11 0.09 -0.18 -0.10 0.00 
Concentration 0.10 -0.02 0.08 0.78 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.13 0.16 
Graduation Year 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.71 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.15 -0.03 -0.16 
High School 0.09 -0.01 0.12 0.69 -0.02 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.02 
Employer 0.08 0.05 0.89 0.12 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Job Position 0.08 0.03 0.90 0.15 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 
Job Description 0.17 0.05 0.77 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.02 
Job City/Town 0.03 -0.01 0.49 0.09 -0.13 0.05 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 -0.15 0.27 
Job Time Period 0.11 -0.05 0.83 0.11 -0.06 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.11 -0.01 
Photos of... 0.09 0.85 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.22 0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 
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Tagged Photos 0.07 0.85 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.26 0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 
Self-Selected 0.15 0.54 0.19 -0.04 0.02 0.41 0.14 0.11 -0.35 -0.12 0.04 
Photos 
Friends Viewable 0.08 0.70 -0.02 -0.02 0.16 0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.07 0.11 0.11 
Wall 0.05 0.80 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.13 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.01 
Groups 0.10 0.55 -0.11 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.02 -0.06 0.19 0.15 0.16 
Photo Albums 0.09 0.17 0.17 -0.05 0.05 0.70 0.23 0.07 -0.26 -0.05 -0.01 
Send message -0.06 0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.93 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.06 
Poke -0.02 0.12 -0.05 0.04 0.94 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Profile Picture 0.12 0.26 -0.06 0.23 0.10 0.65 -0.12 -0.04 0.19 0.02 0.02 
Applications 0.13 0.17 -0.05 0.08 0.03 0.66 -0.09 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.09 
Fun Wall 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.78 0.00 
Super Wall -0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.09 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.77 0.08 
Note Factor loadings > .49 are in boldface 
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Table 5. 
Variables, Mean Scores, and Standard Deviations for Factor Analyzed Content Scales 
(N = 400) 
Scale Variables Included in Scale Mean (SD) 
Personal information Activities, Interests, Favorite Music, 3.51 (3.07) 
Favorite TV Shows, Favorite Movies, 
Favorite Books, Favorite Quotes, and 
Information "About me" 
Tagged and Self- Photos of.., Friends viewable, Tagged 4.50 (1.85) 
selected Photos and Photos, Self-Selected Photos, Groups, and 
Update information Wall 
Work information Employer, Position, Description, and Time 1.80 (1.54) 
Period 
Education information College/University, Concentration, 2.64 (1.41) 
Graduation Year, and High School 
Message and Poke Send a Private Message, and Poke (nudge) 1.98 (. 18) 
information 
Album and Profile Profile Picture, Photo Albums, and 2.43 (.84) 
Picture information Applications 
Age information Birth Day and Birth Year 1.57 (.76) 
Contact information Address, City/Town, and Zip/Postal Code .12 (.41) 
View information Political Views, and Religious Views .67 (.78) 
Other Wall Presence Fun Wall and Super Wall . 13 (.39) 
Relationship Looking for (relationship, friendship, .74 (.73) 
information networking, random play etc), and Sexual 
Orientation 
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Table 6. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and T-test Statistics for Facebook Content Scales as a 
Function of Network Type, Gender Revealed (indicated/not indicated), Gender 
(male/female), Relationship Status Revealed (indicated/not indicated), and Age Revealed 
(indicated/not indicated) 
Factor 
Network type 
View Information 
University 
Community 
Gender Revealed 
Personal Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Photo and Update 
Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Education Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Mean (SD) 
.56 (.75) 
.78 (.80) 
3.71(3.05) 
1.93(2.83) 
4.78(1.60) 
3.07 (2.33) 
2.80(1.33) 
1.41 (1.44) 
T- test 
f ( l , 398) = 2.84/7 = .005* 
f (1,398) =-3.75 ;?< 
001* 
r (1,398) =-6.19/? < 
001* 
t (1,398) = -6.61 p< 
.001* 
Photo Album and Profile 
Picture Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Age Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Gender 
View Information 
Male 
Female 
Relationship Status Revealed 
Personal Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Photo and Update 
Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
2.53 (.72) 
1.72(1.26) 
1.64 (.70) 
1.00 (.94) 
.93 (.80) 
.48 (.70) 
3.83(3.01) 
2.95 (3.10) 
4.87(1.63) 
4.10(2.10) 
t (1,398) = -6.46 p < 
001* 
t (1,398) = -5.61 p< 
.001* 
f (1,352) = 5.58/? < 
f (1,398) = -2.79/7 = 
.005* 
/ ( l , 398) =-4.08/7 < 
001* 
Photo Album and Profile 
Picture Information 
Indicated 2.57 (.67) f( l , 398) = -3.86/7 < 
.001* 
Not Indicated 2.20(1.03) 
Age Information 
Indicated 1.68 (.66) 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 152 
Not Indicated 1.37 (.87) / ( l , 398) = -3.77/7 < 
001* 
View Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
Age Revealed 
Education Information 
Indicated 
Not Indicated 
.77 (.80) 
.50 (.73) 
2.78(1.34) 
2.28(1.54) 
t (1,398) = -3.37/? = 001* 
t (1,398) = 3.22/7 = 001* 
* Significant at the .005 level 
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Table 7. 
Means and Standard Deviations of Each of the Three Relationship Statuses for Tagged 
and Self-selected Photos and Update information, Album and Profile Picture 
information, Age Information, & Work Information 
Scale Single In a Relationship Status 
Missing 
Tagged and Self-selected Photos and .
 4 f . U I 7 « 4 , 7 n n j n 
Update information 4.98(1.35) 4.81(1.78) 4.12(2.08) 
Album and Profile Picture information 2.47 (.68) 2.65 (.62) 2.19(1.03) 
Age Information 1.76 (.56) 1.66 (.68) 1 35 (.87) 
1.38(1.63) 1.21(1.57) .76(140) 
Work Information 
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Table 8. 
Breakdown of Story Condition by Gender of the Target for Male Participants. 
Gender of the Target 
Male Female T o t a i 
Legal Privacy 18 15 33 
Story Condition Personal Privacy 20 15 35 
Internet Control 15 17 32 
Total 53 47 100 
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Table 9. 
Breakdown of Story Condition by Gender of the Target for Female Participants. 
Gender of the Target 
Male Female T o t a l 
Legal Privacy 15 29 44 
Story Condition Personal Privacy 17 29 46 
Internet Control 17 29 46 
Total 49 87 136 
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Table 10. 
Breakdown of Context Condition by Gender of the Target for Male Participants 
Gender of the Target 
Male Female Tofc 
Context Paper and pencil 36 19 55 
Condition Online 17 28 45 
Total 53 47 100 
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Table 11. 
Breakdown of Context Condition by Gender of the Target for Female Participants 
Gender of the Target 
Male Female T o t a l 
Context Paper and pencil 16 58 74 
Condition Online 33 29 62 
Total 49 77 136 
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Table 12. 
Descriptives for all Unstandardized/Newly Created Measures 
Scale N Range Min Max. Mean SD 
Positive Attitudes Towards Computers 230 16 5 21 17.58 3.63 
Concern- Virus 
Concern: Entity 
Software Use Strategy 
Privacy Strategy 
Password Strategy 
Inability to Protect 
No Need for Privacy 
Degree of Disclosure 
Consideration Degree of Disclosure 
Privacy Settings Behaviour 
VIRTUAL OTHER: Myself/Friends 
VIRTUAL OTHER: Other Referents 
227 
228 
229 
227 
227 
228 
230 
228 
229 
229 
230 
209 
48 
30 
18 
18 
18 
27 
16 
25 
12 
18 
12 
54 
8 
5 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
9 
56 
35 
21 
21 
21 
32 
19 
28 
15 
21 
14 
63 
38.116 
24.55 
16.22 
14.53 
11.96 
11.99 
7.23 
15.29 
10.08 
13.26 
9 96 
27.77 
11.85 
8.09 
4.77 
3.98 
3.90 
5.53 
3.49 
5.75 
2 43 
4.68 
2.80 
10.58 
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Table 13. 
Descriptives for Computer Use Scale and Short Privacy Scale, 
Scale Item N Range Min. Max. Mean SD Frequency (Yes) 
Computer Use: How many hours per 
week do you spend using the 
computer for: 
Privacy Survey 
Internet 
Recreation 
Work 
Did you notice the booklet? (Y/N) 
Did you use the booklet? (Y/N) 
Did you learn anything new about the 
settings? (Y/N) 
How enjoyable did you find the 
Facebook creation task? 
230 
230 
230 
226 
232 
226 
213 
104 
65 
69 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
105 
65 
70 
1 
1 
1 
7 
17.71 
13.35 
15.93 
.70 
.28 
.32 
5.21 
15.21 
12.77 
12.42 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1.12 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
69.9 
28 
31.9 
n/a 
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Table 14. 
Descriptives for all Standardized Measures. 
Scale N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
Self Disclosure 
Public Self-Consciousness 
Private Self-Consciousness 
Extraversion 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
Emotional Stability 
Openness 
BIDR: Impression Management 
BIDR: Self Deceptive Enhancement 
Online Privacy Attitudes 
Online Privacy Behaviours: 
General Caution 
Online Privacy Behaviours: 
Technical Protection 
229 
227 
228 
228 
227 
226 
227 
228 
212 
208 
216 
225 
75 
66 
54 
6 
5 
5 
6 
5 
7 
7 
94 
32 
221 33 
16 
18 
16 
2 
2 
1 
1 
18 
6 
91 
84 
70 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
112 
38 
62.72 
47.96 
48.96 
5.11 
4.91 
5.22 
5.87 
5.57 
2.35 
2.35 
68.12 
18.91 
14.10 
11.99 
10.18 
1.31 
1.08 
1.19 
1.19 
1.05 
1.78 
1.95 
21.48 
7.57 
42 28.06 7.26 
Online Privacy Behaviours: Total 219 63 16 79 46.76 12.42 
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Table 15. 
Number of Privacy Settings as a Function of Story Condition, Gender of the Participant 
and Gender of the Target 
Gender of 
the 
Participant 
Male 
Female 
Gender of 
the Target 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Legal 
privacy 
story 
1 
2 
3 
8 
14 
Story Condition 
Personal 
privacy story 
6 
2 
1 
11 
20 
History of 
the internet 
3 
4 
2 
6 
15 
Total 
10 
8 
6 
25 
49 
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Table 16. 
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Overall Disclosure as a Function of Story and Gender 
Model Factor Mean (SD) FTest 
Overall Disclosure 
Story 
Personal Privacy 
Legal Privacy Agreement 
History of the Internet Control 
16.60 (6.24) 
17.08(6.14) 
17.89 (5 56) 
F(2,210) = .68,p = .51 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
Story * Gender of Target 
Personal Privacy * Male 
17.47(6.07) F(l ,210) = .12,/7 = .73 
16.96 (5.96) 
17.85 (6.23) F (1, 210) = 1.38, p = 24 
16.67 (5 79) 
F(2,2l0)=.89,j7= 41 
17.33 (6.53) 
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Personal Privacy * Female 15.98 (6 00) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 17.93 (6.05) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 16.50 (6.20) 
History of the Internet Control * Male 17.17 (5.56) 
History of the Internet Control * Female 18.34(5.56) 
Story * Gender of Participant F (2, 210) 
Personal Privacy * Male 17.38 (5.60) 
Personal Privacy * Female 16 00 (6.70) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 18.16(6.66) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 16 25 (5 64) 
History of the Internet Control * Male 18.07 (6 62) 
History of the Internet Control * Female 17.74 (4.83) 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant F (1, 210) 
Male* Male 17.90(6.06) 
Male * Female 17 80 (6.49) 
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Female* Male 16.98(6 11) 
Female * Female 16.51 (5.64) 
Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male * Male 18 20 (5 93) 
Personal Privacy * Male * Female 16.21 (5.09) 
Personal Privacy * Female * Male 16 25 (7 25) 
Personal Privacy * Female * Female 15.86 (6.49) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male 18.29 (6.45) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female 18.00 (7.16) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male 17 42 (5 66) 
Legal Pnvacy Agreement * Female * Female 15.75 (5.65) 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male 16.92 (6.10) 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female 18.94 (7.04) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male 17 38 (6 70) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Female 17.96 (4.49) 
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Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly 
different at least the 05 level 
Table 17. 
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and 
Stigmatizing Information as a Function of Story and Gender 
Model Factor Mean (SD) FTest 
Disclosure of Personal Identity 
Information, Sensitive Personal 
Information, and Stigmatizing 
Information 
Personal Identity Information 
Story 
Personal Privacy 
Legal Privacy Agreement 
History of the Internet Control 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
4 27(1.45) 
4 32(1.41) 
4 24 (1 25) 
4.35(1.46) 
4.21 (1.29) 
F(2,215) = .30,/7 = .97 
F(l ,215) = .44,/? = .51 
Gender of Participant F(l ,215) = 21,/7 = .65 
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Male 4.35(1.42) 
Female 4.22(1.33) 
Story * Gender of Target F (2, 215) 
Personal Privacy * Male 4.40 (1.59) 
Personal Privacy * Female 4.16 (1.32) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 4.33 (1.40) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 4.30 (1.44) 
History of the Internet Control * Male 4.33 (1.40) 
History of the Internet Control * Female 4.18 (1.16) 
Story * Gender of Participant F (2, 215) 
Personal Privacy * Male 4.38(1.44) 
Personal Privacy * Female 4 18 (1 47) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 4.55 (1.50) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 4.13(1.432) 
History of the Internet Control * Male 4 10 (1.32) 
4.33(121) 
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History of the Internet Control * Female 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Male * Male 
Male * Female 
Female * Male 
Female * Female 
Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male * Male 
Personal Privacy * Male * Female 
Personal Privacy * Female * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female 
F(l ,215) 
4.51(1.58) 
4 24(1.25) 
4.24(1.32) 
4 20(133) 
4.50(161) 
4.25(1.57) 
4.21(1.19) 
4.14(1.38) 
4.67(1.53) 
3.83 (1 03) 
4.40(1.50) 
4.25(1.43) 
F(2,215) 
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History of the Internet Control * Male * Male 4.08 (1 61) 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female 4.53 (1.23) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male 4.12 (1 11) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Female 4 21 (1.21) 
Sensitive Personal Information 
Story 
Personal Privacy 
Legal Privacy Agreement 
History of the Internet Control 
2.91 (1.42) 
3.04 (1 34) 
3 19(1.35) 
F(2,215)= Ti,p = A9 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
3.09(1.47) 
3 01(1.31) 
F( l ,215) = .15,/7 = .70 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
3 06(1.44) 
3 04(1.34) 
F( l ,215) = .00,/7 = .96 
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Story * Gender of Target 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Story * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
F(2,215) = 2 02,/> = 14 
3 14(153) 
271(1.31) 
3.20(1.49) 
2.93 (1 23) 
2 93(141) 
3 37(132) 
2.91(1.46) 
2.91 (1.40) 
3.42(1.78) 
2.73 (1.40)a 
2.83 (1.56) 
3 43 (1 19)b 
F(2,215) = 3.69,p = .03* 
F( l ,215)= 1.75,/; = .19 
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Male* Male 3.23(1.53) 
Male * Female 2.93 (1 40) 
Female* Male 2 87(1.33) 
Female * Female 3 09(1.31) 
Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant F (2, 215) 
Personal Privacy * Male * Male 
Personal Privacy * Male * Female 
Personal Privacy * Female * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male 
3.40(1.57) 
2 76(1.44) 
2 20 (.94) 
3.03 (1 43) 
3.50(134) 
2.75 (1 66) 
3 33 (1.23) 
2.71(1.21) 
2.62 (1 66) 
3 18(1.19) 
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History of the Internet Control * Female * Female 3.00 (1.50) 
3.59(1.18) 
Stigmatizing Information 
Story 
Personal Privacy 
Legal Privacy Agreement 
History of the Internet Control 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
5.92 (2 96) 
6.51(2.78) 
6.79 (2.54) 
6.39 (2.83) 
6.41 (2.77) 
F (2, 215) =1.70,/> = .19 
F(l ,215) = .09,/7 = .76 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
6.64(2.81) 
6.22 (2.77) 
F(l ,215) = .78,/7= 38 
Story * Gender of Target 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
5 89 (2.93) 
5 95 (3.03) 
f (2,215)= 13,Jp = .8 
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Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Story * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Male * Male 
Male * Female 
Female * Male 
6.70 (2.73) 
6 37 (2.84) 
6.67 (2.82) 
6 87 (2.42) 
6 03 (3 14) 
5.84 (2.85) 
6.73 (2.60) 
6.33 (2.94) 
7 23 (2 60) 
6 50 (2.54) 
F(2,215) = .22,/> = .81 
6 16 (2.82) 
6.64 (2.85) 
7 17(2 73)a 
F(l ,215) = .4 30,/?= 04* 
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Female * Female 6.00 (2.71)b 
Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male * Male 
Personal Privacy * Male * Female 
Personal Privacy * Female * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Female 
F(2,215) = .01,/> = .99 
5 60 (3.00) 
6 25 (2 89) 
6.64 (3.34) 
5.61 (2.86) 
6.44 (2.73) 
7.08(2 81) 
7.07 (2.49) 
6.00 (2.98) 
6.62 (2 75) 
6 71 (2.98) 
7.71(2 44) 
6 38(2 31) 
"Significant at the 05 level 
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly 
different at least the 05 level 
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Table 18. 
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Contact and View Information as a Function of Story and Gender 
Disclosure within Facebook 
Content Areas 
Contact Information 
Story 
Personal Privacy 
Legal Privacy Agreement 
History of the Internet Control 
25 (29) 
.23 (.28) 
18 (.22) 
F(2,212)=139,p = .25 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
25 (.29) 
19 (.25) 
F ( l , 212)= 1.19,/?= 28 
Gender of Participant F(l ,212) = 401,/> = .05* 
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Male 
Female 
Story * Gender of Target 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Story * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
.26 (29)a 
19 (.25)b 
F(2,212) = 3 93,/? = .02* 
34 (.30)a 
.17(26)b 
21 (.30) 
.24 (27) 
.18 (.23) 
18(22) 
.31 (.28)a 
.20 (.29) 
.31 (.32)" 
.16 (.23) 
.14 (.23)b 
.21 (.22) 
F(2,212) = 3.55,/> = .03* 
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History of the Internet Control * Female 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Male * Male 
Male * Female 
Female * Male 
Female * Female 
Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male * Male 
Personal Privacy * Male * Female 
Personal Privacy * Female * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female 
F ( l , 212) = 5.01,/? = 03" 
.33 (.31)a 
.17 (.23)" 
19 (24) 
.20 (25) 
43 (.27) 
23 (.32) 
14 (.22) 
.18 (.28) 
.31 (.33) 
.06 (.13) 
.31(31) 
20 (.25) 
F (2, 212) = .39,/?= 68 
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View Information 
Story 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male . 18 (.29) 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female .19 (.17) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male .12 (.16) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Female .21 (.24) 
Personal Pnvacy .40 (.43) 
Legal Privacy Agreement .46 (.47) 
History of the internet Control .51 (.44) 
F (2, 212) = .82,/? = .44 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
.45 (.44) 
.45 (.46) 
F( l ,212)= 33,/?= 57 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
51 (.45) 
.41 (.45) 
F(l,212)=1.81,/? = .18 
Story * Gender of Target F(2, 212) =1.35,/? = .26 
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Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Story * Gender of Participant 
Personal Privacy * Male 
Personal Privacy * Female 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female 
History of the Internet Control * Male 
History of the Internet Control * Female 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Male * Male 
.39 (.46) 
.40 (.43) 
53(47) 
41 (.46) 
43 (44) 
56 (.44) 
44 (.46) 
.36 (.44) 
53 (47) 
.40 (.46) 
.57(.43) 
.47 (.45) 
F (2, 212) = .00,/?= 99 
.43(45) 
F( l ,212) = 4.13,/?= 04* 
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Male * Female .47 (47) 
Female * Male 60 (.45)a 
Female * Female .38 (.43)b 
Story * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant F (2, 212) = .08, p = .92 
Personal Privacy * Male * Male .38 (.46) 
Personal Privacy * Male * Female .41 (.49) 
Personal Privacy * Female * Male .54 (.46) 
Personal Pnvacy * Female * Female .34 (41) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Male .53 (.50) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Male * Female 54 (.47) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Male .54 (.50) 
Legal Privacy Agreement * Female * Female .34 (.43) 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Male .39 (42) 
History of the Internet Control * Male * Female .47 (.46) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Male 71 (.40) 
History of the Internet Control * Female * Female .46 (45) 
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*Significant at the .05 level 
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly 
different at least the 05 level 
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Table 19. 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the Attitudes 
towards Computers Scale. 
Factor 
Item 
1 
In general, how at ease do you feel about using computers? .94 
In general, how comfortable do you feel about using computers? .96 
In general, how enthusiastic do you feel about using computers? .82 
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Table 20. 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the 
Concerns Subscale 
Item Factor 
2 
Please rate how concerned you are about each item when online: 
Viruses 
Spam 
Spyware 
Hackers 
Unauthorized access to personal information 
Security 
Identity Theft 
"Online Stalkers" 
.26 .85 
.24 
.30 
.72 
.80 
.69 
.87 
.81 
.81 
.86 
.50 
.41 
.53 
.24 
.12 
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Table 21. 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the Strategy 
Use Subscale 
Item Factor 
2 
.85 
.85 
.29 
10 
.12 
.74 
.12 
-.05 
.02 
For each of the following, please indicate the degree to 
which you have used that strategy to protect your 
privacy online. 
1. Enabled Firewalls. 
2. Installed Antivirus software. 
3. Been extra careful about the kinds of information 
you submit online. 
4. Used a nickname, fake name or false information -.02 .71 .03 
pertaining to your true identity. 
5. Enabled strict privacy settings when using personal .14 .71 .25 
websites. 
6. Changed passwords frequently or used a strongly .04 .36 .69 
encrypted password. 
7. Enabled parental controls over Internet use. 
8. Password protected your computer log-in. 
9. Installed spyware or malware. 
.01 
.25 
.73 
.17 
-.26 
.11 
.62 
.69 
.21 
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Table 22. 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the 
Facebook Usage Scale 
Item Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 
How private are the things you've included in your .45 .23 -.16 -.55 -.18 
Facebook profile? ("private" means either personal 
or confidential) 
How often have you considered whether something .16 .64 .24 -.08 .33 
was too personal to include in your profile? 
In general, when you post things about people you .51 -.02 .34 -.47 .09 
know personally in your profile: do you ask them 
permission to do so9 
In general, when you post things about people you .62 -.25 .07 -.33 .12 
know personally in your profile: do you reveal their 
names? 
In general, when you post things about .67 -.20 28 .29 -.08 
companies/products/employers in your Facebook 
profile: do you ask them permission to do so? 
In general, when you post things about .62 -.37 .32 40 -.09 
companies/products/employers in your Facebook 
profile: do you reveal their names 
How well do you feel you know your profile's -.04 -.07 .54 .04 -.16 
audience? 
If you were aware of all the people who look at your .19 .56 .16 .15 -.25 
Facebook profile, how likely is it that you would 
become more careful about what you write? 
How often do you written highly personal things in .57 -.18 -.40 .01 .28 
your profile? 
How often have you gotten in trouble for anything .42 .06 -.49 .25 .31 
you posted in your profile? 
Are you surprised when someone you meet in .43 .29 -.26 .27 -.27 
person says they have seen/looked at your Facebook 
profile? 
Does it bother you that the things you post in your .30 .62 -.10 .07 -.34 
profile will be available online for a long time? 
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How liable do you think you are for the things you -.04 .42 .30 .20 .63 
post in your profile? 
r 
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Table 23. 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the 
Facebook Privacy Settings Behaviours Scale. 
Item Factor 
1 
How familiar are you with Facebook privacy .83 
settings? 
How often have you employed privacy settings .89 
yourself? 
How often have you advised others to employ .80 
their privacy settings? 
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Table 24. 
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation of the Virtual 
Other Scale. 
Item 
When you post personally revealing information in 
your profile, who are you thinking 
Myself 
No one 
Friends 
Family 
Business Associates 
Employer 
Partners 
Instructors 
Acquaintances 
E-Romantic Partners 
Strangers 
Anyone 
about? 
1 
.46 
-.18 
.49 
.61 
.71 
.74 
.61 
.72 
.58 
.58 
.69 
.55 
Factor 
2 
.54 
-.09 
.65 
.12 
-.50 
-.50 
.47 
-.45 
.17 
.33 
-.19 
-.11 
3 
.10 
.35 
.16 
.31 
.33 
.26 
.09 
.10 
-.26 
.05 
-48 
-.62 
4 
.02 
.87 
-.00 
-.14 
-.05 
-.10 
.18 
-.02 
-.19 
.08 
.19 
.32 
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Table 25. 
Overview of Measures within Each of the Seven Grouping Categories Used in the 
Privacy Setting Analyses. 
Group 
Attitudes Towards 
Computers 
Online Privacy Attitudes 
Online Privacy Behaviours 
Personality 
Disclosure 
Social Desirability 
Virtual Other 
Individual Measures 
Positive Attitudes Towards Computers 
Concern: Virus 
Concern: Entity 
Online Privacy Attitudes 
Online Privacy Behaviours: General Caution 
Online Privacy Behaviours: Technical 
Protection 
Software Use Strategy 
Privacy Strategy 
Public Self-Consciousness 
Private Self-Consciousness 
Extraversion 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
Emotional Stability 
Openness 
Self Disclosure 
Degree of Disclosure 
Consideration Degree of Disclosure 
BIDR: Impression Management 
BIDR: Self Deceptive Enhancement 
VIRTUAL OTHER: Myself/Friends 
VIRTUAL OTHER: Other Referents 
Number of 
Measures in 
Group 
1 
3 
4 
7 
3 
2 
2 
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Table 26. 
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Overall Disclosure as a Function of Context Condition and Gender 
Model Factor Mean (SD) FTest 
Overall Disclosure 
Context 
Paper-and-Pencil 
Onlme 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
Context * Gender of Participant 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
18.72(6.14)a 
15.19(5.20)" 
17.85 (6.23) 
16.67 (5.79) 
17.47 (6.07) 
16.96(5.96) 
19 14(6.25) 
18.45(6.10) 
F( l ,214) = 22 51,/?< 001s1 
F ( l , 2 1 4 ) = 1 0 1 , /? = .32 
F(l ,214) = .30,/? = .59 
F(l ,214) = .10,/? = .75 
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Online * Female 
Online * Male 
Context * Gender of Target 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Online * Male 
Online * Female 
Gender of Participant * Gender of Target 
Male * Male 
Male * Female 
Female * Male 
Female * Female 
Context * Gender of Target * Gender of 
Participant 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Male 
15 64 (5.36) 
14.79 (5.07) 
19.47(6.71) 
18.13(5.63) 
15.63 (4.73) 
14.89 (5 52) 
17.90(6.01) 
17.80(6.49) 
16.98(6 11) 
16 51 (5 64) 
F (1,214) = .02,/?= 89 
F (1,214) = 3 26,/?= 07 
F (1,214) = .04,/? = .84 
18.94 (6.49) 
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Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Female 20.47 (7 18) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Male 19.69(5.71) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female 17.77 ( 5.60) 
Online * Male * Male 15.21 (3.72) 
Online * Male * Female 15 85 (5.25) 
Online * Female * Male 15.84 (6 00) 
Onlme * Female * Female 13.73 (4.75) 
"Significant at the .001 level 
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly 
different at least the 05 level 
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Table 27. 
Means, Standard Deviations and F-test Statistics for Personal Identity Information, Sensitive Personal Information and 
Stigmatizing Information as a Function Context Condition and Gender 
Model Factor Mean (SD) FTest 
Disclosure of Personal Identity 
Information, Sensitive Personal 
Information, and Stigmatizing 
Information 
Personal Identity Information Context 
Paper-and-Pencil 
Online 
4.40(1.49) 
4 12(1.19) 
F (1,219) = 2.72,/?.10 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
4.35(1.42) 
4.22(1.33) 
F( l ,219) = .15, /? = .70 
Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
4.35(1.46) 
4 21(1.30) 
F (1,219) =1.54,/? = .22 
Context * Gender of Participant F (1,219) =1.39,/? =.24 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 193 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Onlme * Female 
Online * Male 
Context * Gender of Target 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Online * Male 
Onlme * Female 
Gender of Participant * Gender of Target 
Male * Male 
Male * Female 
Female * Male 
Female * Female 
Context * Gender of Target * Gender of 
4.42 (1 54) 
4.38(1.46) 
4.26(1.27) 
4.02(1.14) 
4.53(1 54) 
4.31(145) 
4.17(136) 
4.07(1.04) 
4.45(1.57) 
4 24(1.25) 
4.24(1.33) 
4.20(1.33) 
F( l ,219)= 04, p 
F (1,219) = .02,/?= 88 
F(1,219) = 2 94,/?= 09 
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Participant 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Female 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female 
Online * Male * Male 
Online * Male * Female 
Online * Female * Male 
Online * Female * Female 
4.39(1.68) 
4.47 (1 26) 
4 92(1.04) 
4.26(1.52) 
4.60(1.30) 
4.07(1.24) 
3.97(1.36) 
4.07 (83) 
Sensitive Personal Information Context 
Paper-and-Pencil 
Onlme 
Gender of Participant 
Male 
Female 
F ( l , 219) = 28.21,/?<.001< 
Da 
?)b 
3.48 
251 
3.06(1.44) 
3.04(134) 
F(l ,219) = .28, p = .59 
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Gender of Target 
Male 
Female 
Context * Gender of Participant 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Onlme * Female 
Online * Male 
Context * Gender of Target 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Online * Male 
Onlme * Female 
Gender of Participant * Gender of Target 
Male * Male 
3.09(1.47) 
3 02(1.31) 
3.47 (1 60) 
3.48 (1 32) 
2.52 (.99) 
2.51(1.17) 
3 65(1.54) 
3.36(1.38) 
2.51(1.16) 
2.52 (1 04) 
F(l ,219) = .82,/?= 37 
F (1,219) = .25,/? = .62 
F (1,219) =1.20,/? = .27 
3.24(1.53) 
F( l ,219)= 34,/? = .57 
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Male* Female 2.87(1.33) 
Female* Male 2.93(1.40) 
Female * Female 3.09(1.31) 
Context * Gender of Target * Gender of F (1, 219) 
Participant 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Male 3.58(1.61) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * Female 3.26(1.59) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Male 3.85 (1.35) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female * Female 3.40(1.31) 
Online * Male * Male 2 40 (91) 
Onlme * Male * Female 2.59 (1.05) 
Online * Female * Male 2.56(1.16) 
Online * Female * Female 2 44 (1.04) 
Stigmatizing Information Context F (1,219) 
Paper-and-Pencil 6.48 (2.77) 
6.30 (2.82) 
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Online 
Gender of Participant F (1, 219) = 29, /? = .29 
Male 6.64 (2.81) 
Female 6.22 (2.77) 
Gender of Target F(l,219) = .07,/?=79 
Male 6.39 (2.83) 
Female 6.41 (2.77) 
Context * Gender of Participant F(l,219) = 3.19,/? = .08 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 6.38(2.99) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 6.56(2 61) 
Online * Female 6.98 (2.56) 
Online * Male 5.81 (2.91) 
Context * Gender of Target F (1, 219) = .48, p = .49 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male 6.31(2.97) 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 6.60 (2.65) 
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Onlme * Male 
Online * Female 
Gender of Target * Gender of Participant 
Male * Male 
Male * Female 
Female * Male 
Female * Female 
6.47 (2.70) 
6 15 (2.93) 
6.16(2.82) 
6.64 (2 85) 
7.17(2 73)a 
6 00(2.71)b 
F ( l , 219) = 5.73,/? = .02* 
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Context * Gender of Target * Gender of Participant F (1 219) = 25, p = .62 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * 
Paper-and-Pencil * Male * 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Paper-and-Pencil * Female 
Onlme * Male * Male 
Online * Male * Female 
Online * Female * Male 
Online * Female * Female 
Male 
Female 
*Male 
* Female 
5 92 (3 02) 
7.26 (2.81) 
7 38 (2.66) 
6.38 (2.59) 
6 73 (2.28) 
7.11(2 74) 
6.34 (2.90) 
5.19(2.84) 
*Significantatthe 05 level 
Note Means with same subscripts are not significantly different at least the 05 level Means with different subscripts are significantly 
different at least the 05 level 
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Table 28. 
Number of Privacy Settings as a Function of Story Condition, Gender of the Participant 
and Gender of the Target 
Gender of the 
Participant 
Male 
Female 
Gender of 
the Target 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Legal 
privacy story 
1 
2 
3 
8 
Story Condition 
Personal 
privacy story 
6 
2 
1 
11 
History of 
the internet 
3 
4 
2 
6 
Total 
10 
8 
6 
25 
Total 14 20 15 49 
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Table 29. 
Means for Relationship, Work and Contact Information as a Function of Context. 
Content Area Context Condition Mean 
Relationship Information Paper and Pencil .63 
Online .55 
Work Information Paper and Pencil .24 
Online .08 
Contact Information Paper and Pencil .30 
Online .11 
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Table 30. 
Number of Privacy Settings as a Function of Context Condition, Gender of the 
Participant and Gender of the Target 
Gender of the 
Participant Gender of the Target 
Context Condition 
Paper and 
Pencil 
Online Total 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
8 
7 
3 
21 
2 
2 
3 
3 
10 
9 
6 
24 
Total 39 10 49 
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12 
10 
' W i 
•J 
Single fn o Relationship Status Missing 
I Default/Standard 
Information 
: Sensitive Information 
• Stigmatizing Information 
Figure 1 Presence of default/standard information, sensitive personal information, and 
potentially stigmatizing information as a function of relationship status (single, in a 
relationship and status not indicated/missing) 
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Figure 2 Presence of personal information, photo and update, Album and Profile Picture 
information, age information, work information, view information, and relationship 
information as a function of relationship status (single, in a relationship and status not 
indicated/missing) 
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About Me/Bio 
Appendices 
Appendix A. Glossary of Facebook Terms 
Users can display personal details about themselves. 
For example, I love hot chocolate, I am the eldest of 3 
children. 
Account 
Activities 
Address 
Advanced Wall 
Applications 
Birthday 
Birth date 
Birth year 
Chat 
A Facebook account is the sum total of all the information a 
user owns on Facebook, including the login and password 
information, the profile, the privacy settings, etc. 
Users can name any activity they like to do. 
For example, watching television, student council, playing 
cards, travelling, cooking, etc. 
Common and/or popular activities are often depicted with a 
picture icon next to the activity. For example, the cooking 
activity is depicted with a plate of food. 
Users can provide their street address (e.g. house/building 
number and street name) in the Contact Information section 
of their profiles. 
The advanced wall is similar to a bulletin board where users 
can display information. For example, messages to other 
users, large graphics, photos or videos etc. 
Any additional features that are not default to Facebook. 
For example, Scrabulous is an application that allows users to 
play an online word game (Scrabble) with other users signed 
into Facebook. 
Users can display a "Birthday" that refers to the user's birth 
day, month and year. 
"Birth date" refers to the day and month that the user was 
born. 
For example, May 22. 
"Birth year" refers to the year in which the user was born. For 
example, 1980. 
A Facebook feature that allows users to send and receive 
instant messages with friends who are also logged into 
Facebook. 
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College/University 
Comment 
Users can indicate the university/college they attended or are 
currently attending in the Education and Work section of 
their profiles. Next to "With" users can indicate other people 
they attended the college/university with. Once a 
college/university is indicated the school logo will 
automatically appear. Below each entered college/university, 
users can click on "Add a Class" to include additional 
institutions they have attended or are attending. 
When viewing a friend's content (like a photo or note), users 
can leave a comment, or written observation, on that content. 
Concentration Users can indicate their discipline or area of interest (e.g. 
biology) in the Education and Work section of their profiles 
Courses 
Current City/Town 
Degree 
Alumni 
Users can indicate any courses they took throughout their 
education within a high school, college/university or 
workshop setting. 
Users can name the city in which they live in the Contact 
Information section of their profiles. 
Users can indicate the degree they are working on or have 
obtained (e.g. bachelors, masters etc. .) in the Education and 
Work section of their profiles 
Users can indicate the college/university that they have 
graduated from. 
Bachelors Users can indicate that they hold a bachelor's degree. 
Diploma 
Doctorate 
Users can indicate that they have earned a diploma. 
Users can indicate that they hold a Doctorate degree. 
Masters Users can indicate that they hold a Master's degree. 
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Post-doctorate Users can indicate that they hold a Post-doctorate degree. 
Email Address 
Employer 
Events 
Facebook Blog 
Facebook Username 
Link 
Facebook Blog 
Users can provide email addresses in the Contact Information 
section of their profiles. 
Users can display the name of their current or former 
employer. 
For example, Bank of Montreal 
Users can add a calendar-based resource to their profiles, 
pages and groups that lets them share news about upcoming 
affairs or social gatherings. 
The official Facebook blog where users can find hundreds of 
posts on a wide range of subjects. 
Users have the option of creating a Facebook Username Link. 
A Facebook Username Link is a distinct Web address for 
your profile. When the Username is added to the URL your 
profile is easily accessed. For example, 
http://www.facebook.com is the Facebook homepage. But 
adding a Username such as 
http://www.facebook.com/appleseed.jonny would take you 
directly to Jonny Appleseed's personal profile. A Facebook 
Username can be searched on Facebook as well as some 
popular search engines so it is also another way for people to 
easily find friends. 
The official Facebook blog where you will find hundreds of 
posts on a wide range of subjects. 
Favourite Books 
Favourite Games 
Favourite Movies 
Users can indicate authors, series, comics, or genres of 
literature that they like. 
For example, Introduction to Psychology 
Users can indicate electronic games including computer 
games, video games, and personal console games, board 
games, and outdoor games they like. 
For example, Cranium. 
Users can indicate TV shows and genres of shows that they 
like in the Arts and Entertainment section of their profiles. 
For example, Lord of the Rings. 
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Favourite Music 
Favourite Quotes 
Favourite Teams 
Users can indicate bands, songs, artists, or genres of music 
that they like in the Arts and Entertainment section of their 
profiles. 
For example, Lady Gaga. 
Users can indicate quotations and sayings that they like, 
believe in, or follow in the Philosophy section of their 
profiles. 
For example, "Birds of a Feather, Flock Together". 
Users can indicate their favourite sports teams. 
For example, the Yankees. 
Favourite Television 
Family 
Former Name 
Friend 
Friends List 
Friend Request 
Fun Wall 
Gender 
Users can indicate movies, movie series, and genres of 
movies that they like in the Arts and Entertainment section of 
their profiles. 
For example, Two and a Half Men. 
Users can display names of siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, 
cousins etc. If the family member is signed up on Facebook, 
their profiles will be connected. Other users can them click 
on the family members name, and they will be directed to 
that users profile. 
"Former Name" allows the user to specify whether or not 
they have a former name that is different from their current 
name. The former name may be a maiden name or a given 
name used prior to conducting a formal name change. 
A "friend" on Facebook is a person with whom you have a 
reciprocal, mutually confirmed connection. All friendships on 
Facebook must be initiated by one party (through a friend 
request) and confirmed by the second party. 
Users can display a list of friends that they have accepted or 
have invited as Facebook friends. This list can contain a 
variety of individuals such as family members, high school 
friends, childhood friends, college friends, acquaintances and 
even strangers. 
A friend request is a request to enter into a mutual friend 
connection with the requestee on Facebook. 
The fun wall is an upgraded bulletin board where users post 
messages or quotes, large graphics such as photos or videos, 
for each other to see. 
Users have the option to display their gender. 
For example, male or female. 
This is not necessarily their biological sex but which gender 
they identify with. 
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Gifts 
Graduation Year 
Group Administrator 
Group 
High school 
Hometown 
IM Screen Name 
Inbox 
Interested in 
Interests 
Job City/Town 
Users can accept or give virtual tokens of appreciation that 
are displayed as pictorial icons. These can be playful, serious 
and friendly gifts. 
For example, a birthday cake. 
Users can indicate the year in which they graduated or are 
planning to graduate. 
An admin is a person who's in charge of a group. When you 
create a group, you are automatically listed as both an admin 
and the group's creator. Admins can invite people to join the 
group, appoint other admins, and edit group information and 
content. They can also remove members and other admins. 
A group is not a page or profile. It is a Facebook site created 
by bands, companies and other organizations to promote their 
activities. Users can join groups based around shared 
interests, activities, political or religious causes. 
Users can indicate the high school they are attending or 
attended in the Education and Work section of their profiles. 
"Hometown" allows the user to specify the town in which 
they grew up in and consider their hometown. For example, 
London, Ontario. 
Users can provide Instant Messaging Screen names in the 
Contact Information section their profiles. Screen names for 
AIM, Google Talk, Windows Live Messenger, Skype, ICQ, 
Twitter, and others can be added. 
The Inbox is where all messages, updates, and notifications 
are stored in Facebook. 
Users have the option to display their sexual orientation in the 
Basic Information section of their profiles. They have the 
option to indicate whether they are interested in men or 
women, or both. 
Users can name any personal interest in the Activities and 
Interests section of their profiles. Common and/or popular 
interests are depicted with a picture icon next to the activity. 
For example, the photography interest is depicted with a 
camera. 
Users can display the city that they work in. 
For example, Toronto. 
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Job Listed 
Job Position 
Job Time Period 
Like 
Limited Profile 
Looking for 
Dating 
Friendship 
Networking 
Random play 
Relationship 
Users can display their current jobs or jobs that they have 
held in the past. For example: Royal Bank. 
Users can also list their specific job title. For example, 
Banker. 
Users can display what their job position is. 
For example, a bank teller or a manager. 
Users can display how long they have worked in their current 
job or in former jobs. 
For example, March 1st, 2001 - March 14th, 2011. 
A feature that appears as a link next to something on 
Facebook that allows users to let others know they appreciate 
that something, whether it be a video, a comment or 
something else. 
A profile that allows only restricted access. 
"Looking for" allows the user to specify what type of 
relationship they are looking for. A number of relationship 
type options are available in a drop down box next to 
"looking for." 
"Dating" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Looking for." It means the user is looking for a dating 
relationship which is a form of courtship, and may include 
any social activity with the aim of each assessing the other's 
suitability as a partner. 
"Friendship" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Looking for." It means the user is looking for a friendship. 
"Networking" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Looking for." It means the user is looking to connect with 
people who have similar interests. 
"Random play" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"random play." It means the user is looking to connect with a 
person on a casual basis without committing to a serious 
relationship. 
"Relationship" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Looking for." It means the user is looking for a relationship 
or a state of connectedness that typically includes a romantic 
and emotional commitment. 
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Whatever I can get 
Market Place 
Market Place Listing 
Mini-Feed 
Neighbourhood 
"Whatever I can get" is an option in the drop down menu 
next to "Looking for." It means the user is looking for any 
type of relationship. 
The marketplace is a classified ad section posted through 
Facebook where users can buy and sell advertised goods 
within the following categories: For Sale, Housing, Jobs, and 
Other. Ads can be posted as either available and offered, or 
wanted. 
A listing is an entry in the Facebook Marketplace announcing 
that an item is for sale or exchange. 
A Mini-Feed is a list of updates detailing a user's recent 
activity on Facebook. Recent activity can include posting on 
a friend's wall, being tagged in photos and/or videos, 
uploading an album, submitting an RSPV to a Facebook 
event, etc. 
A Mini-Feed provides details about what has been added or 
removed from personal profile information (e.g. relationship 
status, work information, likes/dislikes). 
The Mini-Feed is different from a News Feed in that it 
centres on one individual's Facebook activity and is 
displayed within a user's Facebook Profile. 
Users can name the neighbourhood in which they live or 
name the nearest major intersection to where they live. 
Network 
News Feed 
Users are able to join a Facebook network which is founded 
in a real-world community. For example, a user can join their 
high school, university, city, or company network. 
News Feeds highlight what's happening in users' social 
circles on Facebook. It is a constantly updating list of stories 
about actions a user's friends have taken. 
Notes 
Notifications 
Online 
Users can display written entries detailing personal thoughts, 
opinions or general comments. Notes are like mini-blogs. 
Users will receive a notifications are when a friend takes an 
action on them on Facebook. 
For example, if someone tags John in a photo, John will 
receive a notification. 
This status describes whether or not a user is logged into 
Facebook chat. 
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Page 
People Who Inspire 
You 
Phone 
Photo Album 
Photos 
Political views 
Profile 
Posted Item 
Profile Picture 
Relationship Status 
Engaged 
Users can add links to pages to show friends what they care 
about. Only the official representative of an artist or business 
can create and make changes to a page. 
Users can list names of people that they find inspiring. 
For example, Albert Einstein. 
Users can display a phone number for other users to see. 
For example, mobile phone number, work phone number, or 
home phone number. 
Users can create online photo albums where they can pick 
and choose pictures and upload them to their profile. 
Users can upload photos of themselves and others. One can 
also post any pictures not related to any person, such as one's 
artistic drawings, that one wishes to share with others. 
Users can display "Political views" or in other words, specify 
their political ideology. For example, Liberal. There are two 
boxes, one where the user can state their orientation and the 
other where the user can describe their political views in 
words. 
Users who want to share information about themselves and 
socialize with others can create a profile. A profile displays a 
user's personal information and their interactions with 
friends. 
Users can display links to websites, blogs, videos etc. Posts 
can include anything users choose to post for others to view. 
Users can display a profile picture which is the main photo 
seen at the top of each profile. This picture is associated with 
the users' name. Any picture can be used as a profile picture. 
For example, a picture of the self, a picture with friends, a 
picture of animals or even an avatar. An avatar is a computer 
generated fictional character that is usually created by the 
user using graphical software. 
Alternatively, users can take an existing picture and use this 
photo or graphic to represent themselves. 
Users have the option to display their relationship status 
which is found in the Basic Information section of their 
profile. A number of relationship options are available in the 
drop down box next to "Relationship Status." 
"Engaged" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is engaged to 
someone. 
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In a relationship 
In an open 
relationship 
It's complicated 
"In a relationship" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is in a 
relationship with someone else. Users also have the option of 
including the name of the person they are in a relationship 
with. E.g. Johnny Appleseed is in a relationship with Jane 
Doe. 
"In an open relationship" is an option in the drop down menu 
next to the user's "Relationship Status." This term describes a 
relationship in which the participants are free to have 
emotional and/or physical relationships with other partners. 
"It's complicated" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Relationship Status." This term can describe a number of 
different relationship situations and can be used if none of the 
other options best describe the user's current relationship 
situation. 
Married 
Single 
Religious views 
Residence 
Room 
School Mailbox 
Self Selected Photos 
Size of Network 
"Married" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is married. 
"Single" is an option in the drop down menu next to 
"Relationship Status." indicates that the user is not in a 
relationship with anyone. 
"Religious views" allows the user to specify their religious 
affiliation. For example, Catholic. There are two boxes, one 
where the user can state their religious affiliation and the 
other where the user can describe their religious views in 
words. 
Users can name a retirement residence, community residence, 
or university residence in which they currently live or have 
lived in previously. 
Users can name the number of their apartment/room in the 
building or residence in which they live. 
Users can indicate a school mailbox number. 
Users can choose to display/upload photos of themselves or 
others. These photos can include profile photos or photos to 
include in albums. 
Number of members in a particular network. 
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Status Status updates are a way for users to keep their friends 
informed about what they are thinking, what they are doing, 
or how they might be feeling. 
For example, users may post things that express their current 
feelings, whereabouts, or actions. An update can come in the 
form of posted messages for all of the users' friends to read. 
Friends can respond with their own comments, and also press 
the "Like" button to show that they enjoyed reading it. 
Super Wall An upgraded bulletin board where one gets to post comments, 
videos and even graffiti to friends. All posts are public. 
Tag Marking a photo or video with text that identifies the image 
or the person in the image. 
Tagged Photos Photos that have been uploaded by another user, and where 
the profile user has been identified or labelled in a photo. 
When someone is tagged in a photo, the mouse cursor can be 
pointed at a person in the photo and his/her name will show 
up on the screen. 
Videos Users can post links to videos that they are in or that they 
like. Users can "tag" their friends in videos they add much 
like the way users can tag their friends in photos. 
Wall A bulletin board where users post messages for each other to 
see. This includes any random messages, such as updating 
your status of what you are doing, thinking or feeling, that 
you want to post. Once again you can post on your own wall 
as well on other user's walls. 
Website Users can name their personal website (e.g. one they have 
created for themselves or their business) or an interest 
website (e.g. the website for the university they attend/work 
for). 
Zip/Postal Code Users can input their zip or postal code in the Contact 
Information section of their profiles. 
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Appendix B. Study 1 A-3 Checklist 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Variable Name 
Facebook Username Link 
Network Searched 
Size of Overall Network 
Status Yes/No 
i 
Gender Yes/No 
male 
female 
Interested m (Sexual Orientation) 
Yes/No 
men 
women 
Relationship Status Yes/No 
single 
in a relationship 
engaged 
married 
it's complicated 
in an open relationship 
Former Name Yes/No 
Looking for (Relationship 
Preference) 
Yes/No 
Variable Description 
Web address of the Facebook profile accessed 
What network (community or university) you belong 
to (e.g., Toronto, ON) 
Number of members in the network 
Update information that notifies other users of your 
whereabouts and actions (e.g, what you are thinking, 
feeling, doing etc. .) 
Sex (e.g., male, female) 
Whether you are interested in men or women 
Whether you are: single, in a relationship, engaged, 
married, it's complicated or in an open relationship 
If you are married and changed your name, what your 
maiden name was 
Whether you are looking for friendship, dating, a 
relationship, or social networking 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
random play 
whatever I can get 
friendship 
dating 
relationship 
networking 
Birthday Yes/No 
Birth date 
Birth year 
Hometown Yes/No 
Political views Yes/No 
Religious views Yes/No 
Mini-Feed Yes/No 
Email address Yes/No 
Mobile Phone Yes/No 
Land Phone Yes/No 
School Mailbox Yes/No 
Residence Yes/No 
Room Yes/No 
Address Yes/No 
Current City/Town Yes/No 
Zip Yes/No 
Website Yes/No 
Activities Yes/No 
The day or month you were born 
The day you were born 
The year you were born 
The town you grew up in 
Your political stance (e.g., liberal, conservative etc .) 
Your religious stance (e.g., Catholic, Muslim etc. .) 
Updates/list of your FACEBOOK™ activity (e.g., 
events you are attending, friends you have added, 
pictures that have been posted of you etc .) 
Your email 
Your cell phone number 
Your land line phone number 
Your school mailbox 
The residence you live in 
The residence room you live m 
Your home address 
The city or town you live in 
Your zip or postal code 
Personal or interest website address (e.g., justudents 
website) 
Things you like to do (e.g, sports, hobbies, leisure 
activities etc. .) 
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44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Interests Yes/No 
Favorite Music Yes/No 
Favorite TV Shows Yes/No 
Favorite Movies Yes/No 
Favorite Books Yes/No 
Favorite Quotes Yes/No 
About Me Yes/No 
College/University Yes/No 
Concentration Yes/No 
Degree Yes/No 
Diploma 
Bachelors 
Masters 
Doctorate 
Post-doctorate 
Alumni 
Graduation Year Yes/No 
High school Yes/No 
Courses Yes/No 
Awards Yes/No 
Job Listed (have listed at least one 
job) 
Yes/No 
Employer Yes/No 
Position Yes/No 
Your personal interests (e.g, painting, photography) 
Bands/songs or genres of music that you like 
TV shows/genres of shows that you like 
Movies that you like to watch 
Favorite books you've read 
Quotations that you enjoy 
Personal details about yourself (e.g., you love hot 
chocolate and are the eldest of 3 children) 
The university/college you attended or are currently 
attending 
Your discipline or area of interest (e g., biology) 
What degree you are working on (e.g, bachelors etc ) 
When you graduated or are planning to graduate 
The high school you are attending or attended 
Any courses you took 
Any awards you won 
Who you work for (or have worked for in the past) 
What your job position is (or was in the past) 
What your job duties were 
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67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Description Yes/No 
Job City/Town Yes/No 
Time Period Yes/No 
Advanced Wall Yes/No 
Fun Wall Yes/No 
Super Wall Yes/No 
Wall Yes/No 
Profile Picture Yes/No 
self 
activity 
friends 
relationship partner 
family 
work 
school 
ammal(s) 
random picture 
Photos of. . Yes/No 
Tagged Photos Yes/No 
Self Selected Photos Yes/No 
Tagged Videos Yes/No 
Friends Viewable Yes/No 
Can you send them a gift? Yes/No 
The city in which you work(ed) 
The time period in which you worked 
An upgraded bulletin board where users post messages 
and large graphics for each other to see, users can add 
applications 
An upgraded bulletin board where users create drawings 
and post graffiti for each other to see 
An upgraded bulletin board where users post messages 
and large graphics for each other to see 
A bulletin board where users post messages for each 
other to see 
The main photo seen at the top of your profile 
(e.g., picture of yourself, friends, animals etc. ) 
Users can upload photos of themselves and others 
Photos that have been uploaded by another user, and 
where the profile user has been identified or labeled in 
a photo 
Photos that have been uploaded by the actual profile 
user themselves 
Videos that the user has been identified in and tagged by 
another user 
All the friends on your friend list 
Whether you can send a gift to the user without prior 
permission 
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90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Can you message them? Yes/No 
Can you poke them'' Yes/No 
Applications Yes/No 
Photo Album(s) Yes/No 
Groups (joined at least one group) 
Yes/No 
Events as indicated m their mini-
feed 
Yes/No 
Gifts Yes/No 
Posted Items Yes/No 
Market Place listings Yes/No 
Notes Yes/No 
Personal Pages Yes/No 
Whether you can send a message to the user without 
prior permission 
Whether you can send a poke (like a virtual nudge to 
let them know you are there) to the user without prior 
permission 
Any additional features that are not default to 
FACEBOOK™ (e.g., scrabulous, must be added by the 
user by signing up for the application) 
Users can create online photo albums where they can 
pick and choose pictures and upload them to their profile 
Any groups that users belong to (e.g., groups based around 
shared interests, activities, or anything you like) 
Any parties, get-togethers or social events you are 
attending 
Gifts that other users have sent you 
Posted websites, blogs, videos, anything users choose to 
post for others to view 
A classified ad section online where users can buy and 
sell advertised goods 
Written entries detailing personal thoughts, opinions or 
general comments 
Personal web pages or links that are connected to the 
users profile 
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Appendix C. Study 2 Exposure Stories 
Legal Privacy Agreement Story 
Facebook's Privacy Policy (Have you ever read it?) 
Facebook is a licensee of the TRUSTe Privacy Progiam. TRUSTe is an independent, non-profit 
organization whose mission is to build user's trust and confidence in the Internet by promoting 
the use of fair information practices This privacy statement covers the site www facebook com 
and its directly associated domains. Because this Web site wants to demonstrate its commitment 
to your privacy, it has agreed to disclose its information practices and have its privacy practices 
reviewed for compliance by TRUSTe. 
When you register with Facebook, you provide us with certain personal information, such as 
your name, your email address, your telephone number, your address, your gender, schools 
attended and any other personal or preference information that you provide to us 
When you enter Facebook, we collect your browser type and IP address. This information is 
gathered for all Facebook visitors In addition, we store certain information from your browser 
using "cookies " A cookie is a piece of data stored on the user's computer tied to information 
about the user We use session ID cookies to confirm that users are logged in These cookies 
termmate once the user closes the browser By default, we use a persistent cookie that stores your 
login ID (but not your password) to make it easier for you to login when you come back to 
Facebook. You can remove or block this cookie using the settings in your biowser if you want to 
disable this convenience feature 
When you use Facebook, you may set up your personal profile, form relationships, send 
messages, perform searches and queries, form groups, set up events, add applications, and 
transmit information through various channels. We collect this information so that we can 
provide you the service and offer personalized features When you update information, we 
usually keep a backup copy of the prior version for a reasonable period of time to enable 
reversion to the prior version of that information 
You post User Content on the Site at your own risk Although we allow you to set pnvacy 
options that limit access to your pages, please be aware that no security measuies are perfect or 
impenetrable We cannot control the actions of other Users with whom you may choose to share 
your pages and information Therefore, we cannot and do not guarantee that User Content you 
post on the Site will not be viewed by unauthorized persons We aie not responsible for 
circumvention of any pnvacy settings or security measures contained on the Site You 
understand and acknowledge that, even after removal, copies of User Content may remain 
viewable m cached and archived pages or if other Users have copied or stored your User 
Content 
Facebook may also collect information about you from other sources, such as newspapers, blogs, 
instant messaging services, and other users of the Facebook service through the operation of the 
service (e.g , photo tags) in order to provide you with more useful information and a more 
personalized experience 
By using Facebook, you are consenting to have your personal data transferred to and processed 
in the United States 
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Personal Privacy Story 
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Could it happen to you? 
lennifer Porter is a little freaked out 
The 17-year-old is hunkered over a sheaf of papers scattered across a Tim Hortons table in Ajax, 
Dnt, one hand flipping pages, the other twirling an oversized blue earring " That 's kind of 
;reepy," she said. 
Indeed. What she's looking at is quite the biography - everything from her cellphone number, 
lome address and a map to her work. 
She sits with myriad details of her life, furnished by me, a Globe and Mail reporter, who found 
Vis Porter's profile on Facebook and then reconstructed her life using nothing but freely 
ivailable websites, such as Google Maps and Canada411 com. 
\ s ide from knowing where she lives, where she works and where she will soon rest her head, 
3ur investigation also turned up her home and cellphone numbers, and when she's turning 18. 
Dh, and pictures, too. She's shocked that someone she has never met could leam so much about 
ler. 
'It's funny because when you called, I was having dinner with my boyfriend. He asked who it 
vas and I said I had no clue but he got my cellphone number off Facebook," she said 
Canadians are embracing social-media sites online at a breakneck pace. According to the most 
ecent data from Com Score Inc., nearly 17 million Canadians have a Facebook profile. Social 
letworkers use these resources to help shape their identity, essentially branding themselves and 
lending their public image around the world But the exposure comes at a price. 
tVhile our digital footprint expands, privacy erodes. More and more, social networkers who are 
lot obsessively careful face the prospect of identity theft, inadvertently marring their own 
eputation or even inviting the threat of physical harm 
iVhile social-networking sites, such as Facebook, offer varying degrees of security and privacy 
>rotection - such as restricting who can view certain parts or the entirety of their profile - many 
isers leave the drapes open. Whether by ignorance or simply a willingness to trust their private 
letails to the public, they leave their photos, blog postings and personal information freely 
ivailable for anyone to discover with a few clicks of a mouse. 
)uring a two month-long investigation, The Globetracked more than a dozen Canadians through 
heir open social-networking profiles, employing only freely available Web tools to build 
)iofiles of each individual user. Here are two examples of what we found: 
There's the 23-year-old Oakville, Ont., woman who posted her home phone number on an 
open Facebook profile. Plug the number into Canada411 .com for a reverse address 
search, and you'll find her home address, which you can then search on Google Maps and 
see she lives on a quiet suburban street near the Queen Elizabeth Way More personal, 
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she's "addicted" to the MTV show The Hills, loves Dr. Pepper and sometimes wears 
contact lenses. 
To celebrate the end of school, a fourth-year University of Toronto student, who has a 
private Facebook profile, posted in public a map to his Collingwood, Ont., cottage and 
left his cellphone as the contact information. 
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History of the Internet Control Story 
The Early Years of the Internet 
The Internet began as ARPAnet, a U.S. Department of Defense project to create a nationwide 
computer network that would continue to function even if a large portion of it were destroyed in 
a nuclear war or natural disaster. 
Although the basic applications and guidelines that make the Internet possible had existed for 
almost a decade, the network did not gain a public face until the 1990s. On August 6,1991, 
CERN, which straddles the border between France and Switzerland, publicized the new World 
Wide Web project. The Web was invented by English scientist Tim Berners-Lee in 1989. 
Today, several Web browsers are available for IBM, Macintosh and UNIX-based computers. 
And the Web is growing at a phenomenal rate. During the 1990s, it was estimated that the 
Internet grew by 100% per year, with a brief period of explosive growth in 1996 and 1997. As of 
June 30, 2008, 1.463 billion people use the Internet according to Intemet World Stats. 
Through keyword-driven Internet research using search engines like Yahoo! and Google, 
millions of people worldwide have easy, instant access to a vast and diverse amount of online 
information. Compared to encyclopedias and traditional libraries, the World Wide Web allows 
for easy access to a variety of information and data. 
The Internet has made possible entirely new forms of social interaction, activities and 
organizing, thanks to its basic features such as widespread usability and access. 
Using the Web, individuals can publish ideas and information for an extremely large audience. 
Anyone can find ways to publish a web page, a blog or build a website for very little initial cost. 
Many individuals use "web logs" or blogs, which are largely used as online diaries. Some 
commercial organizations encourage staff to fill them with advice on their areas of specialization 
in the hope that visitors will be impressed by the expert knowledge and free information, and be 
attracted to the corporation as a result. 
Many use the World Wide Web to access news, weather and sports reports, to plan and book 
holidays and to find out more about their random ideas and casual interests. Also, many use the 
Internet to access and download music, movies and other works for their enjoyment and 
relaxation. 
People use chat, messaging and e-mail to make and stay in touch with friends worldwide, 
sometimes in the same way as some previously had pen pals. Social networking websites like 
MySpace, Facebook and many others like them also put and keep people in contact for their 
enjoyment. 
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Advertising on popular web pages can be lucrative, and e-commerce or the sale of products and 
services directly via the Web continues to grow. 
Another main area of leisure on the Internet is multiplayer gaming. This form of leisure creates 
communities, bringing people of all ages and origins to enjoy the fast-paced world of multiplayer 
games. These range from MMORPG to first-person shooters, from role-playing games to online 
gambling. This has revolutionized the way many people interact and spend their free time on the 
Internet. 
DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY SETTINGS USE ONLINE 226 
Appendix D. Study 2 Target Portfolio 
Female Target 
Sarah D. Barnes 
PERMANENT: 
276 Eiwo C r t - Apt. 103 
Waterloo, ONT - N2K 2M8 
519-880-1694 
Barnes_RIM@gmail.com 
OBJECTIVE: 
SUMMARY: 
EDUCATION-
Programming position with an emphasis in Internet/Web technologies 
• Three years experience implementing Internet technologies 
• Potential Honours graduate with BSC in Computer Science 
• Proficient with Web tools, including Java/J2EE, Cold Fusion and .NET 
BSc expected with Honours in Computer Science & Psychology Minor, June 2009 
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario 
Current GPA of 8.95 on a 10.0 scale 
Courses taken included: 
Psychology 
Internet/Web Development 
Advanced Java Development 
Object-Oriented Programming 
Internet Communications 
Advanced Systems Design 
Senior Project (Web Architecture) 
Object-Oriented Analysis/Design 
C/C++ Programming 
EXPERIENCE: Programmer Internship, May 2007 to September 2007 
Statistics Canada, Ottawa Ontario 
• Member of New Technologies Development Group. 
• Evaluated new technologies for implementation throughout the organization, 
including Java/J2EE, HTML, Cold Fusion and .NET. 
• Assisted in designing and developing Intranet site for Corporate 
Communications. 
• Refined interface to applicant tracking system used by HR department. 
Departmental Aide, May 2006 to September 2006 
IT Dept., University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario 
• Assisted in developing the first campus-wide Intranet application for posting 
course descriptions and pre-requisites. 
• Assisted in developing course grading systems in C++ and integrated into the 
Registrar's office for posting of final grades. 
ACTIVITIES • Member, Intramural Soccer Term 2004-2008 
• Edward C. Grace Award for Excellence in Computing, 2007 
• Volunteer at Elementary Schools teaching computer skills 2005-2008 
Employment Application 
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Full 
Name: 
Barnes 
Last 
Sarah 
First 
D 
Dat 
e. 
November 15,2008 
M.I 
Address 
276 Eiwo Crt. Apt. 103 
Street Address Apartment/Unit # 
Phon 
e-
i 
Date 
Available 
Position A 
for. 
Are you a 
Have you 
Have you 
felony? 
If yes, 
explain-
High 
School: 
From: 
College 
From: 
Waterloo 
City 
(519)880-1694 
Social Insurance 
February 1, No.:749 902 487 
2009 
applied 
Programming Specialist 
YES 
Canadian citizen?
 ra 
YES 
ever worked for this company? „ 
ever been convicted of a YES 
a 
Colonel By Secondary 
T 
1999 ° ' 2004 
N/A 
T 
o: 
University University of Ottawa 
E-mail 
Address-
NO 
• 
NO 
NO 
Addres 
s: School 
Did you 
graduate? 
Addres 
s: 
Did you 
graduate? 
Addres 
If no, < 
If so, \ 
2381 
YES 
YES 
• 
75 Li 
Ontario N2K2M8 
Province POSTAL Code 
Barnes RIM(a).gmail.com 
Desired 
Salary: 
J
 $55,000/annual 
YE 
S NO 
ire you authorized to work in Canada? .—. ,—, 
vhen? 
Ogilvie Rd. Gloucester, Ontario KIJ 7N4 
NO 
• 
N O Diplom 
aurier Ave. E. Ottawa, ON KIN 6N5 
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From: 
2005 
T 
o: 2009 
Did you 
graduate? 
YES NO Degree Expected: BSc with Honours in 
Computer Science and 
• E3 Psychology Minor 
Please list three professional references 
Full 
Name: 
Roberto Narbaitz 
Relationshi 
p: 
Compan 
y: 
Addres 
s: 
Full 
Name: 
Compan 
Addres 
s-
Full 
Name: 
Compan 
y: 
Addres 
s: 
University of Ottawa - Faculty of Engineering 
75 Laurier Ave. E. Ottawa, Ontario. KIN 6N5 
Research Supervisor 
Phone: ( 613 ) 562-5800 EXT 6142 
Kevin Kennedy 
Relationshi 
P : 
University of Ottawa - Faculty of Engineering 
75 Laurier Ave. E. Ottawa, Ontario. KIN 6N5 
Thesis Supervisor 
Phone: ( 613 ) 562-5800 EXT 6133 
Sarah Rizk 
Relationshi 
p: Employment Supervisor 
Statstics Canada 
Phone 
100 Tunney's Pasture Driveway, Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0T6 
(613)951-8116 
Company 
Address 
Job 
Title: 
Statistics Canada 
Phone: 
100 Tunney's Pasture Driveway, Ottawa, Ontario 
(613 ) 951-8116 
Superviso 
r: 
Sarah Rizk 
Programmer Internship 
Starting 
Salary: $15/hour Ending Salary: $16.75/hour 
Responsibiliti 
es: 
Evaluate new technologies, design and develop new Intranet sites 
From: o: 
May 2007 Sept 2007 
Reason for 
Leaving: Going back to school 
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May we contact your previous supervisor for a 
reference? 
YES 
Company 
Address 
University of Ottawa, IT Department 
NO 
• 
Phone- ( 613) 562-5800 EXT 3296 
75 Laurier Ave. E., Ottawa, Ontario 
Superviso 
r: 
John Butcher 
Job 
Title: 
Departmental Aid 
Starting 
Salary: $12/hour Ending Salary: $12/hour 
Responsibiliti 
es: Develop new Intranet applications, research new possibilities for Intranet accessibilities 
r
°
m
' May 2006 ° ' Sept 2006 
Reason for 
Leaving: 
Going back to school 
May we contact your previous supervisor for a 
reference? 
Company 
Address 
Montana's Cookhouse and Saloon 
YES NO 
® • 
Phone: ( 613 ) 747-2744 
1750 Ogilvie Road, Gloucester, ON KIJ 7P4 
Job Starting 
Title . . Salary: 
Waiter J 
Superviso 
r 
Eric Dantey 
$10.75/hour Ending Salary: $11.50/hour 
Responsibiliti 
es-
Effective and efficient customer service, problem solving and conflict resolution 
From: 
July 2004 
T 
o: May 2006 
Reason for 
Leaving: 
Acquired new employment 
May we contact your previous supervisor for a 
reference? 
YES NO 
m • 
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25 THINGS ABOUT ME... 
1. My most productive hours of the day are between 11pm and 3am 
2. I love to be active and play sports, volleyball and soccer are my two favorites © 
3. If I had one wish, it would be to live on the same street as all of my friends and family, 
where our kids could grow up together and we could have street parties 
4. I love the band Metric, and the movies "Zoolander" and "The Abyss" 
5. I really enjoy online shopping 
6. I miss living in Toronto & Ottawa, even though living in Waterloo is pretty good 
7. I've moved 16 times 
8. I'm turning 26 on May 22nd 
9. I lived through a break-in 
10. My boyfriend is my best friend and supports me no matter what I do 
11. I believe in God and consider myself to be Catholic - but I don't go to church 
12. I am musically challenged and absolutely admire anyone who isn't 
13. At first glance, I may look like a nerd, but my friends think I'm the coolest person they 
know 
14. 1 absolutely love the shows Arrested Development, 24 and the Office, and hope that they will 
make an Arrested Development movie really soon 
15. I am really into Tae Kwon Do 
16. I love my dog Muffin and pretty much prefer him to anyone else 
17. 1 love to drive and could drive anything with wheels and a motor 
18. Sunday Morning news shows are my favorite not because it's based on government action 
but because I get to see how politicians are spinning the week's news. Go Liberals! 
19. I love the beach and I'm trained through PADI as an open-water scuba diver 
20. I am currently feeling pretty pumped about my new YMCA membership! 
21. I own more cereal than the grocery store 
22. I am almost 26 and still afraid of the dark 
23. I love getting lost sometimes you go places you would never have gone otherwise 
24. I hate roast beef! 
25. Before I went in to Computer Science & Psychology, I took a few Fine Arts courses 
"ABOUT ME" 
Hey there, my name is Sarah and I'm 26 years old! I am currently about to graduate from the 
University of Ottawa with a degree related to computer programming and will soon be heading up 
to Waterloo, Ontario to start work at RIM. I LOVE big cities and will miss Ottawa a lot, especially 
all of my friends and family, who are absolutely incredible. I love working with computers, whether 
it be rebuilding them or programming them —I know, such a nerd © I have the best boyfriend in 
the entire world and he is my motivation and support for everything I do in life. I'm really scared to 
leave my family, friends and boyfriend to come to Waterloo, but I believe that things happen for a 
reason, and I feel I was meant to come to Waterloo to work, as I think I will be able to use my 
potential to the highest degree - guess we'll find out © I LOVE being active and I'm really hoping 
to find some great intramural activities and/or sports to join when I get to Waterloo this spring. If 
you want to know anything else, just ask © 
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PHOTOS "Sarah" 
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PHOTOS "Michael" 
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Appendix E. Study 2 Paper and Pencil Booklet 
HUtUlMIMH.Um IIIJJI « J 
I E j hltpy/www facdiook.com/profile phprid=l£5SS66598atrgfcpnifilea/prcfil&phphd=16555e659eav=infoBtviewai=16S556&53B l ^ i 7 ^ 
C „ » g l e S : 
i l <fc IB3 ratebook |Sune Smith 
^ • \Q O- h' €$ Bookmarks* | ^ Find ' ^ Check • \_\ AutoFill * 
V Up oad a Profile Future 
SB Tote a i ebtini p.cture 
Edit My JVofilp 
I ntr jftii'-Ifiav) bout yoj7Klt 
0 ft endj 
CL F- rf p=np e vo J bio 
VJdO Info + 
/ / • Cidt on a polBe section befaw to edit It 
• Baste In formation 
Sex female » 
^iShoHi my sex m my profile 
811-ttiday Jan - 1 - 1990 -
Siotv my fv3 tuihdriy tn my profit 
Hometown 
He la turn ship Status » 
I.it.?rc<.r.?<fm r Men 
r Women 
Looking lur j~ Friendship 
r ARelatlorehlp 
I~ Natwortdno, 
POllttLdl VliW5 
UeligiouB Views. 
I* Personal Information 
• Contact Information 
% ' Sign In 
f > ' Q - ttf »
 L j -P«ge - , > T D O I I ~ 
Philthy Mcttasty s 
Haieaipeflt tone at our 
Grand Reoperwifli I Become a 
FAN of Prdtliy McNas*vs and 
Slav up todatevilh 
Lpcontng specials and 
Get Paid To Type 
Gel paid up to $!50/day just 
for lypJig If you have a 
compulfif and free Brae you 
can star! ivofliBU) from home 
1AFT Awtntion Ore 
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£ £ Fateb«)k)Ncwsf . SBSS3ES3GSaa 
https://re91rterfBcebook.Com/pnvacy/JvreMK:feedl ' ifl \4tU|iiw>n^ 
C o g k 3 » ( 3 Search | 
& <ftf j S I Facebook | New) Feed and Wall Pnvacy 
i - \0 eQ»- j j g i
 T $ > Bookmarks- I ^ Find - " ^ Check " t j AutoFill • 
L 
^ - Sign In • 
f i t ' Q ' l l l f i ' * Page - J Tools ' ' 
8> Privacy > News Feed and Walt 
[ ^ y s ^ j j i i f e f i ^ X ^ J SodalAds j 
Actions visible to friends-
Stones are published when you edit your profile information jam 
a new network or update your Status Also publish stones 
when you 
(? W Remove Profile Info 
Ejj3 I * Write on a Friends Wail 
Q R? Comment on or I te a Note 
i f * ] I * Comment on or like a Photo or AJbum 
SP" p Comment on or like a Video 
£U Iv Comment on or See 0 bnk 
£~, [7 Post on a D.BQjssa>n Board 
j ^ i K* AddaFnend 
t j } Iv Change Relabonshtp Status 
O P Leave a Network 
Stones can be shown in your Chat conversaOons 
^£5 R? Show stones in Chat 
Your Wall can show the time stones were posted 
^ I* i n f ore* y- M n n VA r ctts i d St ( i Uodate 
[7 Show times m my Wa3 
Stones wD never be published about-
• Pokes 
• Messages 
• Whose pro Re you view 
o Whose photos you view 
• Whose notes you read 
• Croups and Events you dedine to join 
• PeopJe you reject as fr ends 
» People you remove from your friends 
a Notes and photos you delete 
^App-cabons 5 , S? & 0 • £ 0 
Q Internet | Protected Mode- On •a; 100% 
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Appendix F. Study 2 Privacy Settings Booklet 
How to Use Privacy Settings in Facebook: Overview 
What are privacy settings? 
You can choose to limit who can see information presented in your profile by accessing the privacy 
settings. To find these, go to the top right hand tool bar and click on settings, and then click on 
privacy settings. 
There are a variety of things you can do with the settings, for example, you can control who sees 
your profile and profile information. You can also control who can search for you and who can 
contact you. In addition, you can control what information gets published about you on Facebook 
(e.g., News feed stories that track your activity), and whether photos of you that you personally 
upload or that other users upload are visible. 
How do 1 select/create privacy settings? 
You can click on any of the four privacy setting categories (i.e., profile, search, news feed and wall, 
and applications). In addition, you can choose to block certain people from having the ability to 
search for your profile on Facebook by typing in their name under the "person" box and clicking 
"block". Once you've selected a category, to return to the main privacy page, simply click on the 
privacy heading at the top. Whenever you make changes to your settings, BE SURE TO SAVE 
CHANGES!!! 
Here is what this page looks like: 
B. Privacy 
Prof i le *• 
Control who can see your profile and personal information. 
Search • 
Control who can search for you, and how you can be contacted. 
Hews Feed and Wall > 
Control what stories about you get published to your profile and to your friends' News Feeds. 
App l i ca t i ons • 
Control what information is available to applications you use on Facebook, 
Block People 
If you block someone, they will not be able to find you 
in a Facebook search, see your profile, or interact with 
you through Facebook channels (such as Wall posts. 
Poke, etc.) Any Facebook ties you currently have with 
a person you block will be broken (for example, 
friendship connections, Relationship Status, etc.). Note 
that blocking someone may not prevent all 
communications and interactions in third -party 
applications, and does not extend to elsewhere on the 
Internet. 
• 
9«© 
Person 
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Can you walk me through privacy settings step by step? 
PROFILE PRIVACY: Basic 
If you click on Profile, if will bring you to a screen that has two tabs at the top (basic and contact 
information). 
By clicking on the "basic" tab, you will be given options that allow you to set limits on who can see 
your profile and which information is visible to other users. This is where you can limit who sees 
what. 
You can choose to only allow friends, friends of friends, anyone in specific networks you are a part 
of and their friends, or all of the networks you are a part of to see your information. By clicking on 
the drop down menu, you can choose who sees what for each of the components of basic profile 
information (e.g., photos, status updates, friends e tc . . ) The most stringent setting is either only 
friends or only me (depending on the information). Here is what this page looks like: 
& Privacy Profile 
n S S B l Contact Information | 
Control v\ho can see your profile and related information Visit the Applications page in order to change settings for 
applications 
See how a friend sees your profile -jtai 111, p nq o friend s name 
Profile 
Basic Info 
Personal Info 
Status Updates 
Photos lagged of You 
1
 Only Fnends v j 
[ Customize v j 
Limited Profile 
Edit Custom Setting;. 
j Customize v j 
Limited Profile 
Edit Custom Settings 
[Customize v l 
Limited Profile 
Edit Custom Settings 
1 My Networks and Fnends v j 
Only Me 
Edit Custom Settings 
Edit Photo Albums Prn a<_y Settings 
Videos Tagged of You [ My Networks and Fnends v j 
Only Me 
Edit Custcm Settings 
Friends [My Networks and Friends v j 
Wall Posts fy Friends may post to my Wall 
[OnlyFriends _ _ v ] 
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Appendix G. Study 2 Questionnaire 
Demographics 
How old are you7 
Are you? Male Female Other 
What is your current relationship status? 
Single 
In a relationship 
Married 
Engaged 
Divorced 
In a common-law relationship 
SECTION 2 
Attitudes Towards Computers 
Please indicate the response that best describes you. 
l(notatall)2 3 4 5 6 7(very much) 
1. In general, how at ease do you feel about using computers? 
2. In general, how comfortable do you feel about using computers? 
3. In general, how enthusiastic do you feel about using computers? 
Computer Use 
How many hours do you spend per week using the computer for: (Please fill in your 
response with hrs/week). 
Internet use 
Recreation (e.g., games, connecting with friends, communication, shopping, 
banking) 
Work/School (e.g., word processing, research, writing papers) 
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Facebook Usage Scale. 
1. How private are the things you've included in your Facebook profile? ("private" means either 
personal or confidential) 
1 (not at all) 5 (extremely) 
2. How often have you considered whether something was too personal to include in your 
profile? 
1 (not at all) 5 (extremely) 
3. In general, when you post things about people you know personally in your profile: 
1 (never) 5 (always) 
4. In general, when you post things about companies/products/employers in your Facebook 
profile: 
1 (never) 5 (always) 
5. How well do you feel you know your profile's audience? 
l(notatall) 5 (extremely well) 
6. If you were aware of all the people who look at your Facebook profile, how likely is it that 
you would become more careful about what you write? 
1 (not at all likely) 5(very likely) 
7. How often do you written highly personal things in your profile? 
l(never 5(all the time) 
8. How often have you gotten in trouble for anything you posted in your profile? 
1 (never 5 (all the time) 
9.Are you surprised when someone you meet in person says they have seen/looked at your 
Facebook profile? 
1 (not at all) 5(extremely) 
10. Does it bother you that the things you post in your profile will be available online for a long 
time? 
1 (not at all) 5(extremely) 
11. How liable do you think you are for the things you post in your profile? 
l(notatall) 5(extremely) 
Perceptions of Technology and Uses of Technology 
Do you CURRENTLY have a Facebook account? YES NO 
If no, have you EVER had a Facebook account and deleted it? YES NO 
How familiar are you with Facebook privacy settings? 
1 (not at all familiar) 4 (somewhat familiar) 7 (very familiar) 
How often have you employed privacy settings yourself? 
1 (never) 4 (sometimes) 7 (always) 
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How often have you advised others to employ their privacy settings? 
1 (never) 4 (sometimes) 7 (always) 
Do you identify yourself in your Facebook profile (e.g., you indicate your real name vs. using a 
fake name) YES NO 
How long have you been an active member of Facebook? 
less than 3 months /3 to 6 months/ 6 months to a year /one to two years /over two years 
SECTION 3 
Public Self-Consciousness 
Please select the response that best describes you 
1 (not at all true of me) 7(absolutely true of me) 
1.1 worry about what people think of me. 
2.1 want to amount to something special in others' eyes. 
3.1 feel threatened easily. 
4.1 need reassurance. 
5.1 need the approval of others. 
6.1 am easily intimidated. 
7.1 am not concerned with making a good impression 
8.1 feel comfortable with myself. 
9.1 am not easily bothered by things. 
10.1 am not embarrassed easily. 
11.1 seldom feel blue. 
12.1 don't worry about things that have already happened. 
Private Self-Consciousness 
Please select the response that best describes you. 
1 (not at all true of me) 7(absolutely true of me) 
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1.1 am constantly reflecting about myself. 
2.1 examine my motives constantly 
3.1 look for hidden meaning in things. 
4.1 try to examine myself objectively. 
5.1 spend time reflecting on things. 
6.1 like to get lost in thought. 
7.1 don't try to figure myself out. 
8 I rarely look for a deeper meaning in things. 
9 1 seldom daydream 
10.1 seldom get lost in thought. 
Self-Disclosure 
Please indicate the response that best describes you. 
l(not at all true of me) 2 3 4 5 6 7(absolutely true of me) 
I am open about my feelings 
1 am open about myself to others. 
I disclose my intimate thoughts. 
I show my feelings. 
1 talk about my worries. 
I am willing to talk about myself. 
I don't talk a lot. 
I reveal little about myself. 
I bottle up my feelings. 
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I have little to say 
I say little. 
I am hard to get to know. 
I keep thoughts to myself. 
BIG FIVE: short version (TIPI) from Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number 
next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one targetistic 
applies more strongly than the other. 
1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = Disagree moderately, 3 = Disagree a little, 4 = Neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 = Agree a little, 6 = Agree moderately, 7 = Agree strongly 
I see myself as: 
1. Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
2. Critical, quarrelsome. 
3. Dependable, self-disciplined. 
4. Anxious, easily upset. 
5. Open to new experiences, complex. 
6. Reserved, quiet. 
7. Sympathetic, warm. 
8. Disorganized, careless. 
9. Calm, emotionally stable. 
10. Conventional, uncreative. 
Internet Security Concerns and Behaviours 
1. Please rate how concerned you are about each item when online. 
1 (not at all concerned) 7 (very concerned) 
Viruses 
Spam 
Spyware 
Hackers 
Unauthorized access to personal information 
Security 
Identity theft 
"Online stalkers" 
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2 For each of the following, please indicate the degree to which you have used that 
strategy to protect your privacy online. 
1 (not at all true of me) 7 (very true of me) 
Enabled Firewalls 
Installed Antivirus software 
Been extra careful about the kinds of information you submit online 
Used a nickname, fake name, or false information pertaining to your true identity 
Enabled strict privacy settings when using personal websites 
Changed passwords frequently or used a strongly encrypted password 
Enabled parental controls over Internet use 
Password protected your computer log-in 
Installed spyware or malware 
Online Privacy Attitudes Scale 
For each of the following questions, please indicate the response that best describes you. 
1. Online sites seeking information should disclose the way the data is collected, processed and 
used. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
2. A good online privacy policy should have wording that is clear and easy to understand 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
3. It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how my personal 
information will be used. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
4. Online sites should not use personal information for any purpose unless it has been authorized 
by the individuals who provided the information. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
5. When people give personal information to an online site for a specific reason, the site should 
never use the information for any other reason. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
6. Online websites should never sell the personal information in their databases to other parties. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
7. Online websites should never share personal information with other companies unless it has 
been authorized by the individuals who provided the information. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
8. All things considered, the internet is capable of causing serious privacy problems. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
9.Compared to others I know, 1 am more sensitive about the way online websites handle my 
personal information. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
10. To me, it is very important to maintain my privacy from online websites. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
11.1 believe other people are too concerned with online privacy issues. 
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1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
12. Compared with other things on my mind or other aspects of my life, personal privacy is very 
important to me. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
13.1 am concerned about threats to my personal privacy nowadays. 
1 (strongly disagree) 7 (strongly agree) 
14. In general, how experienced are you with using the Internet? 
1 (not at all experienced) 7 (very experienced) 
15. How frequently have you personally been the victim of what you felt was an invasion of 
your privacy? 
1 (not at all frequently) 7 (very frequently) 
16. How much have you heard or read during the last year about misuse of information collected 
on the internet? 
1 (not at all frequently) 7 (very frequently) 
Online Privacy Behaviours Scale 
Please select the most appropriate response. 
1( never) 7 (all the time) 
1. How often do you shred/burn your personal documents when you are disposing 
of them? 
2. How often do you hide your bank account card PIN number when using cash 
machines or making purchases? 
3. How often do you only register for websites that have a privacy policy? 
4. How often do you read a website's privacy policy before you register/disclose 
your information? 
5. How often do you look for a privacy certification on a website before you 
register/disclose your information? 
6. How often do you read website license agreements/policies fully before you 
agree to them? 
7. How often do you watch for ways to control what people send you online (such 
as check boxes that allow you to opt-in or opt-out of certain offers)? 
8. How often do you remove cookies? 
9. How often do you use a pop-up window blocker? 
10. How often do you check your computer for spy ware? 
11. How often do you clear your browser history? 
12. How often do you block messages/emails from someone you do not want to hear 
from? 
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SECTION 4 
The Virtual Other 
When you post personally revealing information in your profile, who are you thinking 
about? 
1 (not at all true of me) 7 (absolutely true of 
me) 
Myself 
No one in particular 
Friends 
Family 
Business associates 
Employer 
Romantic Partners 
Instructors 
Acquaintances 
Ex-Romantic Partners 
Strangers (whoever comes across it) 
Anyone 
BEDR Version 6 -Form 40A 
Instructions Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate 
how true it is. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not true somewhat true very true 
l.My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
3.1 don't care to know what other people really think of me. 
4.1 have not always been honest with myself. 
5.1 always know why I like things. 
6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
8.1 am not a safe driver when 1 exceed the speed limit. 
9.1 am fully in control of my own fate. 
10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
11.1 never regret my decisions. 
12.1 sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough. 
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
14.My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
15.1 am a completely rational person. 
16.1 rarely appreciate criticism. 
17.1 am very confident of my judgments 
18.1 have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
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19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
20.1 don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
21.1 sometimes tell lies if 1 have to. 
22.1 never cover up my mistakes 
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
24.1 never swear. 
25.1 sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
26.1 always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught. 
27.1 have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
29.1 have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
30 1 always declare everything at customs. 
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
32.1 have never dropped litter on the street. 
33.1 sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
34.1 never read sexy books or magazines. 
35.1 have done things that I don't tell other people about. 
36.1 never take things that don't belong to me. 
37.1 have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick. 
38.1 have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
39.1 have some pretty awful habits. 
40.1 don't gossip about other people's business. 
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Appendix H: Consent Form 
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY 
CONSENT LETTER 
Research Investigators 
Dr Eileen Wood (PhD), Faculty, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 
Amanda Nosko, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 
Miranda Kenney, Undergraduate student, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to learn more about people's 
perceptions of technology and the self 
INFORMATION You will be asked to fill out an 18 scale online survey from a lab computer on campus. In 
particular, you will answer questions about your self views, and about technology This session takes about 45 minutes 
You will also be asked to read a brief statement, and then will be provided with a booklet containing another person's 
personal information (e.g., job application, CV, personal photos, and personal story) We will ask you to create a Facebook 
profile for this person using the information provided. The profile will be constructed either online (in Facebook) or m a 
paper-and-pencil version of Facebook. Although the study cannot be fully explained at this time, full details will be 
disclosed following the conclusion of the study Approximately 240 students will participate in this study. This research is 
being conducted by R Eileen Wood, Amanda Nosko and Miranda Kenney as part of an ongoing research program and as 
part of the research projects for these students. 
RISKS The risks for this study are minimal. While you complete these questions about your perceptions of self 
and technology, you may experience a range of emotions, some of them possibly unpleasant Remember, you can withdraw 
from the study at any time without penalty. We emphasize that you are free to omit a response to any question you prefer 
not to answer If answering some of the questions about yourself makes you feel anxious or concerned even after the study, 
please be aware that Wilfrid Laurier University offers confidential counseling services to its students. An appointment with 
Counseling Services can be made either by calling (519) 884-0710 extension 2338, email 22couns(g),wlu ca or by dropping 
by their office, located in the Student Services building, across from Health Services. You may also contact Dr Eileen 
Wood at ewood@wlu ca or (519) 884-0710 ext 3738, or at room N2074D in the Science Building, or Amanda Nosko at 
nosk2123@wlu.ca or (519) 884-0710 ext 2303 or at room N2050 in the Science Building 
BENEFITS Participating m this study will give you an opportunity to experience psychological research first-
hand Your responses will also help researchers understand how people think about themselves and technology. 
CONFIDENTIALITY Your data will be confidential and anonymous; meaning that no one but the researchers (Dr 
Eileen Wood, Amanda Nosko, Miranda Kenney, Linzi Williamson, Vanessa Buote, and Amy Grant) will see your 
responses and will have access to the data and that the information you complete will not have your name or other 
identifying information on it. Please note, however, that while in transmission on the internet, your survey responses may 
not be entirely secure, however, the information you provide cannot be traced back to you. All of the electronic data 
collected will be stored on a password protected computer in a locked lab in the Science building No identifying 
information will be present in the data, therefore ensuring complete anonymity of response Given the nature of the survey 
tool we are using, all entered data will be stored and automatically added to a data file and because the information you 
provide will be anonymous, it is important for you to withdraw participation before entering any answers if you do not wish 
your answers to be included m this study. The data will be kept for approximately 8 years. All paper data (including consent 
forms and data) will be stored by the researchers in a locked cabinet in a locked lab in the Science Building After 8 years, 
the paper data will be shredded and carefully disposed of by the principal researcher 
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COMPENSATION For participating in this study you will receive 2 credits Other ways to earn credit is the 
completion of a journal article review. Details can be found in the Psychology main office (N2006, second floor, Science 
Building) If you withdraw from the study prior to its completion, you will receive the full amount of credit 
CONTACT If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience adverse effects 
as a result of participating in this study) you may contact the researcher, Dr. Eileen Wood at ewood@wlu.ca or (519) 884-
0710 ext.3738, or at room N2074D in the Science Building, or Amanda Nosko at nosk2123@wlu.ca or (519) 884-0710 
ext.2303 or at room N2050 in the Science Building This project has been reviewed and approved by the University 
Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in 
this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact 
Dr Bill Marr, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, (519) 884-0710, extension 2468 or 
email at bmarr@wlu.ca. 
PART1CIPATION Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If 
you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and without loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to omit any question(s)/procedure(s) you choose 
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION Results of this research may be published at conferences or in journal articles 
Results will be reported only in terms of aggregated group scores The results of this study will also be posted on the Study 
feedback board opposite of N2006 (Psychology Main Office) on October 30, 2009 
CONSENT By signing this form you indicate that you have read and understand the above information, and agree 
to participate in this study. 
Name (please print your full name)-
Signature 
Date 
Researcher initials 
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Appendix I: Debriefing Letter 
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY 
DEBRIEFING LETTER 
Research Investigators-
Dr. Eileen Wood (PhD), Faculty, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 
Amanda Nosko, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 
Miranda Kenney, Undergraduate student, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 
Thank you for taking part in this study! Your participation is sincerely appreciated, and we hope that you have 
found your experience to be interesting. The current study was three fold. 
The first line of investigation looked at a variety of issues, including privacy attitudes and behaviours both in 
online and offline settings, self-disclosure, familiarity and comfort with technology, Facebook usage and privacy settings, 
and the "virtual other" (who it is that you are thinking about when posting things on Facebook) 
Second, this study examined how the wording of a privacy policy impacted on what people were willing to 
disclose in a Facebook profile for another person. More specifically, we were interested in seeing whether a personalized 
privacy statement depicting an actual invasion of privacy would result in lower levels of information disclosed when 
compared to the commonly used privacy statements like those seen on the Facebook website In a third control condition, 
participants read a statement outlining the history of the internet. 
Third, we wanted to know more about how the methodology impacts on the content of a profile, that is, whether 
the profile was completed onlme in an actual Facebook profile or on a comparable paper-and-pencil version, impacted on 
disclosure of information. In this case, we asked you to fill out a profile for either Michael or Sarah We told you that they 
were actual people who had submitted their information to us, but in reality, we generated all of the information about these 
people. This concealment was necessary so as to encourage you to carefully consider what this person might want or not 
want in a personal profile. If we had told you that these people did not actually exist and that all of the information was 
generated, you may not have been as inclined to seriously consider the ramifications of the choices you were making while 
constructing the profile. 
This study will help us to better understand how people are using online social communication websites, and to 
link various factors to one another. In addition, this study could inform policy makers on ways to more effectively tailor the 
wording of their policies to reach as many of their users as possible, and in the most effective way Furthermore, very little 
is known about how people are using Facebook, and what factors are related to their perceptions of privacy and actual 
employment of privacy settings, and so this study will help answer some of these questions. 
If you would like to learn more about self-disclosure online, please refer to the following paper: 
Joinson, A.N., Paine, C , Buchanan, T., & Reips, U.D. (2008). Measuring self-disclosure online Blurring and non-response 
to sensitive items in web-based surveys. Computers in Human Behaviour, 24, 2158-2171. 
Answering some of the questions about your privacy in general and online may possibly have made you feel 
anxious or concerned. Wilfrid Laurier University offers confidential counseling services to its students. An appointment 
with Counseling Services can be made either by calling (519) 884-0710 extension 2338, email 22couns@wlu.ca or by 
dropping by their office, located in the Student Services building, across from Health Services. You may also contact Dr. 
Eileen Wood at ewood@wlu ca or (519) 884-0710 ext.3738, or at room N2074D in the Science Building, or Amanda 
Nosko at nosk2l23@wlu.ca or (519) 884-0710 ext.2303 or at room N2050 in the Science Building. This project has been 
reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. If you feel you have not been treated 
according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of 
this project, you may contact Dr. Bill Marr, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, (519) 
884-0710, extension 2468 or email at bmarr@wlu.ca. 
For feedback about the results of the study, please check the study feedback board opposite of N2006 Study 
results will be posted as soon as they are available, by October 30, 2009. Thank you again for your participation1 
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